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FIRST APPENDIX

TO THE

DICTIONARY OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS

USED IN THE

SCIENCES OF THE MUSSALMANS,

CONTAINING

THE LOGIC OF THE ARABIANS,

IN THE

ORIGINAL ARABIC, WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY

A. SPRENGER, M. D., SECRETARY ASIATIC SOCIETY, BENGAL.

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PREFACE OF THE TRANSLATOR.

EVER since the sixth century of the Hijrah, the Mussalmans abandoned the path of observation and of the acquisition of new facts altogether, and considered all sciences merely as dialectic exercises. It was therefore found expedient that, the first of the compendia, which are to form the Appendix of the Dictionary of technical terms, should be a Treatise on Logic.

The Risálah Shamsyyah having, during six hundred years, been the principal text book on Logic in all Mohammadun schools, appeared to have the best claims to represent the Logic of the Mussalmans. It is therefore here published with an English translation.

Regarding the author of this treatise, I translate a passage from the Nafáyis al-Mâthir (see my Catalogue of the Oudh Libraries, I. p. 46). It is said in the biography of Amyr Kolong, "Mawláná Najm adyn Kátiby Qazwyny was a profound philosopher and a pupil of Athyr adyn Abhary. He is the author of commentaries on the Talakhkhuç, on the Mohacçal and on the Hikmat al'ayn and of the Risálah Shamsyyah and the Jámiy' aldaqáyiq. He died on Friday the 3rd of Rajab 675, (11 December 1272.)" Hájy Khalyfah says, that he was a pupil of Nacyr aldyn Túsy, and No. 7667 he places his death in 693, but he gives the correct date under No. 4586.

There is another treatise called Sollam, which is very celebrated in India, and which is considered as the acme of acuteness and conciseness. It has been added in Arabic, with a short biography of the author, but without translation, to enable the Arabic reader to exercise his acumen on it.

The translation is literal. Technical terms of the Arabic language have been rendered by such English words as appeared to the translator by etymology and usage to express most nearly their meaning, and the same representative is used in the translation throughout for the same term of the original; for instance, English Logicians in speaking of nouns use "singular" and "common" very nearly in the same sense as they use in speaking of propositions "particular" and "universal." The Arabs use the same terms in both instances, and as juzyy is derived from juz "part" and kullyy from kull "all" "universe;" the translator has, wherever the word juzyy occurred, rendered it by "particular," and wherever the word kullyy occurred, by "universal;" and so in other instances, placing where required the word which an English Logician might have employed between brackets. Explanatory additions are placed between parentheses. Both the paragraphs and notes have been numbered in order to facilitate reference."

The right way of studying Arabic Logic would be to take the Arabic translations of Aristotle's organon and by comparing them with the Greek text to ascertain the original import of the terms, and then to observe how their meaning has been changed in the progress of time. Such a labour can only be undertaken at Paris or in the Escurial; no translation of Aristotle's works is to be found in Indian libraries.

It was the intention of the translator to consult, whilst he was engaged with his works, as many Arabic books on Logic as he might have access to, and to point out in notes their differences with a view of throwing light on the history of Logic among the Arabs. But he had hardly commenced his task when he was compelled by ill-health to apply for leave to Syria, and he had to make up his mind either to publish his translation in an imperfect form or to suppress it altogether. Luckily he found a man, who has a most intimate knowledge of Logic, and who was good enough to go over the translation with him. This man is the Revd. W. Kay, Principal of Bishop's College. He has corrected a great many mistakes not only in the language but also in the sense, for his skill in logical reasoning enabled him in most instances to discover errors at first sight. To him the translator is under great obligations.

The translator was obliged, owing to his departure from Calcutta, to leave the correction of the greater part of the original text to his friends Mawlawies Mohammad Wajyh and 'Abd al-Haqq. No men are better able to furnish a good text than they, particularly as there are several good editions with commentaries extant, of these two treatises.

Calcutta, 1st ∠1pril, 1854.

THE LOGIC OF THE ARABIANS.

1. Praise be to God, who has created the system of the universe, who has produced the essences of things in conformity with their existence, who has made by His omnipotence the different species of mental substances (i. e. logoi or demiurgs), and who, in His bounty, has given motion to the heavenly bodies.

Blessings be upon those noble and holy essences (inspired persons) who are pure from human defilement, more particularly upon Mohammad, the doer of signs and miracles, and upon his family and his companions who followed him [and thereby became] his argument and demonstration.

2. Whereas, agreeably to the opinion of all men of mind and liberal education, the sciences, more particularly the positive sciences, are the highest pursuits in life, and whereas the professors thereof are the most noble among human beings, their minds being sooner prepared to be absorbed into the angelic minds (that is to say, the demiurgs or logoi), and further, whereas it is impossible to comprehend the subtilties of sciences and to preserve the aeme of their verities except by the assistance of the science which is called Logic, and which teaches us how to discern between what is correct and erroneous, Shams aldyn Mohammad, a son of the Wazyr Bahâ aldyn Mohammad, has desired me to write a book, which shall comprize the principles of Logic, and contain its fundamental doctrines and rules. Ready to follow his directions, I began to write a book on Logic, making it a rule not to omit any thing that belongs to it. I made some beautiful original additions and acute observations, avoided mere compilation and followed plain truths, which will never be controverted. I gave it the name of Risálah Shamsyyah on the Principles of Logic, and divided it into an Introduction, three Books and a Conclusion. My reliance is in God.

INTRODUCTION.

It contains two inquiries:

FIRST INQUIRY.

On what Logic is and its utility.

3. Knowledge is either apprehension, and nothing further or apprehension together with judgment. Apprehension is the perception of the image of a thing in the mind. Judgment means referring (literally leaning) one thing to another

affirmatively or negatively. The whole [apprehension and a judgment combined] is called declaration.

- 1. Taçawwur, "apprehension" is a verbal noun derived from çûrat "image." Simple apprehension is called taçawwur sadzij سادة. The latter word is derived from the Persian عادة plain.
- 2. الشيع" is one of the most general terms in the language and includes both the res and con-
- 3. 'aql "mind" is sometimes defined as "a substance free from matter in its essence and in its operations." It answers to the Greek word logos and is also used like logos for demiurg: in that case it is rendered by logos in this translation as in § 30, 31, but for the adjective 'aqly invariably "mental" is used. More on this subject in philosophy. The commentator uses also the expressions "apprehension in the soul" تصور في النفي and "images in the intellect" مور في النفي النفين as synonymous with apprehension in the mind. There occurs also التصور النفينية intellective apprehension." Soul is defined as a substance free from matter in its essence (in itself) but not in its actions; and intellect is defined as the faculty, made for the acquisition (perception) of limits (definitions, i. e. apprehensions) and views (judgments).
- 4. Tagdyq "declaration" is the verbal nonn of the causative form of gadiq "true" and means to declare that a thing is true, assertion. It is used in phrases like this "the assertion that negative and affirmative cannot be united" "the assertion that the world is not eternal." The verb of this root is used for to "be predicated" to "be applicable." Arabic Logicians also use Kádzib "false" to express "not predicated." If we say Mohammad is a prophet, and he is not a poet, it is as much as to say the being a prophet is true of Mohammad and the being a poet is not true of him. As the terms seem to be well chosen they are rendered literally in this translation.
- 5. The Commentator says 'to lean a thing on another' is to pronounce that the relation takes place between them or that it does not take place. If we say homo est scribens, we pronounce that the relation takes place between homo and scribens. The commentator enters into some metaphysical details, he says we must in this instance first perceive man then the notion of scribens, then the relation that "writing" can be affirmed of man and then whether that relation is taking place or not. The relation of the two terms is called judicial relation as "Zayd's wife,") and the affirmation that it is taking place is called judgment wowords in the status constructus as "Zayd's wife,") and the affirmation that it is taking place is called judgment to doubt or supposition we perceive the judicial relation without arriving at a judgment. But we cannot arrive at a declaration without judgment. Modern philosophers are of opinion that judgment is not a perception but an act of the intellect. In perception the mind is passive, whereas in judgment it is active. If judgment is a perception, a declaration consists of four perceptions as detailed above, else it contains three. But according to Arabic metaphysicians a declaration is the same as judgment and nothing further. Hand Allah considers the separation of apprehension and judgment as artificial and contends that declaration is usually one act of the mind—complex apprehension.
- 4. Neither is the whole of either of these two things entirely intuitive, else there would be nothing we do not know; nor entirely deductive, else our reasoning would be a circle, or an [interminable] chain.
- 6. Natzary "deductive" from natzar "to inspect to consider" is used in opposition to badyly intuitive (literally sudden) and also to practical. Thus medicine is divided into deductive (i. c. theoretical) and practical unitary. Instead of natzary the word kisby "acquired" and instead of badyly the term dhorury "necessary" axiomatic are also used?
- 5. Part of each is intuitive, and part is deductive, and the result of reasoning, i. e. of such an arrangement of known things [in the mind] that they lead to [the knowledge of] unknown things. But this arrangement is not always correct, for some thinkers contradict others as regards the results of their reasonings, nay the same person contradicts himself at different times; therefore a canon (a code of rules) is required, acquainting us with the ways of deriving deductive knowledge from self-

evident [knowledge], and marking the boundaries between sound and bad reasoning. This canon is Logic. It is described as the canonic organon, (i. e. an instrument consisting of rules), the observance of which guards our intellect from error in reasoning.

Logic is neither entirely intuitive, else there would be no need for learning it, nor is it entirely deductive, else it would be a circle or [interminable] chain, but some [of its doctrines] are intuitive and others are deductive, and founded upon the intuitive ones.

SECOND INQUIRY.

On the Subject of Logic.

- 6. The subjects of a Science are those of its accidents which are inquired into, whether they belong to it immediately, that is to say, belong to its essence, or whether they belong to its parts or whether they belong to it [mediately, but are] co-extensive. The subjects of Logic are apprehensional and declarative notions, for the Logician inquires into them so far as they lead to unknown apprehensional or declarative [notions], and in so far as there rests upon them that which leads to apprehension; he inquires, for instance, whether [such apprehensions as lead to other apprehensions] are universals, particulars, essentials, accidents, genera, species, or differences—and in so far as there rests upon them that which leads to declaration (assertion) whether it rests upon them proximately—they (the declarations which lead to other declarations) being, for instance, propositions or conversions of propositions, or contradictories of propositions; or remotely—they being, for instance, subjects and predicates.
- 7. It will be observed that the use of the term accident differs widely from the use in western logic, the commentator says, accidents are of six kinds, for the accident of a thing either belongs to its essence (to the thing itself) or to a part of it, or it belongs to some property of the thing which is not included in its quiddity. As to the accident of a property it may either be co-extensive, ومساري (i. c. it may be a mediate accident of all the individua under that species as risible in reference to man, it being the effect of joy and common to all men,) or it may be more peculiar leaves of the essence of the essence, and the co-extensive mediate accidents, viz. the accident of the essence, the accident of a part of the essence, and the co-extensive mediate accident accident) are called essential accidents اعراض العارض العار
- 7. It is usual to call that which leads to apprehension oratio explicans [or mo'arrif "definiens"]; and that which leads to declaration, argument. It behaves us to premit the former to the latter in our system, because apprehension precedes declaration in nature, inasmuch as every declaration must contain [firstly] the apprehension of the subject itself, or of an assertion regarding it; and [secondly either the apprehension itself of the thing] whereby the judgment is formed,

(predicate), or an assertion regarding it; and [thirdly] the judgment, for judgment is impossible if one of these (three) things [subject or predicate or judgment] is unknown.

- 8. Hojjat "argument" is derived from a root which means to contend.—The author of the coghrà takes dalyl' demonstration" and hojjat as synonymous.
- 9. Qawl "oratio" is used to denote an expression which consists in most cases of more than one word, but it is not necessarily a sentence, thus "rational animal" is a qawl.
- 10. It will be observed that judgment is used in the text in the two different meanings which are explained in note 5. The commentator says "judgment is one of those words which have two meanings, one is the affirmative or negative relation, apprehended between two things, and the second is the decision that that relation is taking place or is not taking place." He continues to say that the author of the text uses the word in the second meaning where he says "judgment is impossible".

FIRST BOOK.

It contains three Sections:

FIRST SECTION.

On Words.

- 8. That a word is the indication of a meaning (idea), by reason of [its] appointment for it (so as to represent that idea), is [called] coincidence, as, for instance, that "homo" is the indication of (is used to express the idea of) "rational animal." [That a word is the indication of an idea] by reason of its appointment for that in which it (the idea) is included is [called] implication, as for instance, that "homo" is an indication of an animal. [That a word is the indication of an idea] by reason of its appointment for that to which it (the idea) is external is [called] nexus; for instance, that "homo" is an indication of "capable of instruction" and of "acquiring the art of writing."
- 11. The word معنى "meaning" which has in common use the same signification as in English, is explained by the Commentator p. 93: المعاني هي الصور الذهنية من حيث انها وضع بازايها الالفاظ "The images in our intellect in reference to the words which have been appointed to represent them are called meanings."

9. It is necessary in the indication per nexum that the external thing be in such a condition that the apprehension thereof adhere in the intellect

to the apprehension of the thing named, if this be not the case the word will not convey the meaning thereof. But it is not necessary that it be in such a condition that its actual existence be connected with the actual existence of the thing named. For instance the word "blind" is (per nexum) the indication of sight, yet these two things are not connected in their actual existence.

- 10. Coincidence does not (always) comprize implication, as, for instance, in indivisibles (i. e. things the quiddity of which is not composed of parts see notes 18, 19 and 27) and it may or may not comprize nexus; this is uncertain, for it is not known whether there exists an adherens (inseparable property) of every essence, the apprehension of which is connected with the apprehension of that essence. [The opinion of Imám Rázy] that the apprehension of every essence comprizes [per nexum at least if nothing else,] the apprehension that it is [that essence and] no other, is not admissible. From this it is clear that implication does not comprize nexus, they, in fact, are (only) found along with coincidence, for the sequens cannot possibly exist as sequens without something of which it is the sequens.
- 12. The Commentator observes, that the text ought to run ومن هذا عدم تبين استلزام التضمن الالتزام Hence it is not clear whether implication comprizes nexus."
- 11. If any part of the (term which is) indicans by coincidence, is intended to indicate a part of the total meaning, it (the term) is [called] complex, as a thrower of stones, else it is [called] simple. If the simple word is not by itself fit to be a predicable, it is [called] a tool (syncategorematic), as "in" and "not," and if it is fit to be a predicable, and indicates by its form one of the three times, it is a verb, else it is a noun.
- 13. The Commentator shows that in an expression like 'abd Allah, if used as a proper name is not a complex term.
- 14. Tool is the instrument with the help of which a thing is made and not the matter out of which it is made, the term is therefore very appropriate for a syncategorematic. In Grammar particles are called مرزف "letters" and a verb is called "action." The reason of a double terminology is that grammar was worked out by the Arabs independently, whereas they took Logic from the Greeks, and these two Sciences were cultivated by the same class of men long after their terminology had been fixed.
- 15. The Commentator observes that the words "by its form" are used in the text with a view of excluding words whose substance indicates a time as "yesterday."
- 12. A noun has either one meaning or more than one. In the first case if it individuates that meaning it is called a proper-name, else (there are two cases possible: firstly), if its conceivable (literally intellective) and real individua are [all] equally represented by it, it is called univocal (literally agreeing, consentient,) as "homo," "sun;" [secondly,] if it applies to some [of the individua] more forcibly, and in preference to others, it is called doubtful as existence in reference to the being which exists of necessity (God), and the beings of contingent existence (the creation.) In the second case, [if a noun has many meanings] it may be, by appointment, equally applicable to those several meanings, like spring [the spring of a clock, a spring of water],—in this case it is called equivocal: or it may have been appointed for one meaning and then have been transferred to a second. If the original meaning has become obsolete the noun is called a transferred word, it depends whether it has been transferred by common usage

[as the word "omnibus"] or as a law term, or as a term of science; in the first case it is called "a conventionally transferred (word)," in the second "a juristically transferred (word)," and in the third "a technically transferred (word)." If a word has not quitted its original subject (lost its original meaning), it is called, in relation to it, proper, and in relation (to the signification) to which it has been transferred, trop. Example, lion, in reference to the animal of that name and in reference to a brave man.

- 18. A word is in reference to another word synonymous (literally riding on the same camel, one behind the other,) with it if they agree in meaning, and heteronymous (literally distinct) if they differ in meaning.
- 14. A compound (oratio) is either complete, that is to say, it has a sense by itself (literally, silence after it is admissible) or incomplete. If a complete compound predicates something true or false, it is called information or proposition, and if it does not predicate any thing it is called interjection. If an interjection has by appointment the meaning of a request that a thing be done, and if (it be uttered) with an authoritative voice, it is an order (or an imperative) as, beat thou! if (it be uttered) in a humble voice it is a question or prayer, and if in a middling voice, a request. If it has not the meaning of a request that a thing be done, it is a warning (exclamation) expressive of whining, or weeping, or wondering, or exclaiming, or swearing. If a compound is not complete, it is either a limitation as "rational animal," or it is not a limitation, as if it consist of a noun and a tool, or of a verb and a tool (adverb).


SECOND SECTION.

On Simple Meanings (Predicables).

- 15. A notion is particular (singular) if the apprehension thereof of itself excludes the taking place of association, and it is universal (common), if it does not exclude association. The terms indicating these two things are called particular and universal respectively.
- 16. Mafhum "notion" means literally comprehensum, it is therefore the exact equivalent of comprehension as used in western Logic.
- 17. The reason why the author defines "particular" by an apprehension the idea of which excludes plurality, is that terms like "sun" may not be put down as particular.
- 18. The Commentator observes in reference to the terms "particular" and "universal" "Universal is generally a part of the particular, thus [the notion of] homo is a part of Zayd, in like manner animal is a part of homo and body is a part of animal. The particular is therefore a whole the universal a part of "..."
- 16. An universal [notion] is either the whole of the quiddity of the particulars under it, or is included in it (i. e. is part of it), or is external, [but joined] to it. The first is called species, whether it contains many individua [or only one, in the former case] it is said in answer to [the question], "what is it?" in regard both to association and peculiarity as homo, [in the latter case] if it does not contain several individua it is said in answer to [the question] "what is it," in regard to its peculiarity only, as "sun." Species is therefore an universal, which is

said of one or several things which agree in their verities in answer to [the question] "what is it."

- 19. Mahyyat "quiddity" is derived from ma quid or from ma howa quid set Acc. English logicians, use "essence" to express milhyyat. But in Arabic there are two other words which have nearly the same meaning, viz. dant and haqqqat and as for each of these three words a representative was to be chosen in English it was found convenient to use essence as the representative for datt. Haqqqat is rendered by verity (see note 21). The word manyyat is the most definite, being the contents of the veritable species, thus rational, living, bodily substance endowed with voluntary locomotion are the parts which constitute the mahyyat of Zayd, Baki, ac., Joriány, p. 205, defines máhyyat "the quiddity of a thing is that by which the thing is what it is (i. e. its ipseity). Of quiddity in itself it can neither be said that it exists or does not exist, nor that it is an universal or particular, nor that it is general or peculiar." The same author, p. 99, gives the same definition of Aaqyqat as of mahyyat and then he adds "the verity of a thing is that by which the thing is what it is in reference to its verification (or existence, i. e. we take an actually existing thing, e. g. a straight line on paper and ascertain its properties). Ipscity and quiddity has the same meaning in reference to its individuality : and quiddity has the same meaning without any reference." On the whole the sense of verity seems to be more vague than that of quiddity, and hence it is a favorite term of mystical philosophers. Dzit means "self" "essence," and dzaty "essential." It will be observed from note 22 that it is sometimes used in a less extensive meaning than quiddity, but generally it has a more extensive meaning. Jorjány says in p. 112 "the essence of a thing is the self of a thing and it consequently comprehends its [inseparable] properties. The essential [part] of a thing is that what peculiarizes it and distinguishes it from every thing else."
- 20. The Commentator blames the author for giving separate definitions for species, in case there is only one individuum under it, as "sun," and in case there are many individua, and says that in doing so he has wandered beyond the limits of Logic.
- 21. Haquyiq "verities" is the plural of haqyqat, and is derived from haqq "rerum" (germanicé das Wahre) this word is the opposite of bútil "vanum." The word might have been translated by characteristics, but thereby would have been obliterated the affinity of this idea to tahaqquq "to verify," "to ascertain," to motahaqqaq "ascertained" to haqq "verum," and to haqqqy "veritable" which are all of very frequent occurrence.
- 17. In the second case [if the universal is part of the quiddity it must be one of two things, either a genus of the quiddity or its difference], it is called a genus if the universal is the totality of that part [of the quiddity] which is common to the quiddity and to another species. It is said in answer to [the question] "what is it?" in regard to association only. Genus is described as a universal, which is said of many things differing in their verities, in answer to [the question] "what is it."
- 22. The name for a universal which comprehends part of the quiddity is "essential universal." It is defined in the Ysúgújy مفهومه حزيات مفهومه الناتي هو الذي يدخل عمل الناتي هو الذي يدخل عمل "A universal is called essential if it is included in the verity of the particulars to which it applies." The universal which is external to the quiddity is called الكلي العرضي "accidental universal" or accident and property. I give here a table of the Universals.



18. The genus is called near, if the answer [to the question] regarding a [given] quiddity and regarding certain [other species] which are associated with it under that genus is the immediate answer regarding that quiddity, and regarding all [the species] which are associated with the said quiddity, under the same genus, as animal in reference to man.

The genus is called remote, if the answer [to the question] regarding the quiddity and regarding certain [other species] which are associated with it under that genus, is different from the answer regarding the quiddity, and those other [species mentioned above as coming under the near genus]. If the genus is remote by one degree, two answers can be given, as living being in reference to man; and if it is remote by two degrees, three answers can be given, as body in reference to man; and if it is remote by three degrees, four answers can be given, as substance in reference to man, &c.

23. Man, horse, tree and quartz can all be brought under the same denomination or genus "body (matter);" man, horse and tree can be brought under the denomination of "living body"; and man and horse can be brought under the denomination of "animal." Now if you ask

What is man?
What is quartz?
Answer "body."

but horse and tree participate at least as much in the quiddity of man as quartz, and if you ask

What is man?
What is man?
What is man?
What is man?
The answer is "organised body."

- 19. If it (the universal notion) is not (or does not comprehend) the totality of · that part [of the quiddity], which is common to it (the quiddity) and to another species [i. e. if it is not a genus, one of two things must be the case]; either it cannot be common [to both] at all [being peculiar to the quiddity as rational is according to the Arabs to man] or it [is only] a portion of the part which is common to both; although co-extensive therewith. Else (if it were more extensive it would follow that) it must be common to the quiddity and to some other species [not included in the genus] but, agreeably to the above supposition, it must, in reference to such other species, not comprehend the whole part which may be common [to the quiddity and that species], but only a portion of it [and so by assuming that the notion is part of the quiddity of another species we should only rise to a higher branch on the tree of Porphyry]. (This reasoning) does not lead to an [interminable] chain, but to something which is co-extensive with the totality of the part which is common (or genus). This [universal] consequently divides the genus, and whether it distinguish the quiddity from what is associated with it under a genus or under "existence," [which may be considered the summum genus] it is [called] difference (literally.division).
- 24. This paragraph and the commentary thereon are considered the pons asinorum of Arabic Logic. I therefore insert the words of the Commentator in the original with translation and examples between brackets.

فذلك البعض اما أن يكون مبائيناً لتمام المشترك أو اخص منه أو أعم منه أو مساوياً له لا جائز أن يكون مباساً له لا المائية المحال المعال المحال على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمولة و من المحال أن يكون المحمول على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمل المحمولة و من المحال أنه ولا الحمول على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمولة و من المحال المحمولة و من المحال المحمول على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمولة و من المحمولة و من المحال المحمولة و من المحمولة و من

بدون الخص فيلزم وجود المل بدون الجوزء و انه مجال ولا اعم الن بعض تمام المشترك بين الماهية و نوع آخر لو كان اعم من تمام المشترك لكل موجودًا في نوع آخر بدون تمام المشترك ليجوده فيهما فاما ان يكون تمام المشترك بين الماهية و ذلك النوع النوع النوع هو بازاء تمام المشترك لوجوده فيهما فاما ان يكون تمام المشترك بينها و هو محال لان المقدر ان الجوزء ليس تمام المشترك بين الماهية وبين نوع ما من الانواع و اما ان لا يكون تمام المشترك بل بعضا منه فيكون للماهية تمام المشترك احدهما تمام المشترك بين الماهية وبين النوع الذي هو بازائها و الثاني تمام المشترك بينها و بين النوع الثاني الذي هو بازالاً تمام المشترك الماهية و بين النوع الثاني أعم منه لكل موجودًا في نوع الأول و حينلذ لو كان بعض تمام المشترك بين الماهية و ذلك النوع الثاني بازاء تمام المشترك المشترك النوع الثاني و ليس تمام المشترك المناهية و ذلك النوع الثاني و المس تمام المشترك بينهما بل بعضه فيحصل تمام مشترك ثالث و هثم جرا فاما ان يوجد الثاني و ليس تمام المشترك بينهما بل بعضه فيحصل تمام مشترك ثالث و هثم جرا فاما ان يوجد منام المشتركات الى غير النهاية او ينتهى الئ بعض تمام مشترك مساو له و الأول محال و الانتركب الماهية من الماهية عم مناه المشتركات الى غير متناهية

[&]quot;This portion must either be heterogeneous from the totality of that part of the quiddity which it has in common with another species or it must be more peculiar (less extensive) or more general (more extensive) or co-extensive. It cannot be heterogeneous, for we are speaking of the predicable parts [of the totality] and it is impossible that what is predicable of a thing should be heterogeneous from it. Nor can it contain less, for the more general (or more extensive) is found where the less extensive is not found [e.g. "animal" is found in "horse" but "man" is not found in it.] It would therefore follow [from this assertion] that the whole [e. g. "animal"=a living, sensitive, corporeal substance with voluntary motion] can exist without some of its parts parts [e. g, "living" or "sensitive".] This is impossible. Nor can it be more general (or more extensive) [as "living being" in reference to "animal,"] for if a portion [e. g. voluntary motion] of the totality [e. g. "animal"] of what a quiddity [e. g. "man"] has in common with another species [e. g. "horse"] is more general than the totality ["animal"] it must also be found in another species [e.g. "tree"] in which the totality is not found, for this is the meaning of "more general." But as it is found in these two it is common to them, i. c. to the quiddity and that species which is independent of the totality (the genus of the quiddity.) It is impossible that what they (the quiddity and this other species-tree) have in common, should be the totality, for the condition is that it should be a portion and not the totality. But if it is not the totality but only a portion of it, the quiddity must have two totalities (genera) in common [with two several species] :- The totality which it has in common with the species which is independent of it (or co-ordinate with the quiddity) and the totality which it has in common with a second species, which is independent of the first named totality. And then if the portion of the totality which the quiddity has in common with a second species is more general than the totality, it must be found in a species [e. g. mineral].in which the second totality is not found, and it must be common to the quiddity and this third species which is independent of the second totality. But again it cannot be the totality of what they have in common, but it must be a portion of it, and so we come to a third totality and so on. Now either we must admit that a quiddity may have an endless number of totalities in common with other species or we must finally arrive at a portion of a totality which portion is co-extensive with the totality. The former supposition must be false, unless we assume that a quiddity consists of an endless number of parts."

^{21.} The Commentator points out that the expression [interminable] chain is not used in the text in its proper meaning.

- 20. Difference is described as a universal predicated of a thing to the question "what thing is it in its substance?" It follows that if a verity is composed of two—or several—co-extensive things, each of these two things is its difference, for it distinguishes it from those things which are associated with it in "existence."
- 22. The commentator says that "in its substance" is added to the question, lest an inseparable property might be said in answer. The difference is therefore also called "distinguens substantialis" "distinguens substantialis" (distinguens accidentalis."—Ancient Logicians, among them Avicenna in his Shifa, defined difference as an universal said of a thing in reply to the question "what thing of its genus is this in its substance."
- 21. The difference which distinguishes a species from what is associated with it in the genus, is called near (specific), provided it distinguishes it in the near genus e. g. "rational" is the difference of "man" [in the subaltern genus "animal," distinguishing it from other animals]. And it is called remote (generic) if it distinguishes a species from what is associated with it in the remote genus, e. g. "sensitive" is the difference of "man" [in the remote genus "living being"].
- 22. The third [universal is external to the quiddity but joined to it]. If it is inseparable from the essence it is called adherent (property), else it is called separable accident. The adherent adheres to the existence [of a thing], as blackness to the negro, or it adheres to the quiddity, like being even to four. The adherent is [called] evident, if the apprehension of the adherent together with the apprehension of the thing to which it adheres, is sufficient to convince the intellect of the cohesion between the two, as the divisibility of four into two equal parts; and it is [called] not-evident, if a medium is required to convince the intellect of their cohesion, as the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles. Some say that an adherent is evident, if the apprehension thereof adheres to the apprehension of the thing of which it is the adherent. The first [definition] is more general. The separable accident may either pass quickly, as the blushing of shame and flushing of anger, or slowly, like greyness of hair, [under the use of certain medicines which are supposed to have this effect], or youth.
- 23. Both the adherent and separable [accident], if they are peculiar to singulars of the same verity, are called peculiar, as risible, else they are called general accident, as locomotion. The "peculiar" is described as a universal said, as a accident, only of things of the same verity. Common accident is described as a universal, said as an accident, of singulars of the same verity and of other things also in the way of accidentality. The universals therefore are five: species, genus, difference, peculiar (accident) and common accident.
- 23. The commentator justly observes that according to the author's division of the accident the universals are seven and not five. We have the inseparable peculiar accident, the inseparable general accident which answer to "property"; and the separable peculiar and separable general which answer to the "accident" of our Logicians. Sayyid Jorjány says in the Kobrà on this subject "that universal which is external to the verity of its individua is called "Peculiar," if it is restricted to one verity. It distinguishes the verity from others by accidentality. Consequently "a Peculiar" is an universal which is said in answer to the question what thing is it in its accident? as "saible in reference to man. If [the universal] be common to two or more verities it is called general accident as "walking" which is common to animals."

THIRD SECTION.

Five Inquiries on Universals and Particulars.

FIRST INQUIRY.

24. [There are] universals, whose existence is impossible in reality, but not the conception thereof of itself, as "an equal to God." [There are universals] whose existence may be possible but they do not really exist, as "a griffon." "[Under some universals] there is only one [individual], and it is impossible that there should be another, as God; or it is possible that there be others, as the sun; or there are many but they are limited in number, as the seven planets; or they are unlimited in number, as the rational souls.

SECOND INQUIRY.

25. If we say of "animal" for instance, that it is a universal, three things are to be observed. Animal is to be considered in itself, and as a universal, and as the compound of these two things. The first is called a physical universal, the second a logical universal, and the third a mental (metaphysical) universal. The physical universal is existing in reality, for it (animality) is a part of every animal which exists, and a part of what exists has [of course] existence. In regard to the other two universals, opinions are divided as to their existence in reality. The inquiry on this subject does not belong to logic.

THIRD INQUIRY.

- 26. Universals are co-extensive, if one is true of just as much (i. e. of as many individuals) as the other, as "homo" and "rational." There is absolute generality and peculiarity between them (i. e. one is more extensive than the other and contains it wholly), if one of the two, is true of all of which the other is true, but not vice versa; as "animal" and "man." There is generality and peculiarity between them in some respect if either is true only of a part of that of which the other is true; as man and white. And they are heterogeneous if neither of the two is true of any thing of which the other is true; as man and horse.
- 27. The contradictories of two co-extensive [terms] are co-extensive; for else one of them (contradictories) would be true of that about which the other is false, and it would follow that one of the two co-extensive [terms] is true of that about which the other is false—this is impossible. [E. g. every non-man is an irrational being and every irrational being is a non-man.] The contradictory of an absolutely more general [term] is more peculiar than the contradictory of an absolutely more peculiar [term,] for the contradictory of the more peculiar [term] is true of every thing of what the contradictory of the more general term is true, but not vice versa, [non-man contains more than non-animal]. Were the first [of these two assertions] not founded, the peculiar [term] itself [i. e. not its contradictory; man e. g.,] would be true of some things of which the contradictory of the more general [term e. g. non-animal] is true, and

hence it would follow that the more peculiar is true [of certain things] and that the more general is not true [of the same things]—this is impossible. As to the second [assertion viz., that the contradictory of a more general term contains less than the contradictory of a more peculiar term], were it unfounded the contradictory of the more general verm] would be true of every thing of which the contradictory of the more peculiar [term] is true, and hence it would follow that the more peculiar [term] is true of every thing of which the more general is true—this is impossible. There is no generality whatever between the contradictories of terms one of which is more general in 'some respect,' because it is certain that such a generality exists between the absolutely more general [term] itself [e. g. animal] and the contradictory of the more peculiar [term, as for instance non-man;] whilst there is universal heterogeneousness between the contradictory of the absolutely more general and the more peculiar [term] itself. The contradictories of two heterogeneous [terms] are heterogeneous, and their heterogeneousness is [called] particular heterogeneousness, for if [two terms] are in no case true simultaneously [of the same thing], as non-existence and non-nihilum (non-existence and existence), it is [called] universal heterogeneousness; and if they are true simultaneously, as nonman and non-horse, it is called particular heterogeneousness, because one of the two heterogeneous terms is necessarily true [of certain objects] of which the contradictory of the other heterogeneous term is true. Particular heterogeneousness is, therefore, surely an adherent [of the contradictories of two heterogeneous terms.]

FOURTH INQUIRY.

28. [The term] "particular" is not only used in the abovementioned sense [see § 15]—in which it is called "veritable particular"—but also to denote any more peculiar [term] which is under a more general one, and in this case it is called "relative particular." The latter term is more general than the former, for every veritable particular is a relative particular, but not vice versa. The former is the case (i. e. every veritable particular is a relative particular), because every individuum comes under its quiddity, which denudes [the individua under it] of their individuality, (i. e. which abstracts from the individuality of the individua); and the second is the case (i. e. the reverse is not true), because the relative particular may be a universal, but the veritable particular cannot be a universal.

FIFTH INQUIRY.

29. The species which is of the description mentioned above [§ 16] is called the veritable species; but the term is also used of any quiddity, if to the question "what is it" regarding the said quiddity [e. g. what is "man?"] and some other quiddity, [e. g. what is "horse"], the genus [e. g. "animal"] is primarily said in answer. This is called the relative species.

 "homo" the primary answer to the question "what is a Turk" being "homo." Variety is a species limited by universal accidental attributes, as Turk, Greek.

- 30. Species has four degrees, for either it is the most general of all species, and in this case it is called the high species (summa species), as "body;" or it is the most peculiar, and in this case it is called the low species, as "man," this is also called the species specierum; or it is more general than the low species and more peculiar than the high, this is called the intermediate species, as "animal" and "living body;" or it is detached from all other species, this is called the singular (or solitary) species, as logos, if we say that substance is the genus of logos.
- 25. Qotby says that there is no example of the singular species in existence; but that it is illustrated by logos, for under logos are the ten logoi which agree in the verity of logos, yet logos is not more general than any other species, there being no species but only individua under it nor is it more peculiar there being no species above it but only the genus, viz. substance.
- 31. Genus has the same four degrees, but the high genus (summum genus), e. g. "substance," and not the low genus, e. g. "animal," is called the genus generum in the gradation of the genera. Examples of the intermediate genus, are "living being" and "body," and an example of the singular genus is "logos," supposing that "substance" is not the genus of "logos."
- 32. The relative species is to be found without the veritable species, as in the intermediate species. Again the veritable species is to be found without the relative one, e. g. in indivisible verities. These two kinds of species do not stand to each other in the relation of absolute generality and peculiarity, but either of the two is in some respects more general than the other, because they are both true of the low species.
- 26. The author refutes here the opinion of Avicenna who mentions in his Shifu, that the relative species is absolutely more general than the veritable species.
- 27. Indivisible verities are, logos, soul, unity and rationality, they are not resolvable into a genus and a difference, and therefore they cannot form a relative species.
- 33. If [only] a part of what ought to be said in answer to the question "what is it" is said, and if that be [a] coincident [term,] it is called jucens in via [questionis], quid est, e.g. if we ask regarding man, "what is it," and receive the answer "animal" or "rational," in reference to (or instead of) "rational animal." If [only] a part is said in answer to the same question, and if, what is said, be a term for it by implication, it is called inclusum in responsione (i. e. pars responsionis) [ad questionem] quid est, as "living being," "sensitive," "endowed with voluntary motion," animal being indicated by these terms by implication.
- 34. The summum genus may have a difference which establishes it (or is an essential part of it), for it may be composed of two or more co-extensive things; but it must necessarily have a difference which divides it (separates its significates). The low species must necessarily have a difference which establishes it, but it can have no difference which divides it. The intermediate [genera] must have differentive which establish them and differentive which divide them. Every difference

which establishes the summum genus establishes also the low genus, but not vice versa; again every difference which divides a lower genus divides also the summum genus but not vice versa.

28. "Divide" has not quite the same meaning which it has in English Logic, the Arabs use " division" for "difference," see § 19.

FOURTH SECTION.

On Definitions (i. e. the ways of defining).

- 35. The definiens (definition) of a thing is [an expression] the apprehension of which involves the apprehension of the thing defined, or its distinction from every thing else. The definiens must not be the essence itself [i. e. homo is not a definition for man], for the definiens is known prior to the definitum, and a thing is not known prior to itself. It further must not be more general (more extensive) than the definitum else it does not answer the purpose of definition (or limiting), nor must it be more peculiar (more limited), else it conceals (or excludes some of the individua). The definiens must be co-extensive in generality and peculiarity.
- 36. The definiens is called a limes perfectus (perfect boundary) if it consists of the near genus and near difference, [as rational animal for man]; and limes imperfectus (imperfect, boundary) if it consists of the near difference only, [as rationalis for homo], or of the near difference and the distant genus, [as a rational body for man]. And it is called complete description (literally sketch,) if it consists of the near genus and a property, [as the risible animal for man], and imperfect description, if it consists of the property alone, or of the property and the distant genus, [as risible body for man.]
- 37. Care must be taken not to define a thing by what is equally known or unknown, as if we were to define "motion" by "absence of rest," or "couple" by "what is not single." Nor must a thing be defined by another thing, which is known only through the former. It is equally objectionable whether it be immediately known through it, e. g., if we were to say "report" means an "account" and "account" means "report;" or mediately, e. g., if we were to say the number two is the first pair; pair is what can be divided into two equal parts, two parts are called equal if neither exceed the other and the parts are two.

Care must also be taken not to use barbarous unusual words, whose indication (meaning) is not intelligible to the hearer, for in this case the purpose is lost sight of.

29. The example of "the number two" is not very clear in the original, and it has become still more obscure by the want of a dual in the English language.

SECOND BOOK.

ON PROPOSITIONS AND RULES REGARDING THEM.

This book is divided into an introduction and three chapters.

INTRODUCTION.

Definition of proposition and its primary division.

- 38. Proposition (literally a decision) is a speech, which allows that he who utters it be told that he is true or false (right or wrong). It is called categorical, if its two extremities (terms) are resolvable into two simple [ideas], as Zayd is informed, or Zayd is not informed, [or from "the Sun is rising" follows "the day is approaching,"] and it is hypothetical, if they are not thus resolvable, [e. g. if the Sun rises day will approach].
- 30. The commentator shows that a hypothetical proposition is resolvable into not less than two categorical judgments: such a truth necessitates such another and such a truth is opposed to such another.
- 39. The hypothetical [proposition] is either conjunctive (conditional), or disjunctive. It is called conjunctive, if we pronounce in it a proposition (i. e. one of the two propositions of which it consists) to be true or untrue, under the assumption that another (the other) proposition be true. [Example of an affirmative conjunctive] "if this is a man, it is an animal." [Example of a negative conjunctive], "if this is a man, it cannot be a mineral."

A hypothetical proposition is called disjunctive if we pronounce in it that two propositions exclude (literally deny or refute) each other, either both in [case of] truth and [in case of] falsity or in one of the two only, or that their mutual exclusion is denied, e. g. "this number is either even or odd." "That this man is either a writer or a negro, is not admissible."

31. In the conjunctive the judgment is occupied with deciding whether or not the two propositions of which it consists are connected, and in the disjunctive whether or not they are separated or exclusive of each other.

FIRST SECTION.

ON THE CATEGORICAL (PROPOSITION).

FIRST INQUIRY.

Its parts and kinds.

40. The categorical proposition consists of three parts: the part on which judgment is passed,—which is called subject; the one by which judgment is passed,—which

is called predicate; the relation between the two, showing the bearing of the predicate to the subject—which is called judicial relation; and the word which expresses it is called copula, as "is" in the sentence "Zayd is informed." Such a proposition is called ternary. In some cases, which are very easily intelligible, the copula is omitted, and the proposition is called binary.

- 41. If the relation is of such a description that you can say that the subject is in agreement [with the predicate], the proposition is called affirmative, as man is an animal; and if it is of such a description that you can say that it is not in agreement it is negative, as a man is not a horse.
- 42. If the subject of a categorical proposition is a definite individuum, it (the proposition) is called peculiarized or individual (singular). If the subject is a universal, and if the quantity of the singulars (or individua) of which the judgment is true is shown in it, the word expressing the quantity is called wall and the proposition is called fenced or walled-in. It is of four kinds: if it is shown in it that the judgment [applies] to all the singulars, it is [called] an universal [categorical proposition]. This again is either affirmative [or negative: in the affirmative] the wall is "every one," e. g. every fire is hot. In the negative the wall is "no," "none," "not one," e. g. no man is a mineral. If it is shown in it that the judgment [applies] to some things, it is particular, and [again it is] either affirmative, and [in this case] the wall is "some" one," e. g. some animals are men, or one animals a man; or it is negative and the wall is "not all," "some (are) not," e. g. not all animals are men, or some animals are not men.
- 43. If the quantity of the singulars is not shown in it and if we can neither say that it is a universal nor that it is a particular proposition it is called a physical proposition, e. g. "animal" is the genus and "homo" is the species. But if we can say it is universal or particular [but it is not stated] it is called ambiguous, e. g. man is at a loss, or man is not at a loss. Such a proposition is virtually a particular proposition, for if it predicates that man is at a loss, it predicates that some men are at a loss and vice versă.
- · 32. The reason why such a proposition as is mentioned in the text is called a "physical" proposition is clear from the following words of Qotby "in the physical proposition judgment is passed on the nature of the subject itself and not its significates."

SECOND INQUIRY.

On the four fenced Propositions.

44. The expression every C is B, is sometimes employed in reference to the verity, and its meaning is that every possible (imaginable) singular which may exist and is C, is B by reason of its existence; i. e. whatever is the substrate of C is also the substrate of B. [Such a proposition is called verity-proposition [القضية العقيقية] Sometimes the expression is used in reference to actual existence, and it means that every C in actual existence, be it at the time of the judgment or before or after

it, is B in actual existence, [such a proposition is called actuality-proposition الغارجية]. The difference between these two views is evident, for if no square exists in reality, still we are correct in saying every square is a figure in regard to the first view, but not in regard to the second. And if no figure did exist but squares, we would be correct in saying every figure is a square by the second view. From this you can deduce rules regarding the other fenced propositions.

- 33. The subject of a proposition is expressed in Arabic by the letter jym, which in this case is pronounced ja and written without a dot, but for the sake of distinction from part of its tail is cut off. It answers to the Greek y, and the Latin C. The predicate is expressed by B. If hamzah is used as a symbol it is pronounced da, and in certain cases a dál is written in instead of the hamzah, as 45 "therefore D."
- 34. The commentator says: If we say C is B there are two things to be observed; we may mean the notion and verity of C, or the significates of C. If we meant to say that the notion of C is equal to the notion of B, all that we should learn from the proposition would be that the two terms are synonymous. It is therefore clear that the expression C is B means that all the individua of which C is true are B, that is to say that the notion of B applies to them. That of which C is true, i. e. the significates of C is called the essence of the وصف الموضوم and the notion and verity of C is called the attribute or title of the subject وات الموضوع It is called title, because as we learn from the title of a book what its contents are, so from the notion of a term. The title of a term is either the very essence of it (the essence of its significates,) as " homo" is the essence of Zayd, 'Amr, Bakr, &c., or it is a part of the essence as "animal" is in reference to the Zayd, Bakr and other individua; the animal nature being only a part of the quiddity of Zayd, &c. Or it is external to it, as if we say every thing that walks is an animal. The imports of propositions are therefore reducible to two knots and 1. The knot of (arbitrary) appointment; -in this its own attribute is predicated of the subject (Kant calls this the analytical judgment.) 2. The knot of predication ;-in this the attribute of the predicate is predicated of the essence (significates) of the subject, (this is the synthetical judgment of Kaul.) The former is a "limitative sentence" تركيب تقييدي (Kant calls it an explanatory judgment,) and the latter is an "informing sentence" تركيب خبرى (i. e., it tells you some thing new, it gives you information regarding the subject. Kant calls it Erweiterungsurtheil, i. e., eularging judgment, for it enlarges our knowledge of the subject.) Three things are here to be observed.
- 1. The essence (significates) of the subject. Under this term are not to be understood the singulars of C absolutely [but relatively]. If C is a species, or if it is such a difference or property as is co-extensive with the species, the individual singulars are to be understood under "every C," and if it is a genus or a co-extensive general accident, the individual singulars and the specific singulars [أقراف النوعية] are to be understood: e. g. what we predicate of "omnis homo" or "omnis rationalis" or "omnis ridens," we predicate solely of Zayd, 'Amr. &c., but what we predicate of "omne animal," "omne ambulans" we predicate both of the individual singulars, Zayd, 'Amr, Bucephalus, &c., and also of the natura specifical animals another is predicated of the species, of homo and equus, &c. Hence the schoolmen say what one universal predicates of another is predicated of the species and of the singulars under it عمل بعض الما المناص الم
- 2. The predicability of the attribute about the subject. The opinions on this point are divided. Fáryáby says that possibility constitutes predicability without regard to actual existence. Avicenna on the other hand thinks that actual existence, present, past or future, constitutes predicability, c. g. according Fáryáby, if we predicate B of every black man, it means every man who may happen to be black even Europeans, for it is not impossible that they be black; but according to Avicenna the judgment would not apply to Europeans, because there is no instance on record that they were black, nor is there any reason to suppose that they will ever be so. The opinion of Avicenna is the one which is generally received.
- 3. Predicability of the predicate about the essence (significates) of the subject. It may be necessary, contingent, perpetual, actual, &c., as will be explained in the paragraph on modals.

Now if we say every imaginable C if it should exist will be found to be B, the judgment does not refer to the existing individua of C only but also to its hypothetical significates, and it is true though no individuum should exist. This will be intelligible if we say no triangle is a square, because these two terms indicate by appointment cer-

tain figures the definitions of which exclude each other. The same applies to really existing things, e. g: if we say man is not a monkey. The terms man and monkey are applied to certain beings to which certain definitions answer, and as the definition of man (rational) excludes that of a monkey (irrational,) it is impossible that a being be discovered which is a man and at the same time a monkey. The notion of monkey has in fact as arbitrary limits as the notion of a triangle or of a mathematical point.

THIRD SECTION.

On Privatives and Attributives.

- 45. If a negative particle is part of the subject, e. g. an inanimate being is a mineral; or of the predicate e. g. minerals are without intellect (unintellectual); or of both; the proposition is called privative whether it be affirmative or negative. But if no particle forms part of either extremity then the proposition, if it be affirmative, is called attributive and if it be negative indivisible.
- 46. A proposition is affirmative or negative by reason of its affirmative or negative relation (copula) and not by reason of its extremities. If we say "every thing that is not living is without intellect," it is an affirmative proposition though both extremities are nonentities, and if we say "a moving being is not at rest" it is a negative proposition though both extremities have [positive] existence.
- 47. The indivisible negative proposition [e.g. the partner of God is not omnipotent] is more general (contains more) than the affirmative with privative predicate, [e.g. the partner of God is impotent], for the negation may be true though the subject is an nonentity (i. e. though there is no such thing as a partner of God, we can still say if there were one he could not be omnipotent), but the affirmation cannot be true (i.e. if we say the partner of God is impotent, we admit that there is a partner): because affirmation is admissible only in regard to a thing of ascertained (or acknowledged) existence, as for instance in propositions whose subject is an actually existing individuum or in regard to a thing of assumed existence as for instance in propositions whose subject is a verity. If the subject does exist the indivisible negative and affirmative privative propositions are equivalent. The difference in the expression [between the indivisible negative and the affirmative with a privative predicate] is this: in the ternary, if it is affirmative, the copula stands before the negative particle, and, if it is negative, it stands after the particle, [as there are no binary propositions in English; the following sentence, of the text which refers to a peculiarity of the Arabic language is omitted].

FOURTH INQUIRY.

On Modal Propositions.

48. The relation of the predicates to the subjects, be they affirmative or negative, must have a certain qualification as "necessarily," "perpetually." "not-necessarily" "not-perpetually." Such a qualification is called the *materia* of the proposition, and the word expressing it, is called the mode of the proposition.

- 49. There are thirteen modal propositions into which it is usual to inquire. Some of them are simple, that is to say, their verity is simply an affirmation or negation; and some are compound, that is to say, their verity is composed at the same time of an affirmation and a negation.
 - 50. There are six simple modal propositions.
- 1. The absolute necessary [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject of necessity as long as the essence of the subject exists, as if we say, "every man is of necessity an animal" and " of necessity no man is a stone."
- 2. The absolute perpetual [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject in perpetuity as long as the essence of the subject exists. The preceding affirmative and negative examples apply to this case.
- 3. The general conditioned [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of necessity under the condition of [the continuance of] a certain attribute of the subject, as if we say "every writer is of necessity moving the fingers as long as he writes." "A writer does not keep his fingers at rest as long as he writes."
- 4. The general conventional [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject in perpetuity under the condition of [the continuance of] a certain attribute of the subject. The preceding affirmative and negative examples illustrate this case.
- 5. The general absolute [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is actually affirmed or denied of the subject, as if we say "every man without exception (literally with general absoluteness) is breathing." "Every man without exception (literally with general absoluteness) is not breathing."
- 6. The general possible [proposition]. It pronounces that there is no absolute necessity that what is contrary to the judgment should not be the case, as "by a general possibility fire may be hot." "By a general possibility what is warm is not cold."
 - 51. The compound modal propositions are seven in number.
- 1. The special conditioned. It is the same as the general conditioned with the restriction that the relation of the subject to the predicate is not [enounced to be] perpetual in regard to the essence [of the subject]. If it is affirmative, as "every writer of necessity moves his fingers as long as he writes, but not perpetually," it is composed of the affirmative general conditioned and of the negative general absolute propositions. And if it is negative, as "the fingers of a writer are necessarily not at rest as long as he writes, but not perpetually," it is composed of the negative general conditioned and of the general affirmative absolute.
- 2. The special conventional [proposition] is the same as the general conventional with the restriction that [the relation do] not [take place] perpetually in reference to the essence. If it is affirmative it is composed of the affirmative general conventional and of the negative general absolute, and if it is negative it is composed of the negative general conventional and of the affirmative general absolute. The preceding affirmative and negative examples illustrate this case.

- 3. The not-necessary existencial. It is the same as the general absolute with the restriction that [the relation do] not [take place] of necessity in reference to the essence. If it is affirmative, as "man is actually risible (or it happens that man is risible) but not of necessity (he would be man without that property;)" it is composed of the affirmative general absolute and the negative general possible. And if it is negative, as "man is not actually risible but not necessarily" it is composed of the negative general absolute and the affirmative general possible.
- 4. The non-perpetual existencial. It is the same as the general absolute with the restriction of non-perpetuity in reference to the essence [of the subject]. Whether it be affirmative or negative it is composed of two general absolute [propositions] one of which is affirmative and the other negative. The preceding affirmative and negative examples explain this case.
- 5. The temporal. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject of necessity during a definite period of the existence of the subject, under the restriction of non-perpetuity in regard to the essence [of the subject]. If it is affirmative, as "an eclipse of the moon takes of necessity place during the time the earth is placed between the sun and the moon but not perpetually," it is composed of the affirmative absolute temporal and the negative general absolute. And if it is negative, as "of necessity no eclipse of the moon takes place when the earth, moon and sun are at right angles but not perpetually," it is composed of the negative absolute temporal and the affirmative general absolute.
- 6. The spread [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject of necessity and during an indefinite period of the existence of the subject, under the restriction of non-perpetuity in reference to the essence [of the subject]. If it is affirmative, as "every man is of necessity breathing at times but not perpetually," it is composed of the affirmative absolute spread [proposition] and the negative general absolute. And if it is negative, as "man is of necessity not breathing at times but not perpetually," it is composed of the negative absolute spread [proposition] and the affirmative general absolute.
- 7. The particular possible [or contingent proposition]. It pronounces that there is no absolute necessity either for the existence or non-existence of the thing (or relation). It makes no difference whether it is affirmative, as "by peculiar possibility every man is a writer (i. e. every man can or may be a writer,)" or negative, as "by peculiar possibility every man is not a writer." It is composed of two general possible propositions, one of which is affirmative and the other negative.

The general rule is that, if a proposition is restricted by non-perpetuity, it indicates that it is a general absolute proposition, and if it is restricted by non-necessity, that it is a general possible proposition disagreeing in mode but agreeing in quantity.

SECOND SECTION.

On the different kinds of hypothetical Propositions.

52. The first part (or the first proposition) of a hypothetical is called antecedent and the second consequent.

It (the hypothetical proposition) is either conjunctive or disjunctive. [See § 39.] The conjunctive (conditional) is either cogent (literally adhesive) [or contingent.] In the cogent the consequent is true under the supposition that the antecedent be true on account of the connexion between them, which is the cause thereof, as for instance, if the two propositions be connected by causation [e. g. if the sun rises day approaches, if day approaches the sun rises; if day approaches the world becomes illuminated—the cause of both phenomena being the rising of the sun;] or correlation [e. g. if Zayd is the father of Bakr, Bakr is his son]. In the contingent [the consequent is true if the antecedent is true] by merely accidental agreement of the two parts (or of the two propositions of which the hypothetical consists) in being true, e. g. if man is endowed with reason, the donkey is endowed with the faculty of braying.

53. The disjunctive [hypothetical proposition] is divided into the veritable disjunctive proposition [the incompatible and the exclusive]. The veritable disjunctive proposition pronounces that its two parts exclude each other (literally deny or refute each other) both in [case of] truth and [in case of] falsity, [i. e. if the one is true the other must be false and also if the one is false the other must be true,] as "this number is either even or odd." The incompatible disjunctive (literally the hypothetical which excludes co-existence) pronounces that the two parts are opposed to each other in truth only, e. g. this thing is either a stone or a tree, [if it is a stone it cannot be a tree, but it may be neither of the two, and therefore if it is not a stone it does not follow that it is a tree]. The exclusive hypothetical (literally the hypothetical which leaves no vacuum) pronounces that the two parts are opposed to each other in falsity only, as "either Zayd is at sea or else he will not be drowned."

Each of these three kinds [of disjunctives] is either antagonistical [or coincidental]. A disjunctive is called antagonistical if the two parts exclude each other in their nature, as in the above examples; and it is called coincidental, if this exclusion is a mere coincidence as if we say "non-writer" of a black man. But if we say the man is either black or a writer it is a veritable disjunctive proposition; if, he is a not-black or a writer, it is an incompatible proposition; and if, he is either black or a not-writer, it is an exclusive proposition.

- 54. Any of these eight [hypothetical] propositions is called negative if that [connexion or exclusion] which is pronounced [to exist] in the affirmative, is denied. If it negatives the cohesion, it is called negative-cogent, if it negatives antagonism it is called negative-antagonistic, and if it denies coincidence it is called negative-coincidental.
- 36. Example "it is certainly not the case that when the sun rises it be night," is negative-cogent, for it denies the existence of a connexion (or cohesion) between sun rise and night, but "if the 'sun rises it is not night, is affirmative cogent, for it affirms the connexion between sun rise and the negation of the existence of night.
- 55. The affirmative conjunctive proposition is true (i. e. the inference is correct) of two true and of two false [propositions, e. g. if Zayd is a man he is an animal; if Zayd is a stone he is a mineral]; and of one whose truth and falsity is not known [e. g. if Zayd be writing he is moving his fingers], and of a false antecedent and true consequent, [e. g. if Zayd be a donkey he is an animal,] but not the reverse, because from a true [proposition] does not follow a false one.

The affirmative conjunctive is false (nugatory) of two false parts (propositions) and of a false antecedent and true consequent and vice versa, and if it be cogent also of two true [propositions], but if it is coincidental, it is impossible that it be false of two true [propositions].

The veritable affirmative disjunctive proposition is true of one true and one false [proposition], e. g. this number is either even or odd; and it is false (nugatory) of two true and of two false [propositions, e. g. four is either even or divisible by two; three is either pair or divisible by two]. The incompatible is true (holds) of two false [propositions, e. g. Zayd may be a tree or a stone]; and of a true one and a false one, [e. g. Zayd may be a stone or a man]; and it is false (nugatory) of two true ones [e. g. Zayd may be a man or rational]. The exclusive is true of two true [propositions] and of a true one and a false one and it is false (nugatory) of two false ones. The negative is true of what the affirmative is false and it is false of what the affirmative is true.

- 56. The universality of a hypothetical proposition consists in this, that (or a hypothetical proposition is called universal if) the consequent be adherent or antagonistic to the antecedent [at all times] and under all circumstances under which the antecedent can be, that is to say, such circumstances under which the antecedent may be placed by reason of its connexion with things which are compatible with it. The hypothetical proposition is particular if this is the case under some of those circumstances, and it is peculiarized if it is the case under a definite circumstance. The walls (terms indicative) of the affirmative universal are "whenever," "whatever," "when," [c. g. whenever the sun rises it is day], and of the disjunctive "always" [or "at any time," e. g. at any time either the sun is up or it is not day]. The wall of the negative universal is in both cases, (i. e. in the conjunctive and disjunctive) "certainly not" [e.g. when the sun is up it is certainly not night]. The wall of the affirmative particular is in both cases "it will then be," [e. g. it will then be day when the sun rises] and of the negative particular in both cases "it will then not be." An affirmative universal can be rendered negative by the introduction of the negative particle into the wall. The walls of the ambiguous conjunctive are simply "if" "when" and of the ambiguous disjunctive "either-or."
- 57. The hypothetical [proposition] may be composed [1] of two categorical propositions or [2] of two conjunctive ones or [3] of two disjunctive ones or [4] of a categorical and of a conjunctive one or [5] of a categorical and disjunctive one or [6] of a conjunctive and a disjunctive one. Each of the last three kinds if it be conjunctive is sub-divided into two sorts on account of the natural distinction between their antecedent and consequent. But the disjunctives are not thus sub-divided because their antecedent is distinguished from the consequent by appointment only. There are therefore nine divisions (or kinds) of conjunctive hypotheticals and six of disjunctive hypotheticals. You will be able to form examples yourself.
- 37. Examples of the nine conjunctives. 1. Whenever this is a man it is an animal. 2. Whenever it happens that a thing is a man it is an animal, and whenever a thing is not an animal it is not a man. 3. Always whenever it is met with this number will be even or odd, and always it will be either divisible into equal parts or not divisible. 4. (Consisting of a categorical and of a conjunctive proposition,) if sunrise is the cause of day, whenever

the sum rises it is day. 5. (The reverse of the preceding,) as it happens that whenever the sun rises it is day, the being day proves sun-rise. 6. (Consisting of a categorical and a disjunctive proposition,) if this is a number, it will always be either even or odd. 7. (The reverse,) whenever this is either even or odd it is a number. 8. (Consisting of a conjunctive and a disjunctive proposition,) if, always, whenever the sun rises, it is day, it will always be, that either the sun is rising or it is not day. 9. (The reverse,) if it always happens that either the sun is rising or it is not day, whenever the sun rises it is day.

THIRD SECTION.

RULES CONCERNING PROPOSITIONS.

FIRST INQUIRY.

On Contradiction.

- 58. Contradiction is defined as a difference between two propositions in affirming and denying of such a description, that it follows from the difference itself [without medium,] that the one be true and the other false, [e. g. Zayd is a man, Zayd is not a man. But, Zayd is a man, Zayd is irrational, are not included in this definition, because they are contradictory by a medium.]
- 38. The term used by the Arabs for proposition means decision; and the word which is translated here by contradictory means "rescindens." The commentator says, that which annuls a thing is called its rescindent. In § 27 this term has precisely the same meaning as "contradictory" but this is not always the case. The commentator says the contradictory of the propositions. In many cases however the contradictory of a proposition has a definite attributive sense, but this is not always the case. It may however happen that the contradictory has a co-extensive adhærens which has an intelligible attributive meaning, and if this is the case the term contradictory is applied to it (the adhærens). The contradictories of propositions become thereby new propositions with a definite meaning. "Contradictory" then is used in this chapter either for the contradictory itself or for an adhærens, which is co-extensive with the contradictory isself.
- 59. The contradiction of two peculiar (singular) propositions is not ascertained (established), unless the subject and predicate are identical, [example of the contrary: Zayd stands, Amr does not stand.] The identity of the former (subject) comprizes the unity of the condition, [example of the contrary: a body is visible, if it be white, a body is not visible, if it be black;] and the unity of "part" and "all" (quantity of the proposition,) [example of the contrary: Africans are black, that is to say some of them; the Africans are not black, that is to say not all of them.] The identity of the predicate comprizes unity of time and place, [example of the contrary: Zayd sleeps at night or in bed, Zayd wakes at day time or in the bázár,] unity of relation, [example of the contrary: Zayd is father, i. e. of 'Amr; Zayd is not father, i. e. of Bake,] unity of possibility and reality, [example of the contrary: wine inebriates in a basin, i. e. it may inebriate; wine does not inebriate in a basin, it does not do so actually.]

If the two propositions be fenced, it is requisite, in addition to the above, that there be a difference in quantity, for two particulars are true, [e. g. some animals are men, some animals are not men,] and two universals are false [e. g. every animal is a man, no animal is a man,] in every matter in which the subject is more general

(more extensive) than the predicate. In the "all" it is requisite that there be a difference in the mode; for two possible (contingent) propositions are true and two necessary propositions false in matter of possibility (contingency).

- 60. The contradictory of the absolute necessary proposition is the general possible, for if the necessity is of necessity negatived, the two propositions will surely be contradictory. The contradictory of the absolute perpetual proposition is the general absolute; because the contradiction of the negative "at no time" is the affirmation "at some times," and vice versā. The contradictory of the general conditioned is the possible temporal, that is to say, the proposition which pronounces that necessity in reference to the attribute [see § 50] is not applicable to the converse, e.g. every body affected with pleurisy will cough at times on account of his illness. The contradictory of the general conventional is the absolute temporal, i. e. the proposition which pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject at some times when the subject is under certain circumstances. The preceding examples illustrate this case.
- 61. The contradictory of a compound proposition is the contradiction of its two parts. This will be evident to you after you have comprehended the verities of compound propositions and the contradictories of simple propositions, for after you have ascertained that the non-perpetual existential proposition is composed of two general absolute propositions, one of which is affirmative and the other negative, and that the contradictory of the absolute is the perpetual, you will understand, that its opposite is the opposite perpetual or the agreeing perpetual.
- 62. If [the compound proposition] is particular, what we have mentioned will not be sufficient to contradict it, for it would be false, were we to say "some bodies are animals but not always." And it would be equally wrong, were we to employ the contradictory of either of the two parts [e. g. no body is ever an animal]. The correct way of forming the contradictory is to place the contradictories of the two parts universally into a dilemmatic sentence, that is to say, every one must be the contradictory of one of the two parts, e. g. every single individuum of the genus 'body' is ever either an animal or not an animal.
- 63. The contradictory of the universal hypothetical is the particular which agrees with it in genus and species, but which is opposed to it in "quale" (quality) and "quantum" (quantity,) and vice versa.

SECOND INQUIRY.

On even Conversion (Conversio Simplex).

64. Even conversion is an expression which means that the first part of a proposition be put second and the second part first, and that the truth and quale remain unaltered, (i. e. that the converted proposition remain true, if the original proposition is true, and that it remain affirmative, if the original one is affirmative, and negative if (negative,) (e. g. every man is an animal—some animals are men; or no man is a stone, no stone is a man.)

- 65. There are seven [modal] forms of negative universal propositions, which cannot be converted, viz., the two temporals, the two existentials, the two possibles and the general absolute; because the most peculiar among them, the temporal, does not admit of conversion, and if the most peculiar cannot be converted the more general ones cannot be converted, for if the more general can be converted, surely the more peculiar can also be converted; for an adhærens of the more general thing, of necessity, also adheres to the more peculiar. We are correct in saying, the moon can by no means be eclipsed, when she, the sun, and earth form a right angle, but not always; and we are wrong in saying, by general possibility some lunar eclipses may happen to [another celestial body and] not to the moon. In this example we have chosen the most general mode; for every lunar eclipse operates of necessity on the moon.
- 66. The [negative] absolute necessary and absolute perpetual, become by conversion [negative] universal perpetual, for if it is of necessity, or always true, that no C is B, it is always true that no B is C, else some B would, by general absoluteness, be C, and this, together with the original proposition, would prove that some B is necessarily not B—in necessary propositions, and that some B is always not B—in perpetual propositions. This is absurd.
- 67. The general conditioned and the general conventional become by conversion universal general conventional, for if it is of necessity or perpetually true that no C is B, as long as C exists; no B can ever be C, as long as B exists, else let us suppose that some B is C, whilst it is B, and it follows, if this is taken in connexion with the original proposition, that some B is not B whilst it is B. This is absurd.

The peculiar conditioned and the peculiar conventional are converted into the peculiar non-perpetual conventional. The reason of this process in reference to the general conventional is, that it is an adherent of both kinds of general propositions, (i. c. the general conventional and the general conditioned.) The reason why the converted proposition is peculiar non-perpetual, is, because it is not true that some B is absolutely and generally C, because it is true that no B is always C, and therefore it is converted into "no C is always B," but the original proposition was that every C is B. We have therefore proved our thesis by reductio ad absurdum.

39. Paragraphs 68, 69 and 70, and again 72, 73 and 74, and again 84, 85 and 86, are omitted in the translation, because they contain details on modals which are of no interest. The last named four paragraphs are also omitted in most Arabic text books on Logic, and not studied in Mohammedan Schools.

THIRD INQUIRY.

On Conversion by Contradiction.

71. This expression means to place the contradictory of the second part of a proposition first, and the first part unaltered second. The quale of the new proposition will be the opposite of the original proposition, but it will be equally true, [e. g. every man is an animal, and no not-animal is a man.]

40. Ancient Logicians made the process consist in simply prefixing the negative particle to each term and transposing them, e. g. every man is an animal; all that is not-animal is not-man. Their view has been rejected, because, as it has been stated above, the negative privative proposition is more general than the affirmative attributive.

FOURTH INQUIRY.

On the Cohesion of Hypotheticals.

75. The affirmative universal conjunctive must be convertible into an incompatible proposition, consisting of the antecedent unaltered and of the contradictory of the consequent, and into an exclusive proposition consisting of the contradictory of the antecedent and of the unaltered consequent, and should it not be thus convertible the adhesion and conjunction are unsound.

The veritable disjunctive proposition must be convertible into four conjunctive propositions. The antecedent of two of them is one of the parts [of the original proposition] unaltered and the consequent is the contradictory of the other part. The antecedent of the other two is the contradictory of one of the two parts and the consequent is the other part unaltered. Every other hypothetical proposition than the veritable must be convertible into another, composed of the contradictories of the two parts.

THIRD BOOK.

ON SYLLOGISM.

FIRST CHAPTER.

Definition and division of Syllogism.

- 76. Syllogism is a speech composed of propositions, [of such a nature, that] if they are admitted, there follows, from them, taken in themselves, another speech.
- 41. The reader will observe that the term syllogism comprises in Arabic only the two premisses and not the conclusion.

The words "taken in themselves" are used in the definition in order to exclude arguments in which a strange premiss is employed as a medium to arrive at a conclusion, as A=B, and B=C; therefore A=C. Instead of equal you may read "substrate" in the above example, c, g., Mekkah is in Arabia, Arabia is in Asia; therefore Mekkah is in Asia. The following example will show that this is not a syllogism: A is different from B, B is different from C—from which nothing can be inferred.

77. A Syllogism is [called] interpellative (hypothetical), if the conclusion itself or its contrary is actually mentioned in it, as "if this be a body, it is spacial." Here the very conclusion is mentioned in it. And if we say "but it is not spacial" it follows that it is not a body. In this instance the contradictory is mentioned in it. A Syllogism is called conjugate if it is not like the preceding, e. g. "every body is composed of parts, every thing composed of parts is temporal," it follows "every body is temporal." Neither the conclusion nor its opposite are actually mentioned in it.

- 42. The hypothetical syllogism is called interpellative, because the conjunction "but" is used in it, which is called the "exceptive conjunction" in Logic, but in grammar it is called "reparative or interpellative conjunction" حرف الاستدراك. The latter term appears to me best to express the idea. The sentence following "but" is called "which literally means exception but which I translate by interpellation.
- 78. The subject of the question is called minor [term,] and its predicate is called major, and a proposition which forms part of a Syllogism is called premiss, and the premiss which contains the minor [term] is called minor [premiss], and that which contains the major [term] major [premiss], and the repeated intermediate term is called the middle term, the conjugation (connexion) between the minor and major premisses is called the mood, and the shape resulting from the manner in which the middle term is placed in regard the other two terms is called figure. There are four figures: in the first figure the middle term is the predicate in the minor premiss and the subject in the major premiss; in the second figure it is the predicate in both; in the third figure it is the subject in both; and in the fourth figure it is the subject in the minor premiss.
- 43. If the premisses of a syllogism, says Qotby, are categoric propositions, it is called categoric syllogism القياس الحملي If the "adhærens" is considered as the result of the syllogism, it is called conclusion المطلوب and if it is yet to be demonstrated by a syllogism, question المطلوب). The minor term is generally less extensive than the major, hence their names.
- 79. In the first figure the minor premiss must be affirmative, for else the minor term is not contained in the middle term. The major premiss must be a universal (proposition), else it may be that some [things] predicated by the major term are not the same which are predicated of the minor term. It [this figure] admits of four conclusive moods. First, from two affirmative universals an affirmative universal conclusion is derived, as "every C is B; and every B is A; therefore every C is A."

Secondly.—From two universals, the minor premiss being affirmative and the major negative, a universal negative conclusion results as every C is B, no B is A, therefore no C is A.

Thirdly.—From two affirmatives, the mmor premiss being a particular, results a particular affirmative conclusion, as some C is B, every B is Λ ; therefore some C is Λ .

Fourthly.—From an affirmative particular minor premiss and a negative universal major premiss results a negative particular conclusion, as some C is B, no B is A; therefore some C is not A.

The conclusions of this figure are self-evident.

80. In the second figure the two premisses must be different in quale (one must be affirmative and the other negative;) and the major premiss must be a universal: else (if either of these two conditions is not fulfilled) we get a non-identity which warrants no inference, i. e. from correct premisses, sometimes, you obtain a conclusion which you are able to affirm, and, at another, one which you are obliged to deny.

The conclusive moods are again four. Firstly,—From two universals, the minor premiss being affirmative, a negative universal conclusion is obtained, e. g., every C [man] is B [animal;] no A [stone] is B [animal;] therefore no C [man] is A [a stone.] This can be shown by reductio ad impossibile, i. e., the contradictory of

the conclusion is attached to the major premiss, producing the contradictory of the minor premiss as conclusion, [e. g., if you deny that no man is a stone, let us suppose, some men are stones; under this supposition we have: some men are stones; no stone is an animal; therefore some men are not animals—this is contrary to the admission, that every man is an animal.] [It can also be demonstrated] by conversion of the major premiss, [e. g., every animal is a not-stone,] whereby it is reduced to the first figure.

Secondly.—From two universals, the major premiss being affirmative a negative universal conclusion is obtained, c. g., no C is B; and every A is B; therefore no C is A. This can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile; and also by converting the minor premiss, putting it into the place of the major [taking the major as the minor and converting of the conclusion].

Thirdly.—From an affirmative particular minor premiss and negative universal major a negative particular conclusion is deduced, as: some C [men] are B [fair]; no A [negro] is B; therefore some C are not A. This can be demonstrated by reductional impossibile and conversion of the major whereby it is reduced to the first figure. [It can also be demonstrated by supposition:] let us suppose for this purpose that the exact subject of the particular proposition be D [Caucasians], then every D is B, no A is B; therefore no D is A. Hence we say, some C is D; and no D is A; therefore some C is not A.

Fourthly. From a negative particular minor and an affirmative universal major a negative particular conclusion is deduced, as: some C is not B; and every Λ is B; therefore some C is not Λ . It can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile; and by supposition, if the negative be compound, (i. e_i not indivisible, otherwise the subject might have no assignable significates; see § 46.)

81. In the third figure the minor must be affirmative, else there will be non-identity, and one of the two premises must be universal, else some of the things of which the minor term is predicated may be different from some of the things of which the major is predicated, and consequently it leads to no result.

The conclusive moods of this figure are six: First.—From two universal affirmative premises an affirmative particular conclusion is derived, as, every B is C; and every B is A; therefore some C is A. It can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile, i. e. the contradictory of the conclusion is [taken as major premise and] added to the minor premise to deduce the contradictory of the major; and [it can also be demonstrated by reduction to the first figure,] which is effected by the conversion of the minor.

Secondly.—From two universals the minor premiss being negative, a negative particular conclusion is deduced, as: every C is B, and no B is A; therefore some C is not A. [It can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile and] by conversion of the minor premiss.

Thirdly.—From two affirmative premisses, the major being a universal, an affirmative particular conclusion is deduced, as, some B is C, and every B is A; therefore some C is A. [This can be demonstrated] by reductio ad impossibile and by conversion of the minor, and by supposing the [exact] subject of the particular premiss to be D. Then: every D is B, and every B is A; therefore every D is A, then we say: D is C and every D is A; therefore some C is A; and this was to be demonstrated.

Fourthly.—From an affirmative particular minor premiss and a negative universal major a particular negative conclusion is deduced, as some B is C, and no B is A; therefore some C is not A. This can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile and by conversion of the minor and by supposition.

Fifthly.—From two affirmative premisses the minor being universal an affirmative particular is derived, as, every B is C, and some B is A; therefore some C is A. This can be shown by reductio ad impossibile and by using the converted major as minor and then converting the conclusion. It can also be shown by supposition.

Sixthly.—From an affirmative universal minor premiss and a negative particular major a negative particular conclusion is derived, as, every B is C, and some B is not A, therefore some C is not A. This can be shown by reductio ad impossibile and by supposition if the negative be compound [see § 46].

82. Fourth figure. In regard to the quality, and quantity, it is necessary that the two premisses be affirmative and the minor premiss a universal; or the two premisses must differ from each other in quality and one of them must be a universal. If this be not the case there will be non-identity which renders it impossible to come to a conclusion. This figure has eight conclusive moods:

First.—From two affirmative universal premisses an affirmative particular conclusion is deduced, as, every B is C, and every A is B; therefore some C is Λ . It is demonstrated by conversion of the arrangement which gives a converted conclusion, [i. e. every A is B, and every B is C; therefore every A is C.]

Secondly.—From two affirmative premisses, the major being a particular, follows an affirmative particular conclusion, as, every B is C, and some A is B; therefore some C is A; the demonstration is the same as in the preceding mood.

Thirdly.—From two universal premisses, the minor being negative, follows a negative universal conclusion, as, no B is C, and every Λ is B; and therefore no C is Λ . The demonstration is the same as above.

Fourthly.—From two universal premisses, the minor being affirmative, follows a negative particular conclusion, as, every B is C, and no A is B; therefore some C is not A. It is demonstrated by the conversion of the two premisses; [viz] some C is B, and no B is A; therefore some C is not A.

Fifthly.—From an affirmative particular minor and a negative universal major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, some B is C, and no Λ is B; therefore some C is not Λ . It is demonstrated like the preceding.

Sixthly.—From a negative particular minor and an affirmative universal major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, some B is not C, and every A is B; therefore some C is not A. By conversion of the minor it is reduced to the second [figure].

Seventhly.—From an affirmative universal minor and a negative particular major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, every B is C, and some A is not B; therefore some C is not A. By conversion of the major it is reduced to the third figure.

Eighthly.—From a negative universal minor and an affirmative particular major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, no B is C, and some A is B; therefore some C is not A. It is demonstrated by conversion of the arrangement whereby a converted conclusion is arrived to; the first five moods can also be demonstrated by

reductio ad impossibile, that is to say, the contradictory of the conclusion is added to one of the two premisses in order that a conclusion may be come to, which is the converse of the contradictory of the other premiss [e. g., supposing it be not true that some C is A, then it must be true that no C is A; then let us take this as the major premiss and add, every B is C, as the minor; and it follows, no B is A, and by conversion no A is B]. The second and fifth mood can be demonstrated by supposition. We employ supposition for demonstrating the second mood, and the fifth can then be treated in the same manner. Let some individua of A be D, then it follows that every D is A and every D is B, therefore we say, every B is C, and every D is B, and some C is D, and every D is A, and some C is A; this was to be demonstrated.

83 The ancients considered only the first five moods of this figure as conclusive and they held that owing to non-identity in the conclusion the remaining three were not conclusive, this is the case if both premisses are simple, we therefore make it a condition that the negative premiss be of one of the two kinds of peculiar propositions [i. e. the conditioned or the conventional]. This obviates non-identity.

THIRD SECTION.

Conjugate Syllogism containing hypothetical premisses.

- 87. These are of five kinds.—The first is composed of conjunctive premisses. The norm of this class is a syllogism in which the two premisses have a complete part (term) in common and in reference to this term syllogisms of this kind are classed under the four figures. If the common term is the consequent in the minor premiss and the antecedent in the major, we have the first figure. If it is the consequent in both we have the second. If it is the antecedent in both we have the third figure. If it is the antecedent in the minor premiss and the consequent in the major we have the fourth figure. The conditions of arriving at conclusions, the number of moods and the quantity and quality of the conclusion of every figure are exactly the same as in the categorical. Example of the first mood: whenever A is B, C is D, and whenever C is D, E is Z, consequently whenever A is B, E is Z.
- 88. Second kind. It is composed of two disjunctive premisses; the norm of this class is a syllogism in which the two premisses have not a complete part in common, as: invariably either every A is B or every C is D; again, either every D is E, or every D is Z, consequently, either every A is B or every C is E or every D is Z. [This conclusion is correct,] on account of the exclusiveness which there exists between the two premisses of the composition [i. e., every C is D and every D is E] and one of the other two premisses [i. e. every A is B and every E is Z].
- 89. Third kind. It is composed of a categorie and conjunctive premiss. The norm of this class is a syllogism in which the categorical proposition is the major and has a term in common with the consequent of the conjunctive [minor]. The conclusion of the syllogism is a conjunctive proposition, the antecedent of which is the antecedent of the conjunctive premiss, and the consequent is the conclusion of the composition between the consequent [in the minor] and the categorical [premiss], e. g., whenever A is B; C is D; farther D is E; therefore, whenever A is B, every C is E.

90. Fourth kind. It is composed of a categorical and a disjunctive premiss and it is of two descriptions. First.—The number of categorical propositions is the same as the number of disjunctions, and each categorical proposition has one term with the parts of the disjunction in common, and the composition is either identical or there is a difference of composition in the conclusion. Example of a case in which the composition is identical: Every C is either B or D or E, and every B is T and every D is T and every E is T; hence it follows that every C is T, because the parts of the disjunction [B, D, E] are true of that term of the categoric premiss which it has in common with the disjunctive premiss. Example in which there is a difference of composition in the conclusion, every C is either B or D or E; but every B is C and every D is T and every E is Z, hence it follows that every C is either C or T or Z, for the reasons just mentioned.

Secondly.—If there are fewer categoric propositions than there are parts of the disjunction, let us suppose there be a categorical proposition of one part and a disjunctive one of two parts, and the categoric proposition have a term in common with the latter, e, g, either, every Λ is T, or every C is B, but every B is D, hence it follows that either every Λ is T, or every C is D, on account of the exclusiveness which there is between the premisses of the composition and the term which they have not in common. [If there is no such exclusiveness, the conclusion is not of necessity correct.]

91. Fifth kind. It is composed of a conjunctive and of a disjunctive proposition, and the two premisses have either a complete part in common or an incomplete part. In either case only a syllogism in which the conjunctive proposition forms the minor and the disjunctive, the major, is conclusive. Example of the first case: Whenever A is B, C is D, but invariably either every C is D, or E is Z, hence it follows that invariably either, every A is B or E is Z. If the disjunctive proposition, [either C is D or E is Z] is incompatible, the conclusion is equally incompatible, because if a thing is incompatible with the adherent, either perpetually, or only now and then, it follows of necessity that it be also incompatible with the substrate either perpetually or now and then, (i. e. under certain circumstances;) and if the disjunctive is exclusive, the conclusion is "it happens sometimes;" for if A is not B, then E is Z, for the contradictory of the middle term [C is D] requires the two terms [of the conclusion to be "E is Z" and "the contradictory of A is B."] The question is demonstrated by the third figure.

Secondly.—[If the two premisses have an incomplete part in common, we say] whenever A is B, every C is D, and perpetually either, every D is E, or D is Z; if the disjunctive proposition is exclusive, the conclusion is, whenever A is B, either every C or E, or D is Z.

FOURTH SECTION.

On the Interpellative Syllogism.

92. It is composed of two antecedents; one of the two is hypothetical and the other is an assertion that one of its two parts is or is not, and from this assertion follows that the other part is or is not. [In order that such a syllogism be conclu-

sive] it is necessary: [First] that the hypotheticals be affirmative; [Secondly] that if the hypothetical is conjunctive, it be cogent (literally adhesive,) [and that, if it is disjunctive,] it be antagonistic; [Thirdly] that either the hypotheticals be universal or that the assertion that one of the parts is or is not be universal (i. e. that it be asserted it is or is not at all times and under all circumstances); unless the time of conjunction or disjunction is also the time regarding which it is asserted that the part is or is not, [e. g. whenever Zayd comes with Bakr in the afternoon, I receive him with honor, he did come with Bakr in the afternoon and therefore he was received by me with honor.]

If the hypothetical which forms part of the interpellative syllogism is conjunctive, from the interpellation of the antecedent follows the consequent as conclusion, and from the interpellation of the contradictory of the consequent follows the contradictory of the antecedent as conclusion. If this is not the case the adhesion is not established. The reverse is not admissible in either of the above two cases, for the consequent may be more general than the antecedent.

If the hypothetical is a veritable disjunctive proposition, [see § 53] and if, in the interpellation any part, whichsoever, is asserted, there follows from it the contradictory of the other part on account of their incompatibility, but if the interpellation consists of the contradictory of any part, whichsoever, there follows from it the other part on account of their exclusiveness.

If the disjunctive hypothetical is incompatible, the conclusion is as in the first case only, (i. e. there follows from it the contradictory of one part, if the other is asserted with interpellation;) because the two parts are incompatible but not exclusive; and if the disjunctive is exclusive, the conclusion is as in the second case only, because the two parts are exclusive but not incompatible, (e. g. either Zayd is on the sea or he is not drowned; but he is not at sea therefore he is not drowned).

FIFTH SECTION.

Pendents of the Syllogism.

- 93. These are four. First.—The compound syllogism (the Sorites). It is composed of several premisses, some (two) of which lead to a conclusion, which (conclusion) with another premiss leads to another conclusion, and so on until we arrive at the question. The conclusions are either connected, as every C is B, and every B is D, therefore every C is D; again every C is D and every D is A, and therefore every C is A; again every C is A and every A is E, therefore every C is A and every A is E; therefore every C is A and every A is E; therefore every C is E.
- 94. Second.—Reductio ad absurdum. The question is proved by disproving the contradictory thereof; e. g. If you deny that some C is not B, let every C be B and let every B be A. Now if this proposition (every B is A) is true, we say if you deny that some C is not B, you must allow that every C is A; but not every C is A, and therefore your assertion is absurd, and there follows not every C is B. This was to be demonstrated.

- 95. Third.—Induction is a judgment that, what is found in most of the parts (dividing members) is universal, e. g. all animals move the lower jaw in cating because oxen, tiger, &c. move it. This does not enable us to arrive at certainty on account of the presumption, that not all are like those, as is the case (in regard to the above example) with the crocodile. [If a thing is found in all the dividing members, it is called القياس العقس enumeratio partium.]
- 96. Fourth.—Example. A judgment is affirmed of a particular (singular) which is applicable to another particular, because they have a meaning [see note 11] in common, e. g. the world is composed of parts and therefore, as in the case of a house, it does not exist from eternity. That the meaning which the two particulars have in common has the nature of a cause is demonstrated by the argument of "concomitancy" and of "division." This last however does not amount to a dilemmatic judgment, such that if one part is false the other must be true, e.g. the cause of destructibility is either composition or such a thing or such a thing; the futility of the two latter assumptions is shown by reductio ad absurdum, and thereby the first is established. Both these arguments are weak. The former because the last [of the four] parts of a complete cause together with all the conditions is called the madar of an effect, but it cannot be called its cause. Division forms a weak argument, because it is impossible to say that nothing else [than the parts enumerated is the cause, and supposing it be admitted that, what the two things which are analogous, have in common, is the cause in the case cited, it does not follow that it is also the cause of the thing to be proved, for it may happen that a peculiarity of the case cited is the condition for the operations of the cause or that a peculiarity of the thing to be proved renders it impossible that the same chuse should be in operation.
- 44. A complete cause consists of four parts or causes 1. العلة المأدية causa materialis, 3. العلة المأدية causa materialis, 3. العلة الصورية causa formalis, 4. العلة العائية causa intentionalis. The smith is the first of this four causes in producing a knife, iron is the second, the shape is the third, and the object (cutting,) is the fourth, or, as it is called in the text, the last; (see Maybodzy, Calcutta edition, p. 206.)
- 45. In law the example is called syllogism, and the first particular (singular) is called branch فرم the second particular is called root أولكة second particular is called root أولكة المحافق المحاف

CONCLUSION.

FIRST INQUIRY.

On the matter of Syllogisms.

97. The matter of a syllogism is either a certainty or a non-certainty. There are six certainties. [1] Axioms (or first principles). These are propositions the apprehension of whose two terms is by itself sufficient to convey conviction, e. g. the total is greater than the part. [2] Observata; these are propositions in which we pronounce on the strength of the perception of our external or internal faculties, e. g.

that the sun is giving light, or that we feel fear and anger, [the former propositions of this class are called حسيات sensualia, and the latter رجدانيات sensa.] [3] Experta, these are propositions which are the result of repeated observation enabling us to arrive to certainty, e. g. scamony is a purgative. [4] Acumenalia (guesses); these are propositions which are arrived at by superior acuteness which leads to knowledge, e. g. the light of the moon is reflected from the sun. Acuteness means quickness in passing from [general] principles to results. [5] Testata; these are propositions which rest on abundant testimony regarding a subject of which we know that it is not impossible. Such testimony must be free from suspicion of a conspiracy of the witnesses, e. g. the existence of Makkah and Baghdád. The number of witnesses required to make a fact certain cannot be laid down; but we ought to have a number sufficient to destroy all doubt. Knowledge acquired by experience, acuteness and testimony cannot be an argument against other knowledge. [6]. Propositions accompanied by their demonstrations; in these propositions we come to a judgment by a medium which is not concealed from our intellect at the time we apprehend the terms of the proposition, e. g. four is an even number because it is divisible into two equal parts.

The syllogism which is composed of these six kinds of propositions is called demonstration. It is of two kinds: it is called propteric (from propter quid, \(\text{cort}\),) if the middle term is the cause of the relation [of the two terms] both in the intellect and in reality, (i. e. subjectively and objectively,) e. g. the humors of this person are putrid, every person whose humors are putrid suffers from fever, therefore this person suffers from fever. It is called quiatic (from quia,) if the middle term is the cause of the relation in the intellect only, (i. e. merely subjectively,) e. g. this man has fever, every person who suffers from fever has putrid humors, therefore this person has putrid humors, [the presence of fever is the cause of our conviction that the humors are putrid; but in reality it is the effect of the putridity of the humors.]

There are six non-certainties. [1] Nota; these are propositions which are acknowledged by all men, on the ground of general expediency, [e. g. justice is good, oppression is bad,] or on the ground of sympathy, [e. g. to protect the weak is praise-worthy], or on account of propriety, [e. g. exposing the pudenda is wrong,] or on the ground of popular habits, [e. g. the killing of animals is not right with the Hindús,] or on the ground of divine law and humanity. We can distinguish conventional principles from axioms by divesting ourselves of every thing which is not in the mind itself; by doing so we arrive to axioms but not to conventional principles. Some of these principles are true and others are false. Every nation and every profession has its own conventional principles. [2] Admissa; these are propositions which have been admitted by the opponent and upon which the disputation is founded with a view of refuting him, [they may be generally admitted or merely by the disputant,] e. g. the questions regarding the sources of the law with divines. syllogism (argument) composed of these two classes is called disputation. Its object is to satisfy an opponent who fails to see the force of an exact demonstration. [3] Accepta, these are propositions which are taken on the authority of a person on faith, on account of his being [supposed to be] endowed with supernatural powers or superior knowledge or religiousness, e. g. maxims which we take from learned or holy

- [4] Presumptions, these are propositions founded on belief, e. g. a man who sneaks about at night is a thief. A syllogism (argument), composed of these two kinds of propositions is called oratorial. Its object is to exhort the hearer to things useful for him, such as good morals and religiousness. [5] Imaginativa, these, are propositions which produce wonderful effects on the mind such as melancholy, joy, &c., e. g. wine is fluid ruby, honey is bitter and nauscous. A syllogism composed of such propositions is called poetry and its object is to impress the soul with a desire or dislike, and it is accompanied by metre and a sweet voice. [6] Preconceptions; being judgments of wahm (and not of reason) they are false propositions regarding things, which are not objects of the senses, e. g. what we can see is all that exists and beyond the world is infinite space. Preconceptions if they were not refuted by reason or revelation would pass for axioms, but their falsity can be recognized by this that reason assents to them as mere premisses of a syllogism; yet upon finding that they lead to a conclusion contradictory of its judgment, it cannot but deny and reject the result. A syllogism consisting of preconceptions is called sophistry, and its object is to silence the opponent.
- 46. Wahm means originally a fancy or thought which we cannot get rid of. It is said in the tradition "the could not help thinking of the marriage with Maymuniah." Hence وهم الصلوة "the could not help thinking of the marriage with Maymuniah." Hence "to cause to forget" "to mislead;" hence yhum means a sentence which has two or more meanings of which the less obvious is intended—a pun, because it is an attempt to mislead the reader. Wahm means also a misconception and answers precisely to the German word Wahn, and it is used in places like this, our fear of a dead body is a wahm. In this sense it is frequently used in Hindústúny. Philosophers have invented a separate faculty for illusory impressions, and they call this faculty equally wahm as it will be perceived from the text. The commentator says: "wahm is a corporeal [or physical in opposition to mental] faculty of man, by which he perceives such particular [notions] as cannot be perceived by the senses. This faculty follows the senses." According to Jorjány it means instinct; he says that we perceive by it moral qualities such as bravery, liberality, &c., and that it is the faculty which causes the sheep to love its young one, and to fear the wolf.
- 99. Fallacy means an error in the form of syllogism, which renders it inconclusive on account à violation of some important condition in reference to quantity or quality or mode, or of an error in the matter. In a fallacy one of the premisses and the question may be identical, the words used being synonymous, e. g. every man is a person, and every person is risible, therefore every man is risible. Or one of the premisses may be false but resembling truth, owing to the improper use of a word e. g. if we were to say of a painted horse; every horse neighs, this is a horse; therefore it neighs. Or the falsity of the premisses may be owing to a mistake in the meaning, e. g. all what is man and horse is man and all what is horse and man is horse; therefore same men are horse. Or a physical [universal] may be used instead of a [logical] universal, e. g. man is an animal, animal is a genus; therefore man is a genus. Or a conception of the intellect may be taken for a real thing and vice versa. You must observe all these things that you may not fall into error. He who makes use of fallacies is called sophist, if he meets a philosopher with them; but if he meets a disputant with them, he is called cristicos.

SECOND INQUIRY.

On the parts of which Sciences consist.

100. They are: [First] the subjects (or topics of the science) of which we have spoken above [§ 6]; [Secondly] the principles, that is to say, the descriptions (or definitions) of the subjects and their parts and essential accidents and the premisses [of the sciences. These are of two kinds,] either they are not selfevident and taken by the way of appointment [i. e. taken as granted; regarding "appointment" see § 8.] e. g. connecting any two parts by a straight line; drawing a circle at any distance round any point—or they are self-evident, e.g. quantities equal to another quantity are equal among themselves. [Thirdly] the theorems; these are propositions by which the relation of the predicates to their subjects in the respective science is investigated. Their subjects are either identical with the subjects of the science, e. g. every quantity either has something in common with another quantity or it is heterogeneous. Or they are identical, but contain in addition an essential accident, e. g. every mean quantity is a side which is surrounded by the two extremes; or the subject is the species, [and the subject of the science is the genus, e. g. every line can be divided into two halves; or it is the species together with an essential accident, e. g. if a line stands upon another, the angles on either side are either two right angles or equal to two right angles; or it is an essential accident, e. g. the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. The predicates of theorems are external to their subjects, for it is inadmissible that it should be necessary to establish a part of a thing by demonstration. Here ends the Risálah Shamsyyah.

BENGAL MILITARY ORPHAN PRESS.

ٱلْبَحْثُ الثَّانِي فِي أَجْزَا ِ الْعُلُومِ

وَالْمُقَدِّمَاتُ عَيْرُ الْبَيْنَةِ فِي نَفْسِهُا الْمَأْخُوفَةِ عَلَى سَبِيْلِ الْوَضْعَ كَقُولِنَا لِنَا اَنْ نَصِلَ بَيْنَ كُلَّ نَفْطَنَيْنِ وَالْمُقَدِّمَاتُ عَيْرُ الْبَيْنَةَ فِي نَفْسِهُا الْمَأْخُوفَةِ عَلَى سَبِيْلِ الْوَضْعَ كَقُولِنَا لِنَا اَنْ نَصِلَ بَيْنَ كُلَّ نَفْطَنَيْنِ بِعَضَاءُ مُسْتَقَيْمٍ وَانَ نَعْمَلَ بَاعِي بَعْدَ عَلَى كُلِّ نَفْطَة شِكْنَا وَالْبَرَّةُ وَالْمُقَدِّمَاتُ الْبَيْنَةُ بِنَفْسِهَا كَتُولُنا الْمَقَادِيرُ الْمُسَاوِيَةُ وَمُسَامُلُ وَهِي الْقَضَايَا الَّذِي تُطَلَبُ بِهَا نِسِبَةً مُحْمُولًا بَهَا الْمَي الْمُسَاوِيةُ وَمُسَامُلُ وَهِي الْقَضَايَا اللّهَ عَلَيْكُ لَلْمَابُ بَهَا نِسِبَةً مُحْمُولًا لِهَا الْمَي مُوصُوعًا تَهَا كُذُونُ مُوصُوعًا لَا اللّهِ بَعْدَ عَلَى اللّهُ اللّهِ اللّهُ وَمُعَ عُرْضِ وَا آيَّ كُقُولُنَا كُلُّ مِقْدَارٍ وَسَطَّ فِي النِّسَبَةِ فَهُوضِكُعُ مَا يُحيَطُ بِهِ الطَّرْفَانِ وَمُنَا أَنْ مُثَلِّ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ الللهُ اللّهُ ال

٩٧ وَ الْمُعْاطَةُ قِياسُ تَفْسُدُ مُوْرَتَهُ بِانَ لاَ يُكُونَ عَلَى هَيْئَةً مُنْتَجَةً لِإِخْتِلْلِ شُرْطِ مُعْتَبَرِ بِحَسَبِ الْمَتَّقَةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفَيَّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفَيَّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفَيِّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفَيِّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفَيِّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفِيَّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفِيَّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفِيَّةِ اَوِ الْمَيْفَيِّةِ الوَالْحِبَةِ الْمَعْدِينَةِ مَنَ الْمُقَوِّمَةِ وَ الْمَلْوَبِ شَيْمًا وَ لَكُنْ اِنْسَانِ بَشَرْ وَ كُلَّ بَشَرِ ضَجًّا كُ فَكُلُّ اِنْسَانِ ضَجَّاكُ اَوْكَانَ بِعَ شَيْعَةً بِالصَّادِيَّةِ مِن الْمُوجِئِةِ كُثُولِنا كُلُّ اِنْسَانِ مَهَالُ يَنْتَبِهُ الْ يَعْفَى الْحَالِطِ هَذَا فَرَسَ وَ كُلُّ فَرَسِ صَهَالُ يَنْتَبِهُ الْ يَنْتَبِهُ اللَّهُ الْمُوجِئِةِ كَثُولِنا كُلُّ اِنْسَانِ وَ مَن جَبَةِ الْمَعْنَى كَعْدَمِ مُرَاعَةٍ وُجُودِ السَوْضَوعِ فِي الْمُوجِئِةِ كَثُولِنا كُلُّ انسَانِ وَفَرَسِ فَهُونُوسَ يُعْتَعِ اللّهَ الْمُوضَوعِ فِي الْمُوجِئِةِ كَثُولِنا كُلُّ انسَانِ وَفُرَسِ فَهُونُوسَ يُعْتَعِ اللّهَ الْمُعْنَى وَفُولِنا كُلُّ الْسَانِ وَكُلُّ الْمُعْلَى وَفُولِنا كُلُّ الْمُعْتَى مُولَولِ وَ وَرَسِ فَهُوفُوسَ يُعْتَعِ أَنَّ الْإِنْسَانِ فَرَسُ وَوَضِعِ الطَّهِيمِيَّةِ مَقَامُ الْمُعْتَعِيلِ الْمُعْلَى وَالْمَانَ وَكُلُّ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمَالِ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِلَ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِلَ الْمُعْلِلَ الْمُعْلِلَ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِلَ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِيلُ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَ الْمُعْلِقِ وَ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِيلُ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِيلُ وَالْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُلْمِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِيلُ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقُولُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ ا

مَعَ انَّهَا لَيْسَتْ بِعِلَّةٍ وَامَّا التَّقْسِيمُ فَالْحَصْرُ مَمْنُوعُ لِجَوَازِ عِلَيَّةٍ غَيْرِ الْمَذْكُورِ وَبِيَّقْدِيْرِ تَسْلِيمْ عِلَيَّةِ الْمُشْتَرِكِ فِي الْمَقْيْسِ عَلَيْهِ شَرَطًا الْمُشْتَرِكِ فِي الْمَقَيْسِ عَلَيْهِ شَرِطًا لِجُوازِ انَ يَكُونَ خُصُومِيَّةُ الْمَقَيْسِ عَلَيْهِ شَرَطًا لِيُعَلِّيَّةٍ أَوْ خُصُومِيَّةُ الْمَقَيْسِ مَا نِعَةً عَنْهَا •

وَاَمًّا الْخَاتِمَةُ فَنْهَا بَصْثَانِ الْأَقْيِسَةِ الْأَقْيِسَةِ

وه وهي يقيدنيات وعير يقيدنيات و اصّا اليقيدنيات و اصّا المقيدنيات و اصّا المقيدنيات و اصّا المقيدية المستقدم المستقدم المستقد المستقدم ال

٩ ٩ وَ أَمَّا غَيْرُ الْيَتَيْدِيَّاتِ فَسِتُ مَشْهُوْرَاتُ وَهِي قَضَايا بُحَكُمُ بِهَا لِإِعْتِرَافِ جَمِيْعِ النَّاسِ بِهَا لِمَصْلَعَةِ عَامَّةً آوْ لِنَفِعَالَاتٍ عَنْ عَاداتٍ وَشَرًا بُعَ وَآدَابٍ وَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا وَبَيْنَ الْأَوَّلِيَّاتِ آنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ لَوْخُلِّي وَ نَفْسَهُ مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظْرِ عَمَّا وَرَاةً عَقْلِهِ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ بِهَا بَخِلَافِ الْأَوَّيَّاتِ كَقُولُنِا الظَّلْمُ فَبَيْعُ وَ الْعَدْلُ حَسَنَ وَ كَشْفُ الْعَوْرُةِ مَذْمُومُ مُ وَمَرًا عَاةً الضَّعَقَاءِ مَحْمُودةً وَمِنْ هَذِهِ مَا يُكُونُ مَادِقًا وَمَا يَكُونُ كَا ذِبًا

إِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ وَفُتُ الْإِنْصَالِ وَ الْإِنْصَالِ هُو بِعَيْنِهِ وَقَتَ الْوَضِّ وَ السِّرْطَيَّةُ الْمَوْضُوعَةُ فِيهِ إِنْ كَانَتُ مُنْصِلَةً فَاسْتِثْنَاءُ عَيْنِ الْمُقَدَّمِ يُنْتِجُ عَيْنَ النَّالِي وَ الْسَثِثْنَاءُ نَقَيْضِ النَّالِي يُنْتِجُ وَقِيْفَ الْمُقَدَّمِ وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ وَ الْسَبْقَنَاءُ وَقَيْضِ النَّالِي يُنْتِجُ وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ مُنْفَصِلَةً فَإِنْ كَانَتُ حَقَيْقَيَّةً فَاسْتَثْنَاءُ عَيْنِ الْيَ جُزْءِ كَانَ يُنْتِجُ وَلِي النَّالِي الْعَلْقِ وَإِنْ كَانَتُ مَانِعَةً الْجَنْعِ وَلَا كَانَتُ مَانِعَةً الْجَنْعِ يَنْتِجُ وَالْمَنْعُ وَالْوَالِ كَانَ يَنْتَجُ عَيْنَ الْآخِرِ لِاسْتِجَالَةِ الْجَنْعِ وَالْمَالِقُ الْخُلُو وَ الْأَكُولُ وَالْمُ كَانَتُ مَانِعَةَ الْجَنْعِ يَنْتَجُ وَ السِّنْفَاءُ نَقَيْضَ الْآخِرِ وَ الْمُقَالِّةِ الْجَنْعِ يَنْتِجُ وَ السِّنْفَاءُ نَقَيْضَ الْآخِرِ وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ مَانِعَةً الْجَنْعِ يَنْتَجُ وَالْمَا اللَّانِي تَقَيْضَ الْآخِرِ وَ الْمُقَالِقِ الْجَنْعِ وَالْمَامُ اللَّانِي تَقَيْضَ الْتَعْمُ الْمُعَلِقُ وَ الْمُلَوِ وَ الْمُ كَانَتُ مَانِعَةً الْجُنْعِ وَلَا لَكُولُولُ وَالْمُقَالَةِ الْجُلُولُ وَالْمُعُولُولُ وَالْمُ اللَّذِي الْمُعَلِقِ وَالْمُ لَا اللَّهُ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعَلِقِ وَالْمُ لَامِنَاعِ الْمُعْتَ الْجُنْعِ وَالْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ لَالْمُولُولُ وَالْمُولُولُ وَالْمُ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ لِلْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَى الْمُ اللَّهُ وَالْمُ الْمُعْتَلِقُ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتِعُلُولُولُ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْتِلِقِيْمِ اللْمُعْلِقِيْمِ اللْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِيلِ اللْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِيلُ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْتِقِلِقُ الْمُعْلِقِيلُولُولُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْتَلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِيلِيلِيقِ الْمُعْلِقِيلُولُ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِيلُ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْل

الفصل الخامس في لواحق القياس وهي أربعة

وَ الْأُولُ الْقَيَاسُ الْمُرَكِّبُ وَ هُوَ مَا يَتُرَكِّبُ مِنَ مُقَدِّمَاتِ يُبَدِّعُ بَعْضُهَا نَتَيْجَةً يَلْزَمُ مِنْهَا وَ مِن مُقَدِّمَة مُعْدَمة الْخَرِى نَتِيْجَةً الْخَرَى وَ هُوَ النَّا الْمَعْلُوبُ وَ هُوَ الْمَا مَوْمُولُ النَّنَائِعِ كَقُولِنَا كُلُّ جَ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمَكُلُّ جَ الْمُعْلُوبُ وَهُو المَّا مُومُولُ النَّنَائِعِ كَقُولِنَا كُلُّ جَ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمَكُلُ جَ الْمُعْلُوبُ النَّنَائِعِ كَقُولِنَا كُلُّ جَ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ وَامِناً مَفْصُولُ النَّنَائِعِ كَقُولِنَا كُلُّ جَ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ وَامِنا مَفْصُولُ النَّنَائِعِ كَتَوْلِنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ وَكُلُّ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ وَامِنَا مُفْصُولُ النَّنَائِعِ كَتَوْلِنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ وَكُلُّ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ وَامِنَا مُفْصُولُ النَّنَائِعِ كَتَوْلِنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُكُلُّ جَ بَ وَكُلُّ وَ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ مُعَالِي الْمُعْلُوبُ بِالْطَالِ لَقَبْضِهُ كَتَوْلِنَا لُوكُذِبَ لِيْسَ كُلُّ جَ لَكُنَ كُلُ عَلَى اللَّهُ مُعَالِي اللَّهُ مُعَالَى اللَّهُ مُعَلِّى الْمُعْلُوبُ وَهُو الْمُعْلُوبُ وَهُو الْمُطُلُوبُ وَلَا الْمُطُلُوبُ وَلَالِمُ اللَّهُ مُعَلِي اللَّهُ مُعَالًى اللَّهُ مُعَالًى اللَّهُ مُعَالَى اللَّهُ مُعَالًى اللَّهُ مُعَلَّى اللَّهُ مُعَالًى اللَّهُ مُعَلَّى اللَّهُ مُعَلِي اللَّهُ مُعَلِي اللَّهُ اللَّهُ مُعَلِي اللَّهُ اللْهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ ا

٩٣ اَلتَّالِثُ الْإِسْتِقْرَاءُ وَهُوَالْحُكُمُ عَلَى كُلِّي لُوجُودِهِ فِي اكْثِرِ جُزْلِيَّاتِهِ كُقُولِنَا كُلُّ حَيْوَانِ يُحَرِّكُ مَكُهُ الْأَسْفَلَ عِنْدُ الْمُضْغِ لِآنَ الْإِنْسَانَ وَ إِلْبَهَائِمَ وَ السِّبَاعَ كَذَٰلِكَ وَهُولاَيُفِيدُ الْيُقِينَ لِاحْتِمَالَ أَنْ لاَيْكُونَ الْكُلُّ بَلِذِهِ الْمَدَّابَةِ كَالتَّمْسَاحِ .

 وَ الشَّرْكَةُ مَعَ تَالِى الْمُتَّصِلَةِ وَ نَتَيْجَتُهُ مُتَّصِلَةً مُقَدَّمُهَا مُقَدَّمُها مُقَدَّمُ الْمُتَّصِلَةِ وَ تَالِيهَا نَتَيْجَةُ النَّالِيْفِ بَيْنَ النَّالِي وَالْحَمْلِيَّةِ كَقُولِنَا كُلَّمَا كَانَ اللهِ فَهِ قَ وَ كُلُّ قَ * يُنتَهِ كُلَّمَا كَانَ آبَ فَكُلُّ جَ * • وَ تَنْعَقِدُ فَيْهِ الْاَشْكَالُ الْاَرْبَعَةُ وَالشَّرَائِطُ الْمُعْتَبَرَةُ بَيْنَ الْحَمْلِيَّيْنِ مُعْتَبَرَةً هُهُنَا بَيْنَ التَّالِي وَ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ •

٨٨ اَنْقِسُمُ الرَّابِعُ مَا يَتَرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَ الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ وَهُو عَلَى قِسْمَيْنِ • الْأَوْلُ اَنْ يَكُونَ عَدَدُ الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ بِعَدَ دِ الْإِنْفِصَالِ بِشَارِكُ كُلُّواحِدِ مِنْهَا وَاحِدًا مِنْ اَجْزَاءِ الْإِنْفِصَالِ اِمَّا مَعَ التَّبِيْفِ فِي اللَّلْفِجَةِ كَقُولُهَا كُلُّ جَ إِمَّا فَ وَ إِمَّا فَ وَ إِمَّا فَ وَكُلُّ بَ طَ وَكُلُّ فَ طَ وَكُلُّ فَ طَ وَكُلُّ فَ طَ يَنْتُمُ كُلُّ جَ طَ لِصِدَ قِ الْمَثَوْلِةِ اللَّالِفِفِ فِي اللَّلْفِجَةِ كَقُولُهَا كُلُّ الْجَوْلَةِ اللَّالِفِفِ فِي اللَّلْفِجَةِ كَقُولُهَا كُلُّ جَ إِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَكُلُّ فَ طَ وَكُلُّ فَ طَ وَكُلُّ فَ لَا يَعْتَلِقِفَ النَّالِيْفِ فِي النَّلِيْخِةِ كَقُولُهَا كُلُّ جَ إِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَعَ وَلِنَا كُلُّ جَ إِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَ وَإِمَّا فَا وَكُلُّ فَ طَ وَكُلُّ فَ لَا يَعْتَلِقُ وَاللَّهُ عَلَيْ الْعَلَاقِ اللَّهُ الْفَيْ وَالْمُسَارِكَةُ مَعَ الْحَدِيقِ الْمَالِقِيْفِ وَعَى الْفَيْقِ وَالْمُسَارِكَةُ وَالْمَالِقِيقُ الْمَالِقُولِقُ الْوَلُولُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقَةَ وَاللَّهُ الْمُعَلِقُ وَالْمُسَارِكَةُ مَعَ الْحَدِيقِ الْوَلِقِعِ عَنْ مُقَدِّلِنَا الْمِلْ اللَّهُ الْوَلُولُ وَعَى الْبَيْوِفِ وَعَى الْجَوْرُ الْمُسَارِكُ فَا لَكُولُولُ الْمَالِقُولُولُنَا اللَّهُ الْمَالِقُ وَعَى الْمَثَولِيَّ الْمَعْلِقَ وَالْمَالِقِ عَنْ مُقَدِّلِنَا الْمَاكُلُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِقَ وَعَى الْجُورُ الْفَيْلِ الْمُسَارِكِ • وَلَا مُنْفَالِهُ مَا كُولُولُنَا اللْمَالِكِ وَعَى الْجُورُ الْمُسَارِكِ وَلَا لَالْمُولُولُ الْمُسَالِ وَلَا لَا الْمُسَارِكِ وَلَا لَا لَمُ اللَّهُ الْمُسَارِكِ وَالْمُسَارِكِ وَلَا الْمُسَارِكِ وَلَلْ الْمُسَارِكِ وَلَا لَا الْمُسَارِكِ وَلَا لَمُ الْمُسَالِكِ الْمُسَارِكِ وَلَا لَا لَا الْمُسَارِقِ وَالْمُولِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُعَلِقُ الْمُعَالِقُ الْمُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُعَلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقِ الْمُؤْلِقِ الْمُؤْلِقُولُولُ اللْمُعَلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقِ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُولُولُ الللَّهُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُعَالِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِي الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُولُ الْمُؤَلِّ الْمُؤْلِقُ ا

٩ ٨ اَنْقِسُمُ الْخَامِسُ مَا يَتَرَكُّ مِنَ الْمُتَّطِلَةِ وَ الْمُنْفَطِلَةِ وَ الْمُنْفَطِلَةِ وَ الْإِشْتِرَاكُ إِمَّا فِي جُزْءِ تَامٍ مِن الْمُقَدِّ مَتَيْنِ اوْغَيْرِ تَامٍ مِنْهُمَا وَكَيْفَ مَا كَانَ فَالْمَطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا تَكُونُ الْمُنْطِلَةُ مُغْرَى وَالْمُنْقَطِلَةُ وَكُنْ كَثَرَى مِثَالُ الْأَوْلِ قَوْلُنَا كُلَّما كَانَ آبِ فَهِ وَ وَدَائِمًا إِمَّا كُلُّ جَ وَ اَوْ قَوْلُنَا كُلُما اللَّا اللَّهُ وَلَيْنَا اللَّهُ اللَّهِ وَالْمُنْفَطِلة وَمَانِعَة الْجُمْعِ لِاسْتِلْزَامِ الْمَتِنَاعِ مَعَ اللَّارِمِ دَائِمًا اوْفِي الْجُمْلَةِ الْمُتَاعِمُ مَعَ اللَّارِمِ دَائِمًا اوْفِي الْجُمْلَةِ وَمَانِعَة الْجُمْعِ لِاسْتِلْزَامِ الْمَتَنَاعِ مَعَ اللَّارِمِ دَائِمًا اوْفِي الْجُمْلَةِ الْمُتَاعِمُ مَعَ اللَّارِمِ دَائِمًا اوْفِي الْجُمْلَةِ وَمَانِعَة الْخُلُو تُنْتَبِعُ قَدْ يَكُونُ إِذَا لَمْ يَكُنَ آبِ فَه زَ الْمُتَنَاعِمُ مَعَ الْمُلُودِ مِنَ النَّالِي مِثَالُ النَّانِي كُلُمَا كَانَ اللَّالِي مَثَالُ النَّالِي مِثَالُ النَّانِي كُلُمَا كَانَ اللَّالِمُ مُثَالُ النَّالِي مُثَالُ النَّالِي كُلُكُ الْمَاكُلُ وَ وَالْمُنَا وَالْمَاكُلُودِ مِنَ النَّالِي مِثَالُ النَّانِي كُلُمَا كُلُّ الْمَاكُلُ وَ وَالْمَاكُلُودُ مِنَ النَّالِي مِثَالُ النَّانِي كُلُكُ اللَّالِمُ مُنْ اللَّالِمُ مُثَلُ اللَّالِي مُثَلِّ اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي كُلُكُ اللَّالِي اللَّلِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي الللَّالِي الللَّالِي الللَّلِي اللَّالِي الللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي الللَّالِي الللَّالِي اللَّالِي اللَّالِي الللَّالِي اللَّالِي الللَّالِي اللَّالِي الللَّالِي اللَّالِي الللللَّالِي الللَّالِي الللَّالِي

الْفُصلُ الرَّابِعُ فِي الْقِياسِ الْاِسْتِشْنَائِي

٩ و هُوَ مُرَكَّبُ مِن مُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ إِحْدَائِهَمَا شَرْطِيَّةً وَ الْاَخْرَىٰ وَفَعُ لِإَحْدِ جُزْئَيْهَا أَوْ رُفْعُهُ لِيلْلْزَمَ
 وَفَعُ الْآخُر اوْ رُفْعُهُ وَيَجِبُ الْبِجَابُ الشَّرْطِيَّاتِ وَ لَزُوْمِيَّةُ الْمُنْطِلَةِ وَ كُلْلِيْتُهَا أَوْ كُلَيْنَهُا أَوْ كُلَيْنَهُا أَوْ كُلِينَةً الْوَفْعِ أَوِ الْرَفْعِ

انفِفلِيَّاتِ وَ التَّانِي اِنْعِكَاسُ السَّالِيَّةِ الْمُسْتَغَمَّلَةِ بَيْهِ وَ التَّالِثُ مِذْقُ الدَّوَامِ عَلَى مُغرَى الضَّرْبِ التَّالِثِ وَ الْخَامِسُ كُونُ الْكَبْرِي فِي السَّادِسِ مِنَ الْمُنْعَكِسَةِ السَّوالِبِ وَ الْخَامِسُ كُونُ الْكَبْرِي فِي السَّادِسِ مِنَ الْمُنْعَكِسَةِ السَّوالِبِ وَ الْخَامِسُ كُونُ الْكَبْرِي فِي الشَّوْلِي إِلْمَامَ وَ النَّنْفِيةَ فِي الضَّوْبِينِ الصَّغْرِي فِي النَّامِنِ إِحْدَى الْخَامَ عَلَيْهَا أَوْ كَانَ الْقَيْاسُ مِن السِّتِ الْمُنْعَكِسَةَ السَّوالِبِ وَ الْأَنْمَ فَي الشَّوْلِي وَ الْكَبْرِي بِعَنْسِ الصَّغْرِي إِللَّهُ أَنْ مُن اللَّهُ وَ فَي الشَّالِ مِن السَّتِ الْمُنْعَكِسُةَ السَّوالِبِ وَ الْأَنْمَى السَّغْرِي بِعَنْسِ الصَّغْرِي وَ إِلَّا فَي السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِي السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِي وَ اللَّهُ وَ فَي السَّالِ فَي السَّالِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّالِي السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّوْلِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّوْلِ السَّالِ السَّوْلِ التَّالِي السَّوْلِ السَّالِ السَّوْلِ السَّالِ النَّالِي السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ النَّالِي السَّالِ السَّالِي السَّالِ السَّالِي السَّالِ السَّالِي السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِ السَّالِي السَّالِ

الفَصلُ الثَّالِثُ فِي الْإِقْتِرَانِيَّاتِ الْكَائِنَةِ مِنَ الشَّرِطِيَّاتِ وَلَفَصلُ الشَّرِطِيَّاتِ وَهِي خَمْسَةُ انْسَام

٥ ١ الفِسْمُ الأوَّلُ مَا يُتَرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْمُتَصِّلَاتِ وَالْمَطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الشِّرْكَةُ فِي جُزْءُ تَا مِمْ مِنَ الْمُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ وَتَنْعَقِدُ الْاشْكَالُ الْأَرْبَعَةُ فِيهِ لِإِنَّهُ إِنْ كَانَ تَالِيًا فِي الصَّغَرِئ مُقَدَّمًا فِي المُعْرَى مُقَدَّمًا وَيَالَيُمُونَى فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِيهِ الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدِّمًا فَهُو الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثِي وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ وَالنَّلِي فِي النَّيْتِ فِي النَّكُونِ وَالنَّلِيْكَةِ فِي الْكَبِيلَةِ فِي الشَّكُلُ الرَّابِعُ وَشُوا لِثُلُولُ الثَّالُ الشَّرُوبِ وَالنَّلِيْكَةِ فِي الْكَيْلِة فِي الْكَيْلِقِيلَةً فِي الْكَيْلِقَةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكْلُ كُنَا فِي الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقِ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْأَوَّلِ كُلِّمَا كَانَ اللَّهُ فِي الْمُعْلِقِيلِ فَي الْمُعَلِّيَاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقِ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْأَوَّلِ كُلِّمَا كَانَ اللَّهُ لَا كُنَا عَلَى الْمُعَلِقِيلَةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكْلِ كُنَا فِي الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقِ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْآولِ كُلِّمَا كَانَ اللَّهُ لَا كَانَ اللَّهُ لِنَا عَلَى الْكُولُ وَلُكُمُ اللَّالِقَالِ الشَّرِيلَةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكِلًا كُنَا فَلَا كُنَا لَا لَكُونَ اللَّهُ اللَّالِيلِيلِيقِيلِهِ فِي الْمُعَلِقِيلَةِ فِي الْمُعَلِقِيلُ اللَّهُ الْمُنْ الْمُعَلِيلُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّالِيلُولُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّيلُ اللْمُلِيلُولُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعَلِيلُ الللْمُولِ اللْمُعَلِيلُ اللْمُعَلِيلُهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعَلِّيلُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعَلِّيلُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ الللَّهُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُؤْلِقِيلُولُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُعَلِيلُ اللْمُعَلِيلُولُ اللْمُعِلِ

1 + 1 النَّهِ مَا يُعْرَكُبُ مِنَ الْمُنْفَصِلاتِ وَ الْمُطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الشِّرِكَةُ فِي جُزْءُ غَيْرِتَامِ مِنَ الْمُنْفَصِلاتِ وَ الْمُطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الشِّرِكَةُ فِي جُزْءُ غَيْرِتَامِ مِنَ الْمُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ كَقُولْنِا وَ ابْعًا إِمَّا كُلُّ $\frac{1}{1}$ وَ كُلُّ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ إِمَّا كُلُّ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ يُعْتِمُ النَّفَدِ مَتَيْنِ كَقُولْنِا وَ ابْعًا إِمَّا كُلُّ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ أَوْكُلُ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ أَوْكُلُ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ أَوْكُلُ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ أَوْكُلُ $\frac{1}{2}$ وَ أَوْكُلُ وَ وَ لِمُعْتَمَّرُ وَ الْمُعْتَمِّرُ وَ الْمُعْتَمِّرُ وَ الْمُعْتَمِرُ وَ السَّرَاعُطُ الْمُعْتَمِرُ وَ السَّرَاعُةُ وَ الشَّرَاعُ الْمُعْتَمِرُ وَ السَّرَاعُةُ الْمُعْتَمِرُ وَ السَّرَاعُةُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَ السَّرَاعُةُ اللَّهُ اللَّالِي اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ ال

٨٨ الْفِسْمُ النَّالِثُ مَا يَتَرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَ الْمُتَّصِلَةِ وَالْمُطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الْحَمْلِيَّةُ كُبْرَى

بَعْضُ بَ لَيْسَ جَ وَكُلُّ ا بَ فَبَعْضُ جَ لَيْسَ ا بِعَكْسِ الصَّعْرَى لِيَرْتَدُ إِلَى النَّانِي وَ السَّابِعُ مِنَ مَوْجَبَةً كُلَيَّةً مُعْرَى وَ سَالِبَةً جُزئيةً كُفُرك وَ سَالِبَةً جُزئيةً كُفُرك وَ سَالِبَةً جُزئيةً كُفُرك وَ مُوجِبَةً جُزئيةً كُفُرك وَ مُوجِبَةً جُزئيةً كُبُرك جَ لَيْسَ الْبَعْضُ الْكَبْرَى لِيَرْتَدُ إِلَى الثَّالِثِ وَ الثَّامِي مِنْ سَالِبَةً كُلَيْةً مُعْرَى وَمُوجِبَةً جُزئيةً كُبُرك يَنْتِع سَالِبَةً جُزئيةً كُقُولنا لا شَيْقُ مِن بَ جَ وَبَعْضُ البَّامِي مَن سَالِبَةً جُزئيةً كَقُولنا لا شَيْقُ مِن بَ جَ وَبَعْضُ اللَّهُ عَنْ لَكُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْ اللَّهُ عَلَيْ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللَّهُ ا

اَلْفُصِلُ الثَّانِي فِي الْمُخْتَلِطَاتِ

1 ٨ ١ مَّ الشَّمْلُ الْأَوَّلُ فَشَرْطُهُ "بِحَسَب الْجِهَة فِعْلَيَّةُ الصَّغْرَى وَ النَّلَيْجَةُ فِيْه كَالْكُبْرَى الْكَانَتُ غَيْرَ الْسَّمُووْطَتِيْنِ وَ الغَّرُورَةُ لَكَا لَصَّغْرَى مَحْدُونًا عَنْهَا قَيْدُ اللَّا ضَرُورَةٌ وَاللَّادُوامِ وَ الضَّرُورَةُ الْسَحْصُومَةُ الْمَشْرُوطَتِيْنِ وَ الغُرُورَةُ لَكَا لَصَّغْرَى مَحْدُونًا عَنْهَا قَيْدُ اللَّا ضَرُورَةٌ وَاللَّادُوامِ وَ الضَّرُورَةُ السَحْصُومَةُ السَّخُولِ النَّالَةِ اللَّادُولِ الْكَانَتِ الْكَبْرَى الْحَامَّتَيْنَ وَ الْعَامَّتَيْنَ وَ اللَّادَوَامِ اللَّالَةُ اللَّالَةُ الْكَانَتِ الْحَدِي الْخَامَّتَيْنَ وَ الْعَامَلَيْنَ وَ الْعَدُولِ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّالَةُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَى الللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّالَةُ وَاللَّالَةُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّالَةُ وَلَا اللَّالَةُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللللَّهُ وَلَا اللللَّهُ وَلَا الللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللْعُلَالَةُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُلْفَالِمُ الللْعُلُولُ الْمُؤْمِلِي الْمُلِلْفُ الللْكُولُولُ اللَّهُ وَلَا اللللْمُ الْمُؤْمِلُ الللَّالَةُ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِلُ الللْمُولَالِولَا اللللْمُولَ

٨٢ و أمّا الشَّكلُ الثّانِي فَشَرْطُهُ بِحَسَبِ الْجِهَةِ امْرَانِ احْدُهُمَا مِدْقُ الدَّرَامِ عَلَى الصَّغْرِي اَوْ كُونُ مِن الْتَضَايَا المُنْعَكِسَةِ السَّوَالِبِ • وَالثَّانِي انْ لا تُسْتَعْمَلُ الْمُمْكِفَةُ الأَمْعَ الضَّرُورِيَّةِ الْمُطْلَقَةِ الْمُعَلِيْقِ اللَّمَانِي الْمُنْعَمِينَ المُشْكِرُورِيَّةِ المُطْلَقَةِ الْمُعَلِينَ وَالنَّالِيَجُةُ دَائِمَةً إِنْ صَدَقَ الدَّوَامُ عَلَى احْدَى مُقَدِّمَتَيْهِ وَالَّا فَكَالصَّغْرَى الْمُشْكُرُولَةِ وَاللَّهُ مُرورَةٍ أَنِّهُ ضُرُورَةٍ كَانَتْ •

٨٣ وَ امَّا الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ نَشَرْطُهُ نِعَايِمَةُ الصَّغْرَى وَ النَّذِيجَةُ كَالْكُبْرِى الْكَانَتِ الْكُبْرَى غَيْرَ الْاَرْبَعِ وَالَّا فَكَانَتُ الْكُبْرَى الْكَانَتِ الْكُبْرَى الْعَامِلَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اللَّهِ الْكَانَتُ فَكَانَتُ الْكُبْرَى الْحَامِلَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اللَّهِ الْكَانَتُ الْكُبْرَى الْحَدَى الْعَامِلَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اللَّهِ الْكَانَتُ الْمُرْتَى الْعَامِلَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اللَّهِ الْكَانَتُ الْمُدَى الْعَامِلَيْنِ وَمُضْمُومًا اللَّهِ اللَّهِ اللَّهِ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهِ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ مُنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَالْ

٩٨ وَ أَمَّا الشَّمْلُ الرَّابِعُ نَشَرُطُ إِنْتَاجِهِ بِحَسَبِ الْجِبَةِ ٱمُورَ خَمْسَةً • اَلْأَوْلُ كُونُ الْقِيَاسِ فَيْهِ مِنَ

٨ وَأَمَّا الشَّكُلُ الرَّابِعُ نَشَرُطُهُ بِحَسُبِ الْكَتَّيَةِ وَالْكَيْفَةِ الْبَجَابُ الْمُقَدِّمِتَيْنِ مَعَ كُلِيَّةِ الحديث اللَّهِ اللَّهِ الْمُحْرَى الْاَحْدَالُ المُوحِبُ لِعَدَمِ الْإِنْلَةِ وَ وَهُرُوبُهُ النَّاتِجَةُ وَالْمَائِةَ وَالْمُرَى الْاَحْدَالُ المُوحِبُ لِعَدَمِ الْإِنْلَةِ وَ وَهُرُوبُهُ النَّاتِجَةُ الْمُعْرَى مِن مُوجِبَة جُزئِيَّة كُقُولِنا كُلُّ بَ جَ وَكُلُّ اللَّ فَعَفَى جَ الْعَالِيَة عَنْسِ النَّنَجُةِ وَ النَّانِي مِن مُوجِبَتَيْنِ وَالنَّمْرَى جُزئِيَّة يُنْتِعُ مُوجِبَة جُزئِيَّة كُقُولِنا كُلُّ بَ جَ النَّانِي مِن مُوجِبَتَيْنِ وَالنَّعْرَى اللَّهُ يُنْتِعُ مُوجِبَة يُنْتِعُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة جُزئِيَّة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة جُزئِيَّة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة كُنْتِهُ سَالِيَة جُزئِيَّة عَنْ اللَّهُ جُزئِيَّة عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَلَيْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَلَيْلَا اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَنْ اللَّهُ عَلَيْلِهُ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهِ اللَّالِمَ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَلَيْهِ عَ

الشَّكُولِيْ يَسَمَّى شَكُلُا وَهُوَ اَرْبَعَةً لِأَنَّ الْاَوْسَطَ إِنَّ كَانَ مَحْمُولًا فِي الصَّفْرَى وَمَوْهُوعًا فِي الْكَبْرَى فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ الثَّالِثُ اللَّا فِي وَ إِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِيهِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ الثَّالِثُ وَلِيْكُ الثَّالِثُ وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِيهِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ الثَّالِثُ وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِيهِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ الثَّالِثُ وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِي الصَّغْرَى وَمَحْمُولًا فِي الْكَبْرَى فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ الرَّابِعُ •

٧٨ وَأَمَّا الشَّمْلُ التَّانِي فَشَرَطُهُ الْجَنَعْتُ مُقَدِّمَنَيْهُ بِالْكَيْفِ وَكُلِيَّةُ الْكَبْرَى وَإِلاَّ يَحْصُلُ الْإِخْلَانُ الْمَثْرَى الْمَبْرَى وَالْمَعْرَى مُوْجِبَةً يُنتَجُ سَالِبَةً كُلِيَّةً كَقُولْنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ وَلا شَيْئَ وَالصَّغْرَى مُوْجِبَةً يُنتَجُ سَالِبَةً كُلِيَّةً كَقُولْنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ وَلا شَيْئَ مِن السَّغْرَى وَ النَّبُرَى السَّغْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْ السَلِمَ السَّغْرَى السَّعْمَ السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّغْرَى السَّغْرَى السَّعْمَ السَلْعَةُ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلْعَةُ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلْعَةُ السَلِمَ السَلْمَ السَلِمَ السَّعْمَ السَلِمَ السَلْمَ السَلِمَ السَلْمَ السَلِمَ السَلِم

و ٧ أمَّا الشَّمْلُ التَّالِي نَشَرْطُهُ النَّجَابُ الصَّغْرَى وَاللَّا يَحْصُلُ الإَخْتِلاَفُ وَكُلِيَّةً إَحْدَيٰ مُقَدِّ مُثَيْهِ

ج لاَدَائِمًا لَفَوْضُ الْمَوْمُوعُ لَا فَهُوَ لَيْسَ بَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ لَ جَنِي بَعْضِ اَوْقَاتِ كُوْنِهُ لِيسَ بَ وَهُوَ الْمَدُّ عَلَى هَ وَامَّا بَنِي جَنِيْعِ اَوْقَاتِ جَ فَبَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ فِي بَعْضِ اَحْيَانِ لَيْسَ بَ وَهُوَ الْمُدَّ عَلَى هَ وَامَّا الْوَقْتِيَّانِ وَ الْوَجُودِ يَثَنَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً لاَنَّهُ امْدَى لاَ شَيْعَ مِنْ جَ بِاحْدَى عَلَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ الْجَهَاتِ الْوَقْتُ وَ الْمُوفَوْعُ لَا فَهُو لَيْسَ بَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ جَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ السَّوْطَيِّةُ مُوجِبَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ وَالسَّوْطِيَّةُ مُوجِبَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ مَا لَيْسَ لِعَدَم الظَّفْرِ بِالْبُرْهَانِ هِ وَ السَّوْلَامِ وَ السَّوْطَيِّةُ مُوجِبَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَالسَّوْطَيِّةُ مُوجِبِعَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ مَا لَكُولُولُ وَ هُكُذًا بَيْنَ عُلُوسٍ جُزِئِياً تِهَا هَ وَ امَّا بَوَا قِي السَّوْلَافِ وَالسَّرُطِيَّةُ مُوجَبِعَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِنِ الْمُؤْمِلِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمَالِي الْعَلَى وَهُو النَّسُ لِعَدَم الظَّفْرِ بِالْبُرْهَانِ هِ الْمُؤْمِلُ الْمُؤْمِنِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِلِ الْمُؤْمِلُولُولُ وَالْمَالِكُولُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِلُ الْمَلْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمَؤْمِ الْفَالِي الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمِؤْمِ الْمِلْمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمِؤْمِ الْمُولُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُعُولُومِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُ

البَعثُ الرَّابِعَ فِي تَلَازُمِ السَّرِ طِيَّاتِ

اَلْمَقَالَةُ النَّالِثَةُ فِي الْقِيَاسِ وَفِيْهَا خُمْشَةُ فُصُولِ الْمَقَالَةُ الثَّالِثَةُ فُصُولِ الْفَضَلُ الْأَوْلُ فِي تَعْرِيْفِ الْقِيَاسِ وَأَتْسَامِهِ

١٧ اَلْقِيَاسُ قُولً مُولُّفُ مِنْ قُضَايًا إِذَا سُلِّمَتْ لَزِمْ عَنْهَا لِذَا تَهِا قُولُ آخَرُهُ

٧٥ وَهُوَ إِشْتِثْنَائِي الْكَانَ عَيْنُ النَّلْفَجَةِ أَوْ نَقْيْضُهَا مُذَكُورًا فِيْهِ بِالْفِعْلِ كَقَوْلِنَا إِنْ كَانَ هَذَا حِسْبًا فَهُوَ مُتَّعَيِّزُو هُوَ بِعَيْنِهِ كَفَرُ فَيْهِ وَ لَوْ قَلْنَا لِمِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِمُتَعَيِّزٍ يُنْتِمُ اللَّهُ لَيْسَ بِجِسْمٍ وَ نَقِيضُهُ مَنْ كُورًا فِيْهِ وَ لَوْ قَلْنَا لَمِنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِمُتَعَيِّزٍ يُنْتِمُ اللَّهُ لَيْسَ بِجِسْمٍ وَ نَقِيضُهُ مَنْ كُورًا فِيْهِ وَ لَوْ قَلْنَا لَمِنَّا لِمُنْ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ مُولَقَفُ وَ كُلُّ مُولَقْبٍ حَادِثُ يُنْتِمُ كُلُّ جِسْمٍ حَادِثُ وَ لَيْسَ هُو وَلَا نَقِيضُهُ مَذْكُورًا فِيْهِ بِالفِعْلِ •
وَ لَيْسَى هُو وَلَا نَقِيضُهُ مَذْكُورًا فِيْهِ بِالْفِعْلِ •

٧٧ وَ مَوْضُوعُ الْمَطْلُوبِ يُسْمَى اصْغَرَ وَمُحْمُولُهُ الْكَبْرُ والْقَضِيَّةُ الَّذِي جُعِلَتْ جُزْءَ قِياسِ تُسَمَى مَقَدِّمَةً وَالْمُقَدِّ مَةُ النِّي فِيهَا الْاَمْعُرُ الْصُغْرَى وَ النِّنِي فِيهَا الْاَكْبُرُ الْكُبْرَ لِلْكَبْرَ الْكُبْرَى وَ الْمَكْرَرُ بَيْنَهُمَا حُدًّا أَوْسَطَ وَ الْمُقْرَى بِالْكُبْرَى وَ الْمَكْرَرُ بَيْنَهُمَا حَدًّا أَوْسَطَ وَ الْمَدْرَى الْمُعْرَى وَ الْهَيْئَةُ الْحَامِلَةُ مِنْ كَيْفَيِّةً وَهُمْ الْحَدْرِ الْمَدْرَى الْمَعْرَى الْمَدْرَى الْمَدْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمَعْرَى الْهَيْئَةُ الْحَامِلَةُ مِنْ كَيْفَيِّةً وَهُمْ الْحَدْرِ الْمَعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمَعْرَى الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَالِي اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَالِي اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَالِهُ الْمُعْمِيّةِ الْمُعْرَالِي اللّهُ الْمُعْرَالِي اللّهُ الْمُعْرَى اللّهُ الْمُعْرَالِي اللّهُ الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَى الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرِقِيقِ الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرِقِيقِ الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرِقِيقِ الْمُعْرِقِيقِ الْمُعْمِي الْمُعْرِقِيقِ الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرِقِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرِقِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِقُ الْمُعْرِقِ الْمُعْرِقِي الْمُعْرَالِقُولِ الْمُعْرَالِي الْمُعْرَالِمُ الْع

٧٠ وَأَمَّا الْمُوْجِبَاتُ فَانِ كَانَّتُ كَلِيَّةٌ فَسَنِعُ مِنْهَا وَهِيَ النَّيْ لاَ تَنْعَيْسُ سُوَائِبِهَا بِالْعَلْسِ الْمُسَتَدِي لاَ قَلْمَعِيسُ لَا لَقُرُ يَصُدُقُ بِالضَّرُورَةِ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ الْمَقَدِينَ بِالضَّرُورَةِ اَ وَ دَائِماً كُلَّ جَ بَ فَدَائِماً لاَ شَيْقَ مِنْ عَلَيْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّمَ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّمَ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَ

٧٧ وَ أَمَّا السَّوَالِبُ كُلِيَّةً كَانَتْ أَوْ جَزْئِيَّةً فَلَا تَنْعَيسُ كَلِيَّةً لِإِ حَتِمَالِ كَوْنِ نَقِيْفِ الْمَحْمُولِ أَعَمَّ مِنَ ٧٢ وَ أَمَّا السَّوَالِبُ كُلِيَّةً كَانَتْ أَوْ أَمُدَى بِالضَّرُورَةِ الْوَدَائِمَا لاَ شَيْئَ مِنْ جَ بَ مَا ذَامً

مَدَقَ قُلُ جَ بِإِحْدَى الْجِهَاتِ الْآرَبِعِ النَّدْكُورَةِ فَبَعْضَ بَ جَ حِيْنَ هُو بَ وَالْأَنْفَقِ مِن بَ جَ فِي الْفَرُورَةِ اَوْ دَائِما فِي الْفَرُورَةِ وَ الدَّائِمةِ وَ مَادَامَ مَا دَامَ بَ وَهُومَ عَالَّا مُلِينَةِ لَا شَيْنَ مِن جَ عِلَيْقَةً مُطَلَقَةً مُقَلِّدَةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْنَةِ الْمُطْلَقَة مُقلِدةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْنَةِ الْمُطَلَقَة مُقلِدةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْنَةِ الْا دَوَامِ فِي الْأَمْلِ الْكَلِّي فَلِيَّةً مُطَلِقة مُقلِدةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْنَةِ اللَّا دَوَامِ فِي الْأَمْلِ الْكَلِّي فَلَا بُولِقَةً لَوْ كَذَبَ بَعْضَ بَ لَيْسَ جَ بِالْفِعْلِ الْمُونَةِ لَا لَا دَوْلِهِ مِي الْأَمْلِ وَهُو قُولُنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ اَوْدَالِمَا كُلُّ جِ بِالْإَطْلَاقِ مَن كُلُّ بَ بِ دَائِمًا فَنَصَّمُ إِلَى الْجُزْءِ النَّانِي الْفَارِ وَهُو قُولُنَا بِللَّهُ مَن مِن جَ بِ بِالْإِطْلَاقِ الْمَلْوَقِ لَا تَعْيَى مِن جَ بِ بِالْإِطْلَاقِ الْمَلْوَقِ لَا الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْلِي الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْقَ لِمُ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْلَوْ الْمُلْاقِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْقَ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْقِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْقَ الْمُلْوَقِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْقَ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُلْوَةِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُولِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُولِ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْمُ وَالْمُولُ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُلُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّوْمُ وَالْمُولُ وَالْمُولُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ الْمُؤْمِ وَلَى الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُولُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُ وَالْمُولُ وَالْمُؤُمُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُلُومُ وَالْمُلُومُ وَالْمُولُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُلُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُ وَالْمُلُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَلَامُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُ الْمُؤْلِقُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَالْمُولُومُ وَا

اللهُ وَالنَّالِمِ المَّالِبَةِ الضَّوْوِرِيَّةِ كُنَفْسِهَا أَوْعَلَى إِنْفَاسٍ وَعَدَمِهِ غَيْرُ مَعْلُومٍ لتَوَقَّفِ الْبُرُهَانِ الْمَدُكُورِ لِلْإِنْعِكَاسِ فِينِمَا عَلَى إِنْعَالِ المَّالِمَةِ الصَّغْرَى الْمُمُكِنَّةِ مَعَ الْكَبَرَى الصَّوُورِيَّةِ فِي الشَّكْلِ عَلَى إِنْفَاجِ الصَّغْرَى الْمُمُكِنَّةِ مَعَ الْكَبَرَى الصَّوْورِيَّةِ فِي الشَّكْلِ الْأَوْلِ وَالنَّالِمِ اللَّهَ الْمُعَلَّسُ وَعَدَمَهُ وَ أَمَّا السَّالِمَةُ الْمُوَجِبُ الْإِنْعِكَاسَ وَعَدَمَهُ وَ أَمَّا السَّالِمَةُ الْكَلِيَّةُ الْمُوهِبِيَّةُ لَا يَعْمَلُ مَعْ الْمُعَلِّلُ وَ السَّالِمَةُ الْكَلِيَّةُ الْمُوهِبِيَةُ لَا لَهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّسُ لِمِدَى قَوْلِنَا قَدْ لاَ يَكُونُ الْعَلَى وَاللَّالِمِي اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى وَاللَّالِمِي اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى وَاللَّالِمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُنْفَصِلَةُ وَلاَ يَنْعَلِسُ لِي اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِلَ وَاللَّالِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ ا

البَعثُ النَّالِثُ في مَكْسِ النَّقيضِ

٩٤ وُهُوعِبُارَةً عَنْ جَعْلِ الْجُزِءِ أَلَاوَلِ مِنَ الْقَضِيَّةِ نَقِيْفَ النَّانِي وَالنَّانِي عَيْنَ الْأَوْلِ مَعَ مُخَالَفَةِ الْأَمْلِ فِي الْكَيْفِ وَ مُوانَقَتِهِ فِي الصِّدَقِ . و قَتْ التَّرْبِيْعِ لاَ دَائِمًا وَ كَدَبَ قُوْلُنَا بَعْضُ الْمُنْخَسِفِ لَيْسَ بِقَمْرِ بِالْاِمْكَانِ الْعَامُّ الَّذِي هُوَ اَعَمُّ الْجَاتِ لِأَنْ كُلُّ مُنْخَسِفٍ لَيْسَ بِقَمْرِ بِالْاِمْكَانِ الْعَامُّ الَّذِي هُوَ اَعَمُّ الْعَكَسَ الْاَعَمُّ لاَنْعَكَسَ الْاَعْمُ لِيَ

الله الله الله ورِيَّةُ وَالدَّائِمَةُ الْمُطْلَقَتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ دَائِمَةٌ كُلَيَّةٌ لِإِنَّهُ الْذَا مَدَى بِالضَّرُورَةِ أَوْ دَا يُما لاَ شَيْقَ مِنْ بَهِ وَ الله فَيْمَ مِنْ بَهِ مَا الله وَمُحَالُ وَهُومَ عَالَمُ الله وَمُحَالُ وَالله وَمُحَالُ وَالله وَلّه وَالله وَلّه وَالله وَل

٩٥ وَامَّا، الْمَشْرُوطَةُ وَ الْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْعَامَّتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ عُرْفِيَّةً عَامَّةً كُلِيَّةً لَا نَّهُ إِذَا صَدَى بِالضَّرُورَةِ اَوْ ذَائِمًا لاَ شَيْعَ مِن ب ج مَادَامَ ب وَ إِلَّا فَبَعْضُ ب ج حَيْنَ هُو ب وَ هُوَ مَعَ الْاَشْدِيَ مِنْ ج ب مَادَامَ ج بَعْضُ ب ج حَيْنَ هُو ب وَ هُو مَعَ الْاَشْدُو طَةً وَالْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْخَامَّتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ الْآصَلِ يُنْتَجُ بَعْضُ ب لَيْسَ ب حَيْنَ هُو ب وَ هُو مُحَالً • وَامَّا الْمَشْرُوطَةُ وَالْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْخَامَّتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ عُرْفَيْةً عَامَّةً لا دَائِمَةً فِي الْبَعْضِ امَّا الْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْعَامَّةَ فَلِكُونِهَا لاَرْمَةً لِلْعَامَّتَيْنِ وَامَّا اللَّا دَوَامُ فِي الْبَعْضِ أَمَّا الْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْعَامَّةَ فَلِكُونِهَا لاَرْمَةً لِلْعَامَّتَيْنِ وَامَّا اللَّا دَوَامُ فِي الْبَعْضِ أَمَّا اللهُ دَوَامُ فِي الْبَعْضِ اللهُ اللهُ وَالْعَامِ فَلَا اللهُ وَالْعَلَى وَاللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ وَاللّهُ لَا اللهُ لاَ اللهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلَا لَاللّهُ وَلَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلَا لَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلَا لَا لَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ

٩٧ وَ اَمَّا الْمُوْجِبَةُ كُلِيَّةً كَانَتْ اَوْ جُزْئِيَّةً فَلاَ تَنْعَيْسُ كُلِيَّةً اَمَلاً لِإِحْتِبَالِ كَوْنِ الْمُحْمُولِ اَعَمَّ مِنَ ٱلْمُوْلُوعِ كَقَوْلِنَا كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيْوَانُ وَامَّا فِي الْجِهْةِ فَالضَّرُورِيَّةُ وَالدَّائِمَةُ وَا لَعَا مُثَانٍ تَنْعَيْسُ حِيْنِيَّةً مُطْلَقَةً لَا لَنْهُ إِذَا وَبِي ٱلْمُعْمُورَكُيْنِ وَبُدَّمَعَ ذَلِكَ مِنَ الْبَغْتِونِ بِالْلَّبِيَّةِ بِعِدَقِ ٱلْيُرْجُلُنِيْنِ وَكِنْبِ الْقَلِيَّنَيْنِ مِي كُلِّ مَاذَّةٍ يَكُونُ النُّوْمُوعُ فِيْهَا أَمَّ مِنَ الْمُغْتُولِ وَوَبُدَّ مِنَ الْبَغْتِقْفِ بِالْبِينِةِ فِي الْكُلِّ لِعِدْقِ الْسُكِنَتَلَيْنَ وَكِذَمِهِ الضَّرُورِيَّنَيْنَ فِيْ مَاذَّةِ الْإِمْكَانِ ه

الا وَامَّا الْتُركَّبَاتِ فَإِنْ كَانَتْ كَلَيَّةُ نَنْقِيضُهَا اَحَدُ نَقِيْضَي جُزْئَيْهَا وَذَٰلِكَ جَلِي بَعْدَ الْإِحَاطَةِ بِعَقَائِقِ الْتُركِّبَاتِ وَ نَقَائِفِي الْبَسَائِطِ فَإِنَّكَ إِذَا تَسَقَّقَتَ انَّ الْوَجُودِيَّةُ لِللَّادَائِمَةَ تَرْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ مُطْلَقَتْهُم عَامَتَهُم الْمُطْلَقَةِ هُوَ الدَّائِمَةُ وَ الْاَحْرَى سَالِبَةً وَ انَّ نَقِيْقِي الْمُطْلَقَةِ هُوَ الدَّائِمَةُ تَحَقَّقَتَ انَّ لَلْقَائِمَةً لَوْ الْاَئِمَةُ وَ الْاَحْرَى سَالِبَةً وَ انْ نَقِيْقِي الْمُطْلَقَةِ هُوَ الدَّائِمَةُ تَحَقَّقَتَ انَّ كَفِيفِهَا إِمَّا الدَّائِمَةُ الْمُوافِقَةُ ه وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ جُزْئِيَّةٌ فَلَا يَنْفِي فِي نَقِيفِهَا انَّ الدَّائِمَةُ الْمُوافِقَةُ ه وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ جُزْئِيَةً فَلَا يَعْفِي فِي نَقِيفِهَا اللَّالِمُ لَكُونَا لِللَّهُ الْمُوافِقَةُ ه وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ جُزْئِيَةً فَلَا يَمْعِي فِي نَقِيفِهَا مَن اللَّالِمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُولُو مُن الْمُوافِقَةُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى وَاحِدِ مِنْ فَقِيفِهِم اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعَلِقُ وَلَا مُعَالِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُولُولُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ عَلَى الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِمُ اللْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ الْمُولِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الللْمُعْلِقُ اللْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الللْمُعِلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللللْمُ اللْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللْمُعِلَى الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللْمُعْلِقُ اللْمُعِلَقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللللْمُعِلِقُ اللللْمُعِلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعِلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللللْمُعِلِقُ الْمُلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ

٩٢ وَ أَمَّا الشَّرْطِيَّةُ مَنَعِيْفُ الْكَلِيَّةِ مِنْهَا الْجُوْتِيَّةُ الْمُوَانِقَةُ فِي الْجِنْسِ وَالنَّوْعِ وَالْمُصَالِغَةُ فِي الْكَيفَ وَا لَكُمْ وَبِالْعَنْسِ .

النَّسَتُ النَّانِي فِي الْعَكْسِ المُستَوِي

وَ هُو عِبْارُةً عَنْ جَعْلِ الْجُوْدِ الْكِلْهِمِيَ الْقَفِيدُ قَانِياً وَالنَّانِي أَوَّامَعُ بِقَادِ الصِّنْقِ وَالْكَيْفِ بِسَا لِمِمَاهُ ١٣ إِنَّا السَّوَالِبُ فَلِي كَانَتْ كُلِيدٌ فَسَبْعُ مِنْهَا وَهِيَ الْوَقْتِيَّتَانِ وَ الْوَجُودِيْنَاكِ وَالْمُعْتَالِقِ وَالْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَةُ وَ كُفْتُهُسُ 9 مَيْنَاعِ الْمُكْسِ فِي الْفَصِّهَا وَهِيَ الْوَقْتِيدُ لِصِنْقِ قَوْلِنَا بِالضَّرُورُ لِا وَ فَيْفِي مِنْ الْفَتَرِ بِمُنْفَسِفِ

٥٩ وَكُلِيَّةُ الشَّرْطِيَّةِ الْ يَكُوْنَ النَّالِيُ لَا رَمَّا أَوْ مُعَانِدًا لِلْمَقَدَّمِ طَلَى جَبِيغِ الْرُضَاعِ النَّبِي بَعَنِي الْجَنْقُ عَمَلَ لَهُ بِسَبِ الْتَبَرَانِ الْأَمُورِ النِّي يُعْنِى اجْتِنَا عَهَا مَعَهُ وَ الْجُوْنِيَّةَ اللهُ كَنُونَ كَذَلِكَ عَلَى بَعْنِي هَٰذِهِ الْأَرْفَاعِ وَالْخَصُوطَةُ أَنْ تُكُونَ كَذَلِكَ عَلَى بَعْنِي هَٰذِهِ الْأَرْفَاعِ وَالْخَصُوطَةُ أَنْ تُكُونَ كَذَلِكَ عَلَى بَعْنِي هَٰذِهِ الْأَرْفَاعِ وَالْخَصُوطَةُ أَنْ تُكُونَ كَذَلِكَ عَلَى وَفَعِ مَعَيَّى وَلَيْ وَلِي الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ ذَالِيَّا وَسُورٌ السَّالِيَةِ الْعَلِيَّةِ فِيهِمَا وَمَتَى وَفِي الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ ذَالِكًا وَسُورٌ السَّالِيَةِ الْعَلِيَّةِ فِيهِمَا قَدْ يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيَةِ الْعَلِيَّةِ فِيهِمَا قَدْ لَا يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيَةِ الْجُورُالِيَّةِ فَيْهِمَا قَدْ يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيَةِ الْعَلِيَّةِ فِيهِمَا قَدْ يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيَةِ الْمُؤْدُولُ اللهَ لَهُ لَا يَكُونُ وَاللهُ عَلَى سُورٍ الْاَيْجَابِ الْعَلِيِّ وَالْمُهُمَلَةِ بِإِطْلَاقِ لَا عُظْ لَوْدُ إِنْ وَإِذَا فِي الْمُنْقِلِلَةِ فَاللّهِ لِيَ السَّلَيِةِ الْمُعْلِقِ الْمُنْقِيلِةِ فَلَى السَّلِيةِ الْمُنْقِيلِةِ فَلَى اللهُ اللهِ اللهِ اللهُ اللهِ اللهُ اللهُ اللهِ اللهُ اللهِ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ ال

٥٥ وَ الشَّرْطِيَّةُ قَدْ تَتَرَكَّبُ عَنْ حَنْلِيَّنِي وَ عَنْ مُتَّصِلَةً وَ مُتَّصِلةً عَنْ النَّيْطِةُ وَ مُتَّصِلةً وَ مُتَّامِعًا عَنْ ثَالِيهًا بِالطَّبْعِ بَعِيلاً فِ النَّنْصِلةِ فَانَّ مُقَدَّمَها وَلَا تَنْفَصِلةً بِالطَّبْعِ بَعِيلاً فِ النَّنْصِلةِ فَانَّ مُقَدَّمَها وَلَا تُنْفَصِلةً وَالنَّالْ اللهُ عَلَيْكَ بِالسَّيْخُرَاجِها عَنْ نَفْسكِ وَ تَالَيْهَا بِالطَّبْعِ بَاللّهَا الْآمَثِلَةُ تَعْلَيْكَ بِالسَّيْخُرَاجِها عَنْ نَفْسكِ وَ اللّهَا الْمُتَالِعُ اللّهَ اللّهَ عَلَيْكَ بِالسَّيْخُرَاجِها عَنْ نَفْسكِ وَ اللّهَا اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ ال

ٱلْفَصْلُ النَّالِثُ فِي أَحْكَامِ الْقَضَايَا وَفِيهِ أَرْبَعَةُ مَبَاحِثُ

ٱلْبَصْثُ الْأُولَ فِي النَّنَاكُضِ

١٥ و حَدُّورٌ بِاللهُ اعْتِدُونَ عَضِيْلَيْنِ بِالْ نَجَابِ وَ السَّلْبِ بَعَيْثُ بِعَثْنَى بِالْمُونَ اللهِ اله

التابط

الفَصْلُ الثَّانِي فِي أَفْسَامِ الشَّرْطِيَّةِ

٩٥ الْجُزْهُ الْأَوْلُ مِنْهَا يُسَمَّى مُقَدِّمًا وَالثَّانِي تَالِيًّا وَهِي إِمَّا مُتَصِلَةً أَوْ مُنفَصِلَةً أَمَّا الْمُتَصِلَةً فَإِمَّا أَوْرَمِيةً وَهِي الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّبِي عَلَى الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّصَابُ فَي الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّصَابُ فَي الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّصَابُ فَي الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّصَابُ فَالْمَا عُرْمَ اللَّهَ الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّعَامُ الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّعَامُ الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّعَامُ الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّهِ عَلَى الْمُقَدِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُقَدِّمِ الْمُقَدِّمِ الْمُقَدِّمِ النَّهُ الْمُقَدِّمِ الْمُقَدِّمِ الْمُقَدِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُقَدِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُقَدِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُقَدِّمِ اللَّهُ اللللللَّاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللللللْمُ الللللْمُ

٥٣ وَ أَمَّا الْمُنْفَصِلَةُ فَامًا حَقِيْقِيَّةً وَهِي الَّنِي تَعَكُمُ فِيهَا بِالثَّنَافِيْ بَيْنَ جُزْقَهَا فِي الصِّدُقِ وَ الْكِذَابِ مَعًا كَقُولِنَا إِمَّا الْمَدَدُ رَوْجًا أَوْقَرُدًا وَإِمَّا مَانِعَةُ الْجَنْعِ وَهِي النَّيْ تَعَكُمُ فَيْهَا بِالنَّفَافِي بَيْنَ الْجُزْفَيْنِ فِي الصِّنْقِ فَقَطَ كَقُولِنَا إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ هٰذَا الشَّيْقُ حَجَرًا أَوْشَجَرًا وَ إِمَّا مَانِعَةُ الْجُلُووَ هِنِي النَّيْنَافِي بَيْنَ الْجُزْفَيْنِ فِي الْكَذَبِ فَقَطَ كَقُولِنَا إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ لَيْنَافِي الْبَعْرِ أَوْقِي يَعْرَقَ وَ يَعْرَقَ وَكُلُّ وَاحِدِ مِنْ هٰذِهِ النَّلْقَةِ إِمَّا عِنَادِيَّةً وَهِي النَّيْ يَكُونُ النَّيْافِي فَيْهَا لِنَالِمَ اللَّهُ اللَّلَا اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِلُهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّه

وه و سَائِبَةً كُلِّ وَاحِدَةً مِنْ هَٰذِهِ الْقَصَابِ النَّمَانِ هِي النِّي يُرْفَعُ فِيْهَا مَا حُبَمَ بِهِ فِي مُوجِيْنِهَا فَسَائِبَةً النَّهُ وَسَائِبَةً إِلَّا ثَمَانِي سَائِبَةً النَّهُ وَسَائِبَةً إِلَّا ثَمَانِي سَائِبَةً النَّهُ وَسَائِبَةً الْآوَةِ مِثَنَّى سَائِبَةً النِّهُ الْمَائِدُ لَنُومِيَّةً وَسَائِبَةً الْمُعَلِّمُ مَا اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ اللِّهُ اللَّهُ اللِّهُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعِلِمُ اللْمُعِلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْمُعَالِمُ اللْمُعِلِمُ اللْمُعِلَى اللْمُعُلِمُ اللْمُعَلِمُ الللْمُعِلَى الللْمُعَالِمُ اللَّهُ اللَل

وه وَ الْمُقْصِلَةُ الْمُوجِبِةُ تَصَافِيْقِ مِنْ مَادِقِمَنِ وَ عَنْ كَاذِينِي وَعَنْ مَضِعُولِ الْعَنْدِي وَ الْمُؤْتِ وَ عَنْ مَعْمُولِ الْعَنْدِي وَ الْمُؤْتِي عَنْ مَادِقَتُنِ وَعَنْ الْمُؤْتِي عَادِيقِي مَادِقَتُهِ عَادِيدٍ وَ عَالَمُ مَادِقَتُهُ وَاللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ مَوْلَكُونِ عَادِيدٍ وَ عَالَمُ مِنْ مُولِكُونِ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ الْمُؤْتِينِ عَلَيْهِ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ ا

श्रीधा

الْوَجُوْدِيَّةُ الْأَضُرُورِيَّةُ وَهِيَ الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْمَامَّةُ مَعَ تَيْدِ الْأَضُرُورَةِ بِصَعَبِ النَّاصِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتْ مَوْجِئِةً كَاتُولِنَا كُلُّ اِنْسَانٍ مَاحِكُ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ بِالشَّرُورَةِ فَتَرْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ مُوجِيَّةٌ مُطْلَقَةٍ عامَّةٍ أَوَسَالِهَةٍ مَنْفِئةً عامَّةٍ وَإِنْ كَانَتْ سَالِبَةً كَقُولِنَا وَهُفِينَ مِنْ الْإِنْسَانِ بِضَاحِكِ بِالْفِعْلِ وَبِالضَّرُورَةٍ فَتَوْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ شَالِبَةٍ مُطْلَقَةٍ عَامَّةٍ وَمُوجِبَةٍ مُنْكِنَةٍ عَامَّةٍ ه

الرابعة

الْوَجُوْدِيَّةُ الْأَدَائِمَةُ وَهِيَ الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَّةُ مَعَ قَيْدِ اللَّذَوَامِ بِعَسْبِ النَّاتِ وَهِيَ سَوَّاءٌ كَانْتُ مُوْجِبَةً . أَوْ سَالِبَةُ فَنَوْ كِيْبَهَا مِنْ مُطْلَقَتْهِي عَامَّتَهُي إِحْدَافِهَا مُوْجِبَةً وَ الْآخُرِي سَالِبَةً وَ مِثَاثَهَا إِنْجَابًا وَسَلَبًا مَامَرٌ ه

الخامسة

الوَّقَلِيَّةُ وَهِيَ النَّي تُسْمُ فِيْهَا بِضَرَوْرَةِ تُبُوْتِ الْمُعْمُولِ لِلمُوْمُوعِ اوْسَلِيهِ عَنْهُ فِي وَفْتِ مُعَلِّي مِنْ اَوْقَاتِ وَهِيَ اِنْ كَانَتُ مُوجِبَةً كَقُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ الْمُومُوعِ وَجُودِ الْمُومُوعِ مُقَيِّدًا بِاللَّهُ وَامِ بِحَسَبِ النَّاتِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتُ مُوجِبَةً كَقُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُولَةِ الْأَرْضِ بَيْفَةً وَبَيْنَ الشَّنْسِ لَا دَائِنًا فَتَرْكِيْبَهَا مِنْ مُوجِبَةٍ وَ تَنَيَّةً مُطْلَقَةً مَطْلَقَةً مَطْلَقَةً عَامَةً وَإِنْ كَانَتُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ لَقَيْقَ مِنَ الْقَبَرِ بِمُنْفَسِفٍ وَقْتَ النَّرْبِفِي وَسَالِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةً وَانْ كَانَتُ سَالِبَةً وَتُوبِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةً وَانْ كَانَتُ مَا اللّهَ وَنُوبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةً وَانْ كَانِي مَا لِهُ وَانْ كَانَتُ اللّهُ وَانْ كَانَتُ مَا اللّهُ وَانْ كَانَتُ عَامَةً وَانْ كَانَا فَا لَائِنَا عَلَيْهِ وَانْ كَانِي اللّهُ وَانْ كَانِي اللّهُ وَانْ كَانِي اللّهُ وَانْ كَانَا فَا مَا لَا لَهُ مُولِكًا إِللْكُورُورَةِ لَا عَلَيْكُ عَلَيْكُ إِلَيْكُولُكُونِ اللّهُ اللّهُ وَمُوجِبَةً مُظْلَقَةً عَامِّةً وَاللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ لَا لَكُولُولُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللللّهُ الللللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ الللّهُ

السادسة

المُنْتَشِرَةُ وَهِيَ النِّيْ تُحَمَّ فِيهَا بِضَرُورَةٍ تُبُوفِ الْسَعَنُولِ لِلْمُؤْمُوعِ أَوْسَلَيهِ عَنْهُ فِي وَقْتِ فَيْدِ مُعَيَّي مِنْ اَوْقَافِ وَجُوهِ النَّافِ وَهِي إِنْكَانَتُ مُوْجِبَةً كَفُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ مَنْ النَّافِ وَهِي إِنْكَانَتُ مُوْجِبَةً مُنْتَشِرَةٍ مُطْلَقَةٍ وَسَائِمَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً كُلُّ إِنْسَانِهِ مُنْتَشِرَةٍ مُطْلَقَةً وَسَائِمَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً وَ إِنْ كَانْتُ سَالِيَةً كَفُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقَ مِنَ الْانْسَانِ بِمُتَنَفِّسٍ فِي وَقْتِ مَا لَا قَالِمًا فَتَوْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ وَانْتِ مَا لَهُ قَالِمُهُ عَلَيْهِمُ مِنْ الْنَسَانِ بِمُتَنَفِّسٍ فِي وَقْتِ مَا لَا قَالِمُ اللّهُ عَلَيْهِمُ مِنْ الْأَنْسَانِ بِمُتَنَفِّسٍ فِي وَقْتِ مَا لَا قَالِمُ اللّهُ عَلَيْهِمُ مِنْ الْأَنْسَانِ بِمُتَنَفِّسٍ فِي وَقْتِ مَا لَا قَالِمُ اللّهُ عَلَيْهِمُ مَنْ الْأَنْسَانِ بِمُتَنَفِّسٍ فِي وَقْتِ مَا لَا قَالِمُ اللّهُ عَلَيْهِمُ مَا اللّهُ مُنْتُصِرَةٍ مُثَلِقَةً وَمُولِمَةً عَامِيّةً عَامِيّةً مَنْتُ فِي اللّهُ مُنْتُصِرًا مُ مُثْلِقَةً وَمُولِمَةً عَامِيّةً عَامُتُهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ الْعَلَقَةِ عَامِيّةً عَامِيّةً مَنْ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ عَلَيْهُ عَالَيْهُ مُنْ الْعَلَقِيمِ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الل

بِهَرْطِ وَمْفِ الْنَوْمُوعِ كَقُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ كَا تِبِ مُنْعَرِّكُ الْاَمَائِعِ مَا دَامَ كَا تِبَا وَبِالضَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقُ فَي بِعَدَ الْمَائِعِ مَا دَامَ كَا تِبًا .
 مِنَ الْكَاتِبِ بَصِاكِي الْاَمَائِعِ مَا دَامَ كَاتِبًا .

ألرابعة

الْعُونِيَّةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَهِيَ النَّنِي تُحْتُمُ نَهْمًا بِدِّرَامٍ تُبُوْتٍ الْمَعْمُولِ لِلْمُوْهُوعِ أَوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ بِشَرْطٍ وَصْفِ الْمَوْهُوعِ أَوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ بِشَرْطٍ وَصْفِ الْمَوْهُوعِ وَمِثَالُهَا إِنْجَابًا وَسَلْبًا مَامَرًا .

. أَلْخَامِسَةُ

الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِيَ النَّيْ تُحْكُمُ بِيهَا بِنُبُوْتِ الْمُحْمُولِ لِلْمُوْهُوْمِ اوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ بِالْفِعْلِ كَقَوْلِنَا بِالْمُطْلَقِ الْعَامِّ كُلُّ الْمُسَانِ بِمُتَفَقِّسِ .

ألسادسة

الْمُنْفِئَةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِيَ الَّذِي تُحْتَمُ فِيهَا بِالْرَقِفَاعِ الضَّرُورَةِ الْمُطْلَقَةِ عَنِ الْجَانِبِ الْمُخَالِفِ لِلْحُتَمِ كَقُولِنَا بِالْإِمْكَانِ الْعَامِّ لَاشْفِقَ مِنَ الْجَارِّبِيَا رُدُ .

ا المُورَكِّبَاتُ نَسْبُع

أَلْأُولَى

الْمَشُرُوطُةُ الْخَاصَّةُ وَهِيَ الْمَشُرُوطُةُ الْعَامَّةُ مَعَ قَيْدِ اللّا دَوَامِ بِحَسَبِ الذَّاتِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتَ مُوجِبَةً كَقُولِنَا بِالفَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ كَاتِبِ مُنْجَرِّكُ الْاَمَانِعِ مَا دَامَ كَاتِبًا لَا دَائِمًا فَتَوْكَيْبُهَا مِنْ مُوجِبَةٍ مَشُرُوطَةٍ عَامَّةً وَسَالِبَةً مُطْلَقَةٍ عَامَّةٍ مَشْرُوطَةٍ عَامَّةً مَنْ وَاللّهِ الْفُرُورَةِ لَا شَاعِينَ الْكَاتِبِ بِسَاكِنِ الْاَمَانِعِ مَا دَامُ كَاتِبًا لاَ دَائِمًا فَتَرْكِيبُهَا مِنْ سَالِبَةً مَشْرُوطَةً عَامَّةً وَ مُوجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةً .

أَلْثَانيَةً

ا الْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْخَاصَّةُ وَهِي الْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْعَامَّةُ مَعْ قَيْدِ اللَّادُوَامِ بِحَسَبِ الذَّاتِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتْ مُوْجِبَةً فَتَرَكِيْبُهَا مِنْ سَالِبَةٍ عُرُفِيَّةٍ عَامَّةً وَمُوْجِبَةً مَطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً وَمُوْجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً وَمُوْجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامِّةً وَمُوْجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامِّةً وَمُوْجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامِّةً وَمُوْجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَالَّةً وَمِثَالُهَا إِنْجَابًا وَسَلَبًا مُامَرً .

ٱلْبَعْثُ الرَّابِعُ فِي الْقَضَايَا الْمُوَجَّهَةِ

أع لابد لنِسْبَةِ الْعَصُولَاتِ إِلَى الْمَوْمُوعَاتِ مِنْ كَيْفِيَّةِ الْجَابِيَّةَ كَانَتِ النِسْبَةَ اَوْ سَلْبِيَّةً كَانَتُورُورَةٍ
 وَ الدَّوَامِ وَاللَّاضُوُورَةٍ وَ اللَّادَوامِ و تُسَمَّى تِلْكَ الْكَيْفِيَّةُ مَادَّةً الْقَضِيَّةِ وَ اللَّفْظُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْبَا يُسَمَّى جَبَةَ الْقَضِيَّةِ .
 جَبَةَ الْقَضِيَّةِ .

وع وَ الْقَضَايَا الْمُوجَّهَةُ النَّبِي جَرَتِ الْعَادَةُ بِالْبَحْثِ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ اَحْكَامِهَا ثَلَثَ عَشَرَةَ قَضِيَّةً مِنْهَا بَسِيْطَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِي حَقَيْقَتُهَا الْبَجَابُ فَقَطْ اَوْ سَلْبُ فَقَطْ وَمِنْهَا مُرَكَّبَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِي حَقَيْقَتُهَا تَرَكَّبَتْ مِنْ الْبَيْ حَقَيْقَتُهَا تَرَكَّبَتْ مِنْ الْبَيْحَابُ وَسُلْبِ مَمًا •

وَهُ أَمَّا الْبُسَائِطُ فُستُ

ألأولى

الصَّرُورِيَّةُ الْمُطْلَقَةُ وَ هِيَ الَّتِيْ تُحْكُمُ بَيْهَا بِضُرُورَةِ تُبُوْتِ الْمَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْمُومِ أَوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ مَا دَامَ ذَاتُ الْمَوْمُومِ مَوْجُودَةً كَقُولْنَا بِالضُّرُورَةِ كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيْوَانٌ وَبِالضُّرُورُةِ لِتَشَيْئَ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِعَجْرٍ •

اَلْثًا نِيَةً

الدَّائِمَةُ الْمُطْلَقَةُ وَ هِنِي الَّتِنِيُ تُحْكُمُ بِيْهَا بِدَرَامِ ثُبُوْتِ الْعَصْمُوْلِ لِلْمَوْضُوْعِ اوَ سَلَبِهِ عَنْهُ مَا دَامَ وَاتُ الْمَوْضُوْعِ وَاوَ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ مَا دَامَ وَاتُ الْمَوْضُوعِ مِوْجُودَةٌ وَمِثَا لَهَا إِنْجَابًا وَ سَلْبًا مَا مَرَّ ه

أَلَّا لَثُمَّ

الْمَشْرُوطَةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِنِي النِّنِي تُحْكُمُ فِيْهَا فِضُرُورَةٍ تُكُوْتِ الْمَحْمُولِ لِلْبَرْضُوعِ أَوْ كَالْبِهِ عُنْهُ

ٱلْبَعْتُ الثَّانِي فِي تَعْقِيقِ الْمَعْصُوْرَاتِ الْأَرْبَعِ

وَ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ الْحَقِيقَةِ وَمُعْلَاهُ أَنَّ كُلُّ مَالُو وُجِدٌ كَانَ جَ مِنَ الْاَفْوَادِ الْمُمُكِنَةِ فَهُوَ مِلْوُرُمُ بَ وَ تَارَةً بِحِسَبِ الْخَارِجِ وَمُعْلَاهُ أَنْ كُلُّ مَا هُو مَلْوُرُمُ جَ فَهُو مَلْوُرُمُ بَ وَ تَارَةً بِحِسَبِ الْخَارِجِ وَمُعْلَاهُ كُلُّ جَمِي الْخَارِجِ وَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِعْتِبَارِينِ كُلُّ جَ فِي الْخَارِجِ وَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِعْتِبَارِ الْأَوْلِ كُلُّ مَنْ الْمُرَبَّعَاتِ فِي الْخَارِجِ لَصَعَ آنَ يَقَالَ كُلُّ مُرَبّع شَكْلُ بِالْإِعْتِبَارِ الْأَوْلِ لَكُونَ النّانِي وَ لَوْلَمُ يُوجَدُ شَيْئُ مِنَ الْمُرَبّعاتِ فِي الْخَارِجِ اللّهُ الْمُربّع اللّهُ اللّهُ كُلُّ مُرَبّع شَكْلُ بِالْإِعْتِبَارِ الْآوَلِ لَكُونَ النّائِي وَ لَوْلَمْ يُوجَدُ مِنَ الْاَشْكَالِ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُربّع لَصَعَ آنَ يُقَالَ كُلُّ شَكْلٍ مُربّع بِالْإِعْتِبَارِ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ الللللّهُ الللللللّهُ اللللللّهُ اللّهُ الللللللّهُ الللللّهُ اللللللللللللللللّهُ الللللللللللللللللللّ

ٱلْبَعْثُ النَّالِثُ فِي الْعُدُولِ وَالتَّعْصِيلِ

٣٥ خَرْفُ السَّلْبِ إِنْ كَانَ جُزْءًا مِنَ الْمُوضُوعِ كُقُولْنِا اللَّحَيُّ جَمَادُ اَوْمِنَ الْمُحَمُولِ كَقُولِنَا اللَّحَيُّ جَمَادُ اَوْمِنَ الْمُحَمُولِ كَقُولِنَا اللَّحَيُّ اللَّهِ عَلَيْ اللَّهِ اللَّهَ اللَّهُ اللْمُنْ الللْمُنْ اللْمُنْ اللْمُولِلْمُ الللْمُولِلْمُ الللْمُولِمُ اللَّهُ اللْمُلْمُ اللَّهُ ال

٣٩ وَ الْإِعْتِبَارُ بِإِنْجَابِ الْقَضِيَّةِ وَ سَلِبِهَا بِالنِّسْبَةِ النَّبُونَيَّةِ وَ السَّلْبِيَّةِ لَا بِطَرْفَي الْقَضِيَّةِ فَإِنَّ قُولُنَا كُنَّ مَا لَيْسَ بِعَيْ فَهُو لَنَا لَا شَيْنَ مِنَ الْمُتَّحَرِّكِ بِسَاكِي مَا لَيْسَ مَعْ وَلَيْ اللَّهُ مَعْ أَنَّ طَرْفَيْهَا عَدَمِيَّانٍ وَقُولُنَا لِاَشْدِيْ مَنِ الْمُتَّحَرِّكِ بِسَاكِي مَا لَيْسَ عَنْ طَرْفَيْهَا وَجُودِيَّانٍ •

٣٧ وُ السَّالِلَةُ الْبَسِيْطَةُ أَمَّ مِنَ الْمُوْجِبَةِ الْمَعْدُولَةِ الْمَعْمُولِ لِصِدْقِ السَّلْبِ عِنْدُ عَدَمِ الْمُوْهُوعِ

المُقَالَةُ الثَّانيَةُ

نِي الْقَضَايَا وَ اَحْكَامِهَا وَ نِيْهَا مُقَدِّمَةً وَتَلْتَهُ نُصُولِ أَمَّا الْمُقَدِّمَةُ فَفِي تَعْرِيْفِ الْقَضِيَّةِ وَ اَتْسَامِهَا الْأُولِيَّةِ .

٣٩ الْقَضِيَّةُ قُولُ يَضِعُ أَنْ يُقَالَ لِقَائِلِهِ إِنَّهُ صَادِقُ فِيْهِ أَوْ كَاذِبُ وَهِي حَمْلِيَّةُ إِنِ الْحَلَّتُ بَطْرَفَيْهَا إِلَى مُفْرَدَيْنَ كَقُولِنَا زَيْدُ عَالِمُ وَزَيْدُ لَيْسَ بِعَالِمِهِ وَشُرْطِيَّةُ أِنْ لَمْ تَنْصَلُ ه

وع وَ الشَّرْطِيَّةُ إِمَّا مُتَّصِلَةً وَهِنِي التَّبِي يُحَكُمُ فِيهَا بِصِدْقِ قَضِيَّةٍ أَوْلاً مِدْقِهَا عَلَى تَقْدِيْرِ مِدْقِ تَضِيَّةٍ أَهُرَى لَكُونَ هُذَا إِنْسَاناً فَهُو جَمَادُ وَ إِمَّا مُنْفَصِلَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِي كَقُولِنَا إِنْ كَانَ هُذَا إِنْسَاناً فَهُو جَمَادُ وَ إِمَّا مُنْفَصِلَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِي كَقُولِنَا إِنْ كَانَ هُذَا إِنْسَاناً فَهُو جَمَادُ وَ إِمَّا مُنْفَصِلَةً وَهِيَ النَّهِي كَقُولِنَا يُخْمَ فِيهَا بِالثَّنَا فِي بَيْنَ الْقَضِيَّتَيْنِ فِي الصِّدْقِ وَالْكِذْبِ مَعًا أَوْ فِي احْدهِمِا فَقَطْ اوْبِنَفْيهِ كَقُولِنَا لِمَا أَنْ يَكُونَ هُذَا الْإِنْسَانُ السَودَ اوْكَاتِبًا هُ إِلَيْسَ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ هُذَا الْإِنْسَانُ السَودَ اوْكَاتِبًا ه

اَلْفَصْلُ الْأُولُ فِي الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَفِيْهِ اَرْبَعَةُ مُبَاحِثَ اَلْبَصْثُ الْأَوْلُ فِي اَجْزَائِهَا وَاتْسَامِهَا *

اع وَالْحَمْلِيَّةُ إِنَّمَا يَنَحَقَّلُ بِالْمُوْمُوعِ وَتُسَمَّى نَسِبْةً حُمْمِيَّةً وَ اللَّفْظُ الدَّالُّ عَلَيْهَا يَسُمَّى وَالْمَعْمُومُ عَلَيْهِ وَيُسَمَّى مُوْمُوعًا وَ الْمُحْمُومُ بِهِ وَيُسَمَّى مُحْمُولًا وَنُسْمَى وَسِبْةً حُمْمِيَّةً وَ اللَّفْظُ الدَّالُّ عَلَيْهَا يُسْمَى وَالْمَعْمُ بَيْ وَاللَّهُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسْمَى وَالْمَعْمُ وَيَعْمَى وَاللَّهُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسْمَى وَالْمَعْمُولُ بِالْمُوفُوعِ وَتُسْمَى وَسِبْةً حُمْمِيَّةً وَ اللَّهُ الدَّالِ عَلَيْهَا الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا اللَّهُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسْمَى الْقَضِيَّةُ حَيْنَانُهِ لِمُسْمَى الْقَضِيَّةُ وَيُسَمِّى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّالَةُ اللَّهُ اللَّ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللِّهُ الللللِّهُ اللللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ الللْمُ الللللْمُ الللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ الللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ الللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللل

وَهُ وَهُوهِ النِّسْبَةُ إِنْ كَانَتْ نِسْبَةً بِهَا يَصِيُّ أَنْ يَقَالُ الِّ الْمُوضُوعَ مَحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ مُوجِبَةً كَقُولَنَا الْإِنْ الْمُوضُوعَ لَيْسَ بِمَحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولَنَا الْإِنْ الْمُوضُوعَ لَيْسَ بِمَحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولَنَا الْإِنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِمَحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولَنَا الْأَنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِمُحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولَنَا الْأَنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِمُحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولَنَا الْأَنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِحَجُر •

سم و مَوْضُوعُ الْحَدْلِيَّةِ إِنْ كَانَ شَخْصًا مُعَيَّنَا سُبِيَتْ مَخْصُوْمَةٌ وَشَخْصِيَّةٌ • وَ اِنْ كَانَ كُلِيًّا فَاِنْ بُيْنَ فِيْهَا كَيْبَا كَيْبَةً أَفْرَادٍ مِا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْحُمْمُ وَيُسَمَّى اللَّفْظُ الدَّالَّ عَلَيْهَا سُوْرًا سُبِّتَ مَخْصُورَةٌ وَ مُسَوَّرَةٌ وَ هِيَ ارْبَعْ وَلَهُ اِنْ بُيْنَ فِيهَا اللَّا الْحُمْمُ عَلَى كُلِّ الْاَفْرَادِ فَهِي كُلِيَّةً وَهِي امّا مُوجِبَةً وَسُورُهَا كُلَّ كُلُّ نَارِ مَا رَبَّ وَ اللَّهُ اللَّ

بِالنَّفَسِّ يُسَمَّى دَاخِلًا فِيَّ جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ كَالْجِشِ النَّامِيْ وَ الْعَشَّاسِ وَ الْمُتَّعَرِّكِ بِا لَإِرَادَةِ النَّالِ عَلَيْهَا الْخَيْوَانُ بِالتَّفَسِّ وَ الْمُتَّعَرِّكِ بِالْإِرَادَةِ النَّالِ عَلَيْهَا الْخَيْوَانُ بِالتَّفَسُّ و

٣٥ وَالْجِنْسُ الْعَالِي جَارُ أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُ قَصْلُ يُقَوِّمُهُ لِجَوَازِ تَرَكِّيهِ مِنْ آمْرَيْنِ مُتَسَاوِيَيْنِ آوُ أَمُورِ مُتَسَاوِيَةِ وَيَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهُ قَصْلُ يُقَوِّمُهُ وَ النَّوْعُ السَّافِلُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهُ قَصْلُ يَقَوِّمُهُ وَالنَّوْعُ السَّافِلُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهَ قَصْلُ يَقَوِّمُهَا وَفُصُولُ تُقَسِّمُهُ • وَالنَّوَسُطَاتُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهَا فَصُولُ تُقَوِّمُهَا وَفُصُولُ تُقَسِّمُهُ • وَالنَّوسُطَاتُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهَا فَصُولُ تُقَوِّمُهَا وَفُصُولُ تُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ تُعَلِيمً وَيُعَلِّمُ السَّافِلَ تُعُويَهُمَ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُن غَيْرِ عَمْسِ كُلِي وَكُلُّ فَصْلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ السَّافِلَ مُن غَيْرِ عَمْسِ كُلِي وَكُلُّ فَصْلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ السَّافِلَ مُن غَيْرِ عَمْسِ كُلِي وَكُلُّ فَصْلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ اللَّافِلَ مُن غَيْرِ عَمْسٍ كُلِي وَكُلُّ فَصْلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ اللَّافِي مِن غَيْرِ عَمْسٍ كُلِي وَكُلُّ فَصْلِ يَقْسِمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَلِمُ السَّافِلَ مُن عَلْمَ عَمْسٍ كُلِي وَلَيْ اللَّهُ اللَّافِلَ مُن عَلْمُ لَا اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّافِلَ مُعْمِلُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ ا

الْفَصْلُ الرَّابِعُ فِي التَّعْرِيْفَاتِ

٣٩ ٱلْمُعْرِفُ لِلشَّيْمِ هُوَالَّذِي يَسْتَلْزِمُ تَصَوَّرُهُ تَصَّورُ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْمِ أَوِامْتِيَارَهُ عَنْ كُلِّ مَا عَدَاهُ ٥ وَهُولاَ يَجُوزُ اللَّيْمِيُ وَ لِلْمَارِفِي وَالشَّيْمُ لَا يُعْلَمُ قَبْلَ الْمُعَرِّفِ وَالشَّيْمُ لَا يُعْلَمُ قَبْلَ لَغُسِهِ وَلاَ اعْمُ

لِقُصُورِ عَنْ إِنَادَةِ النَّعْرِيْفِ وَلَا آخَمُ لِكُونِهِ اخْفَى فَهُو مُسَاوِلُهَا فِي الْعُمُومِ وَ الْخُصُومِ .

٣٧ وُيُسْمَى حَدًّا تَامًا إِنْ كَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ وَالْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيْبَيْنِ • وَحَدًّا نَاقِصًا إِنْ كَانَ بِالْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيْبِ
وَحْدَةً أَوْ بِهِ وَبِالْجِنْسِ الْبَعِيْدِ • وَرَسْنًا تَامًّا إِنْ كَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ الْقَرِيْبِ وَ الْخَاصَّةِ • وَرَسْنًا نَاقِصًا الْ كَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ الْقَرِيْبِ وَ الْخَاصَّةِ • وَرَسْنًا نَاقِصًا الْ كَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ الْبَعِيْدِ •
بِالْخَاصَّةِ وَحْدَهَا آوْبِهُ وَ بِالْجِنْسِ الْبَعِيْدِ •

٣٨ وَ يَجِبُ الْإِخْتِرَارُ عَن تَعْرِيْفِ الشَيْمِ بِمَا يُسَاوِيهِ فِى الْمَعْرِفَةِ وَ الْجَهَالِةِ كَتَعْرِيْفِ الْحَرَكَةِ بِمَا لَيْسَ بِسُكُونِ وَالزَّوْجِ بِمَا لَيْسَ بِقُرْدٍ وَعَن تَعْرِيْفِ الشَّيْمِ بِمَا لَايُعْرَفُ الْأَبِهِ سَوَاةً كَانَ بِمَرْتَبَةً وَاحِدَةً كَمَا يُقَالُ الْمُشَابَةَةُ أَمْ يُقَالُ الْمُشَابَةَةُ الْقَالُ الْمُشَابَةَةُ أَوْبِمَرَاتِبَ كَمَا يُقَالُ الْإَنْ الْمَثَانِ اللَّهَ الْمُقَالُ الْمُشَابِقَةُ الْمُشَابَةَةُ لَمْ يُقَالُ الْمُشَابِقَةُ الْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْ اللَّهُ الْ لَا يَعْلَلُ الْمُشَادِيَانِ هُمَا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْ اللَّهُ الْ لَوْ يَعْلَى الْمُسَالِ اللَّهُ الْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْ لَا يَعْلَلُ الْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّ

وَ اللَّا عَدَمِ كَانَ يَهِنْهُمَا تَبَايِّنَ كُلِيٍّ وَإِن مُدُقاَ مِمَا كَالَّا نُسَّانِ وَالَّا فَرْسِ كَانَ بَيْنَهُمَّا تَبَايُنَ كَلِيٍّ فَرُورَةَ مِدْقِ احَدِ الْهِتَبَايِئِيْنَ مَعَ نَقِيْفِ الْآخَرِ فَقَطْ فَالنَّبَايُنُ ٱلْجُزْئِيُّ لَازِمُّ جَزْمًا •

الوابع

المُعَلَّى بِالْعَقِيقِيِّ فَكُمَا يُقَالُ عَلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُذَكُّورِ الْمُسَتَّى بِالْعَقِيقِيِّ فَكُذَاكِ يُقَالُ عَلَى كُلِّ اَخْصًّ تَخْتَ إِنَمْ مِنَ الْأَلِ قِنَّ كُلَّ جُزْئِي حَقِيقِي فَهُو جُزْئِي إِنسَانِي وَ وَهُو اَعْمُ مِنَ الْأَلِ قِنَّ كُلَّ جُزْئِي حَقِيقِي فَهُو جُزْئِي إِنسَانِي الْمَانِي وَمَانُ اللَّا اللَّهُ إِنْ كُلَّ جُزْئِي الْمُعَلِّقِ عَي الْمُشَجِّصَاتِ وَأَمَّا اللَّا إِنِي كُونَ الْمُحَوَّا وَمُونَ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَوَّاةِ عَي الْمُشَجِّصَاتِ وَأَمَّا اللَّا إِنِي الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَوَّاةِ عَي الْمُشَجِّصَاتِ وَأَمَّا اللَّا إِنِي الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَلِّقِ عَي الْمُعَلِّمِ وَأَمَّا اللَّا إِنْ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَلِّقِ عَلَى الْمُعَلِّمِ وَالْمَانِي وَالْمُعَلِّمِ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّ وَالْمُعَلِّمِ وَالْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعَلِّمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعِلَّمُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعِلَّمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعِلَّمِ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَمِ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَمِ الْمُعْلَمِ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعِلَمِ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَمِ الْمُعْلَمِي الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ

الخامس

- م النَّوْعُ كَمَا يُقَالُ عَلَى مَا ذَكُرْنَا ﴾ وَ يُقَالُ لَهُ النَّوْعُ الْحَقِيْقِيُّ فَكَذَٰلِكَ يُقَالُ عَلَى كُلِ مَاهِيةٍ يُقالُ عَلَى كُلِ مَاهِيةٍ يُقالُ عَلَيْهِ الْجَانُوعُ وَلَا اللَّهُ عَلَيْهَا وَعَلَى عُلْيُوهَا الْجِنْسُ فَيْ جَوابِ مَا هُوَ تُولًا أَرَّلِياً وَ يُسَتَّى النَّوْعَ الْإِضَاقِيُّ •

عمام وَ مَرَاتِبُ الْآجْنَاسِ اَيْضًا هٰذِهِ الْأَرْبَعُ لَكِنَّهِ الْجَدْمُ النَّامِيْ وَالْجِسْمُ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ إِنْ تُلْنَا عِنْسَ الْاَجْوَشُرُ النَّامِيْ وَالْجِسْمُ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ إِنْ تُلْنَا إِنْ النَّامِيْ وَالْجِسْمُ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ إِنْ تُلْنَا إِنْ اللَّهُ وَالْجِسْمُ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ إِنْ تُلْنَا إِنْ اللَّهُ وَمِنَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ إِنْ تُلْنَا إِنْ اللَّهُ وَالْجَوْمُ لَيْسَ اللَّهُ وَالْجَوْمُ لَيْسَ اللَّهُ وَالْجَوْمُ اللَّهُ وَالْجَوْمُ اللَّهُ وَالْجَوْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْمُفْلُولُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَقْلُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْعَلْمُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ

سِم و النَّذِعُ الْإِمَانِيَّ مَوْجُودُ بِدُونِ الْحَقَيْقِيِّ كَالْاَنُواعِ الْمُتَوسِّطَةِ وَالْحَقَيْقِيِّ مُوجُودُ بِدُونِ الْإِمَانِيِّ كَالْاَنُواعِ الْمُتَوسِّطَةِ وَالْحَقَيْقِيِّ مُوجُودُ بِدُونِ الْإِمَانِيِّ كَالْاَنُواعِ الْمُتَوَائِقِ الْبَسِيطَةِ فَلَيْسَ بَيْنَهُمَا عُمُومُ وَ مُحْهُومًى مُطْلَقًا بَلْ كُلُّ مِنْهُمَا اَعُمَّ مِنَ الْآخَرِ مِنْ وَجْهِ لِصِدْقِيما عَلَى النَّوْعِ السَّافِلِ •

مَا وَ جُزْءُ الْمُقُولِ فِي جَوابِ مَاهُو إِنْ كَانَ مَذْكُوزًا بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ يُسَمَّى وَاقِعًا فِي طَرِيقِ مَا هُو كَالْحَيْرَانِ النَّاطِقِ إِلَى مَذْكُوزًا بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ يُسَمَّى وَاقِعًا فِي طَرِيقٍ مَا هُو كَالْحَيْرَانِ النَّاطِقِ الْمُقُولِ فِي جَوَابِ السَّوَالِ بِمَا هُو عَي الْإِنْسَانِ • وَانِ كَانَ مَذْكُوزًا النَّاطِقِ بِالنِّسَانِ • وَانِ كَانَ مَذْكُوزًا

وَ قُفْ يَكُونُ مُنِينَ الْوُجُودِ لِكِنَ لَيُوجُدُ كَالْعَنْقَادِ ، وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْمُوجُودُ مِنْهُ وَ احِداً فَقَطْ مَعَ امْتِنَاعِ غَيْرِهِ كَالْبَارِيْ تَعَالَى أَرْمَعَ إِمْكَانِهِ كَالشَّنْسِ ، وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْمَوْجُودُ مِنْهُ كَثَيْرًا إِمَّا مُتَنَاهِينَا كَالْكُواكِبِ السَّبْعَةِ السَّهَّارَةِ أَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَنَاهِ كَالنَّفُوسِ النَّاطِئَةِ ،

الثاني

٢٩ إِذَا قُلْنَا لِلْعَيْوَانِ مَذَلًا بِاللهُ كُلِيُّ فَهُنَاكَ أَمُورُ ثَلْنَةً الْعَيْوَانُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَهُوَ وَكُونُهُ كُلِيًّا وَالْمُرْتُّ ثَلْنَةً الْعَيْوَانُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَهُو وَكُونُهُ كُلِيًّا وَالْمُرْتُّ وَالْمُرْتُونِ الْمُوجُودِ فِي الْعَالِيَّ وَالْمُلِيَّ الطَّبُعِيُّ الطَّبُعِيُّ مَنْ هُذَا الْعَيْوَانِ الْمُوجُودِ فِي الْعَالِيَ وَجُورُ الْمَوْجُودِ مَوْجُودُ وَ أَمَّا الْمُعَيْوَانِ الْمُوجُودِ فِي الْعَالِيَ وَالْمُؤْوِدِ مَوْجُودُ وَ أَمَّا الْمُنْطِقِ الْمُنْطِقِ وَ الْمُنْطِقِ وَ الْمُنْانِ الْاَحْدُولِ الْمُؤْمُودِ فِيهِ خَارِجُ عَن الْمَنْطِقِ وَ الْمُنْانِ الْاَحْدُولِ الْمُؤْمُودِ فِيهِ خَارِجُ عَن الْمَنْطِقِ وَالْمُؤْمِودُ وَ أَمَّا الْمُنْانِ الْاَحْدُولِ الْمُؤْمُودِ فِيهِ خَارِجُ عَن الْمَنْطِقِ وَالْمُؤْمِدِ وَالْمُلِّي الْمُنْطِقِ وَالْمُؤْمِدِ وَالْمُؤْمِودُ وَالْمُؤْمِ فِيهِ خَارِجُ عَن الْمُنْطِقِ وَالْمُؤْمِدِ وَالْمُؤْمِدِ وَالْمُؤْمِدُودِ الْمُؤْمِدُودِ فِي الْمُنْطِقِيْ وَالْمُؤْمِدُ وَالْمُؤْمِدُودُ فَيْهِ فَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ مُنْ وَالْمُؤْمِدِ فَي الْمُنْطِقِيْ وَالْمُؤْمُودُ وَالْمُؤْمُودُ وَلَالَّامُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ فَا اللَّهُ فَيْ وَالْمُؤْمُودُ وَلَا اللَّهُ فَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ فَالِمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِقِيلُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِنُ وَلَالِهُ الْمُؤْمِقِ وَاللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِلُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِقِ وَالْمُؤْمِلُ وَلَالِمُ اللْمُؤْمِلُ وَلَالَالِهُ اللْمُؤْمِقِ الْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُؤْمِلِ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُؤْمِلِ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُولِ اللْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيلِي الْمُؤْمِلُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُولِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالَمُوالِمُولِ اللْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالِ

ألفًا لِثُ

٢٧ أَلْكُلِيّاً بِ مُنَسَادِبَانِ إِنْ صَدَى كُلَّ وَاحِد مِنْهُمَا عَلَى كُلِّ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَ النَّاطِقِ وَ رَبَيْنَهُمَا عُمُومٌ وَخُصُومً مُطْلُقًا إِنْ مَدَى آحَدُ هُمَا عَلَى كُلِّ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى كُلِّ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى كُلُّ مِنْهُمَا عَلَى بَعْفِ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ كَا لَحَيْرَانِ وَ الْإَيْنَمُ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ فَقَطْ كَالْحَيْرَانِ وَ الْآبِيْفِ وَ وَمُنْبَايِنَانِ إِنْ لَمْ يَضَدُّى شَيْعٌ مِنْهُمَا عَلَى شَيْعٍ مِمَّا يَصَدُى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَ الْقَرْسِ .

 مِالِلَّشْهَةِ إِلَى الْإِنْمَانِ وَقَلْقَةُ الْجُوبَةِ إِنْ كَأَنَ بَهِيْداً بِمَرْقَبَتَيْنِ كَالْجِسْمِ وَ ارْبَعَةُ الْجُوبَةِ إِنْ كَانَ بَهِيْدًا بِثَلْثِ مَوَاتِبَ كَالْجُوهَرِ وَعَلَى لِمُدَا الْقِيَاسُ •

٣٠ وَ إِنْ لَمْ يُكُنُ ثَمَامَ الْجُزْءِ المُشْتَرَكِ بِيَنْهَا وَبِيْنَ نَوْمِ آخَرَ فَلَا بُدَّ أَنْ لاَ يُكُونَ مُشْتَرَكَا أَنْ الْمَاهِلَّةِ وَبَيْنَ نَوْمِ آخَرَ فَلا بُدُ أَنْ لاَ يُكُونَ بَعْضًا مِنْ تَمَامِ الْمُشْتَرِكِ مُسَاوِيًا لَهُ وَ إِلَّا لَكَانَ مُشْتَرَكًا بَيْنَ الْمَاهِلَّةِ وَبَيْنَ نَوْمِ آخَرَ وَلاَ يَجُونُ أَنْ يَكُونَ تُمَامُ الْمُشْتَرِكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ الِيَ ذَلِكُ النَّوْمِ لاَنَّ الْمُقَدَّرَ خِلانَةٌ بَلْ بَعْضَهُ وَلاَ يَنْسَلْمَلُ بَلْ يَنْتَهِي إلى مَا يُسَاوِيْهِ فَي المُشْتَرِكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ النَّيْ فَلِكُ النَّاهِيَّةَ عَنْ مُشَارِكِهَا فِي جِنْسِ أَوْفِي وَجُودٍ فَكُلَّ فَضَلاً • فَعَدُ المَاهِيَّةُ عَنْ مُشَارِكِهَا فِي جِنْسِ أَوْفِي وَجُودٍ فَكُلَّ فَضَلاً •

٢١ وَرَسُمُوهُ بِاللَّهُ كُلِّيُ يُحْمَلُ عَلَى الشَّيْمِ فِي جَوَابِ آبُّ شَيْمٍ هُوَ فِي جَوْهُو فِي خَوْهُو فَا نَعْلَى هَذَا لَوْ تُرَكَّبَ عَلَيْهِ هُوا فِي جَوْهُو فَا فَاللَّهُ مُنَا لَوْ تُرَكَّبُ عَلَيْهُ مِنْ الْمُرَبِّي مُتَسَارِيَةً كَانَ كُلَّ مِنْهُمَا فَصْلًا لَهَا لِأَنَّهُ يُمِيِّزُهَا عَنْ مُشَارِكِهَا فِي الْوُجُودِ • ٢٢ وَ الْفَصْلُ الْمُنَيِّزُ لِلنَّوْعِ عَنْ مُشَارِكِهُ فِي الْجِنْسِ قَرِيْبُ إِنْ مَيَّزَهُ عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسٍ قَرِيْبُ كَا لَيْ الْمَالِي وَ بَعَيْدُ إِنْ مَيَّزُهُ عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسٍ بَعِيْدٍ كَا لَحَسَّاسِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ • فَي الْمُنْ فَي جِنْسٍ بَعَيْدٍ كَا لَحَسَّاسِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ • وَبَعَيْدُ إِنْ مَيْزَةً عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسٍ بَعِيْدٍ كَا لَحَسَّاسِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ • وَبَعَيْدُ إِنْ مَيْرَةً وَيَ جِنْسٍ بَعِيْدٍ كَا لَحَسَّاسِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ وَ بَعَيْدُ إِنْ مَيْرَةً وَيْ جِنْسٍ بَعِيْدٍ كَا لَهُ اللَّالِي وَالْمُولِ وَالْمُولِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمِيْلِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمِيْسِ فَرِيْبُ إِلَيْ اللَّهُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَلَيْمُ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُومِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِولِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَلَا لَمُنْ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُوالِمُوالْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالِمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُوالِمُ

٣٣ وَ أَمَّا النَّالِثُ فِإِنِ امْتَنَعَ انْفَكَاكُهُ عَيِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ فَهُو اللَّازِمُ وَ اللَّا فَهُو الْعَرْضُ الْمُفَارِقُ وَ اللَّازِمُ قَدْ يَكُونُ لَازِمًا لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ كَالرَّوْجَيَّةِ لِلْاَرْبَعَةِ وَهُو النَّابِيِّ وَ هُو النَّانِي يَكُونُ تَصُوَّرُ لا مَعْ تَصَوِّرُ مَلْوُومِهِ كَا نَيْنَا فَيْ يَكُونُ لازِمًا للْمَاهِيَّةِ كَالزَّوْجِ بَيْنَهُمَا كَالْاَنْقِسَامِ بِمُنْسَاوِييْنِ للْاَرْبَعَةِ وَ اللَّا غَيْرَبَيْنِ تَصُوِّرِ مَلْوُومِ بَيْنَهُمَا اللَّي وَسَطَ كَتَسَاوِي الزَّوَايَا التَّلْفِ لِلْقَائِمَتَيْنِ لِلْمُنَلِّثِ وَقَدْيِقَالُ وَهُو النَّانِ اللَّهُ فِي بِاللَّرُومِ بَيْنَهُمَا الِي وَسَطَ كَتَسَاوِى الزَّوَايَا الثَّلْفِ لِلْقَائِمَتَيْنِ لِلْمُنْلَثِ وَقَدْيِقَالُ وَهُو النَّالِي عَلَى اللَّهِ فَي بِاللَّرُومِ بَيْنَهُمَا الْنِي وَسَطَ كَتَسَاوِى الرَّوَايَا الثَّلْفِ لِلْقَائِمَتَيْنِ لِلْمُنْلَثِ وَقَدْيِقَالُ وَهُو النَّذِي عَلَى اللَّوْمِ النَّذِي الْمَنْفَالِقُ إِللَّهُ مِن تَصَوِّرِ مَلْوُومِ تَصَوَّرُهُ وَ الْآوَلُ الْمَالِي اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ فَالْمَالِكُومُ اللَّهُ الْمَالِكُونُ اللَّهُ فَي اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمَالِقُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمَالُولُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمَعْلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمَالِقُ اللَّهُ اللَّاللَّيْسُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْعُلُولُ اللَّهُ اللَّالَةُ الْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّ

٢١٠ وَكُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ اللَّزِمِ وَ الْمُفَارِقِ إِنِ اخْتُصَّ بِاقْرَادِ حَقِيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً فَهُوَ الْعَاصَّةُ كَالصَّاحِكِ وَ إِلَّا فَهُوَ الْعَاصَّةُ كَالْمَاحِكِ وَ اللَّهُ فَا كُلِيَّةً مُقُولَةً عَلَى مَا تَحْتَ حَقَيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً فَقَطْ فَوْلاً عَرْضِيًّا وَالْعَرْضُ الْعَامُّ كِلِيَّةً مُقُولًا عَلَى الْمُوادِ حَقَيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً وَ غَيْرِهَا قُولاً عَرْضِيًّا فَالْكَلِيَّاتُ إِذَن خَمْسَةً نَوْعً وَجِنْسُ وَالْعَرْضُ الْعَامُ فِي الْمُوادِ حَقَيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً وَ غَيْرِهَا قُولاً عَرْضِيًّا فَالْكَلِيَّاتُ إِذَن خَمْسَةً نَوْعً وَجِنْسُ وَ فَصْلُ وَخَامَةً وَعَرْضُ عَامً •

اَلْفُصْلُ الثَّالِثُ فِي مَبَاحِثِ الْكُلِّيِ وَ الْجُزْئِي وَهِي خَمْسَةً الْفُصْلُ الثَّالِثُ فِي خَمْسَةً

ٱلْأُولَ اللَّهِ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الرُّجُودِ فِي الْخَارِجِ لاَ لِنَفْسِ مَفْهُومِ اللَّفَظِ كَشَرِيْكِ البّارِي عَزَّ السُّمَّةِ اللَّهُ عَذْ يَكُونُ مُنْتَنَعَ الرُّجُودِ فِي الْخَارِجِ لاَ لِنَفْسِ مَفْهُومِ اللَّفَظِ كَشَرِيْكِ البّارِي عَزَّ السُّمَّة

هُ إِنْ لَمْ يُغْرَكَ مُوطُوعُهُ إِلْالًا يُسَمِّلُ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَيْهِ حَقِيقَةً وَ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْمَنْقُولِ إِلَيْهِ مَجِّارًا كَالْسَدِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْحَيْوَانِ الْمُقْتَرِسِ وَالرَّجُلِ الشَّبَاعِ .

١١ و كُلُّ لَفَظِ فَهُو بِالنِّشْبَةِ إِلَىٰ لَفُظٍ آخَرَ مُوَادِفُ لَهُ إِنْ تَوَافَقًا فِي الْمَعْنَى وَمُبَايِنُ لَهُ إِنِ

اَلْفُصْلُ الثَّانِي • فِي الْمُعَانِي الْمُفْرَدَةِ

١٦ كُل مَفْهُوْمٍ فَهُو جُزْمُي إِنْ مَنْعَ نَفْسُ تَصَوَّرٍ عَنْ وُقُوْعِ الشِّرْكَةِ فِيْهِ وَكُلِّي إِنْ لَمْ يَمْنُعْ وَاللَّفْظُ النَّالُ عُلَيْهِما يُسَمَّى جُزْئِيا و كُلِّياً بِالعَرْضِ .
 الدَّالُ عُلَيْهِما يُسَمَّى جُزْئِيا و كُلِياً بِالعَرْضِ .

الله وَ الْكُلِّي إِمَّا اَنْ يَكُونَ تَمَامَ مَاهِيَّةِ مَا تَحْتُهُ مِنَ الْجُزْئِيَّاتِ أَو دَاخِلًا فِيهَا اوْ خَارِجًا عَلْهَا وَ الْأُولُ هُوَ النَّوْعُ سَوَاءً كَانَ مُتَعَدِّدُ الْاَشْخَاصِ وَهُو الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُو بِحَسْبِ الشِّرْكَةِ وَ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ مَعًا كَالْإِنسَانِ أَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَعَدِّدِ الْاَشْخَاصِ وَهُو الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُو بِحَسْبِ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ الْحَقْةَ كَالشَّمْسِ كَالْإِنسَانِ أَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَعَدِّدِ الْاَشْخَامِ وَهُو الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُو بِحَسْبِ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ الْحَقْفَةِ كَالشَّمْسِ فَهُو إِنْنَ كُلِّي مَقُولُ عَلَى وَ احدٍ أَوْ عَلَى كَثَيْرِينَ مُنْفَقِينَ بِالْحَقَائِقِ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُو .

١٨ وَ إِنْ كَانَ النَّانِيْ فَإِنْ كَانَ تَمَامَ الْجُزْءِ الْمُشْتَرِكِ بَيْنَهَا وَ بَيْنَ نَوْعِ آخَرَ فَهُو الْمَقَرَّلُ فِي جَوَابِ
مَا هُوْبِعَسْبِ الشِّرِكَةِ الْنَعْضَةِ وَيُصَمَّى جِنْسًا وَ رَسَّمُوا بِآنَهُ كُلِيٍّ مَقُولُ عَلَى كَثَيْرِيْنَ مُغْتَلِفِيْنَ بِالْحَقَائِقِ

19 وَهُوَ قُرِيْبُ إِن كَانَ الْجَوَابُ عَنِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ وَهِنَ بَعْضِ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ هُوَ الْجَوَابُ عُنْهَا وَعَنْ كُلِّ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ هُوَ الْجَوَابُ عُنْهَا وَعَنْ كُلِّ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ هُوَ الْجَوَابُ عُنْهَا وَعَنْ كُلِّ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ بَعْضِ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ الْبَحْضِ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا نِيهِ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ الْبَعْضِ النَّحْرِ وَيَكُونُ هُذَاكَ جُوَّابِكِي إِنْ كَانَ بَمِيدًا بِمَرْتَبَةً وَ احْدَةً كَالْجِشْمِ النَّامِي عَنْهُ وَالْمَدِيْ الْبَعْضِ النَّعْمِ النَّامِي النَّامِي اللَّهُ الْجَوْدِ الْمُعْلِي اللَّهُ مِنْ الْمُعْلِي اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى النَّامِي اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِلْمُ الْمُعْلِمِ الْمُعْلِقِيلِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمِ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ ال

تَقديمُ الآولِ عَلَى النَّانِي وَضَعَالِتَقَدَّمِ النَّصَوْرِ عَلَى النَّصْدِيْقِ طَبَعًا لِأَنَّ كُلَّ تَصْدِيْقِ لِبَدْنِيْهِ مِنْ تَصَوَّرِ الْمَعْنُومِ عَلَيْهِ بذَاتِهِ أَوْبِا مْرِصَا دِي عَلَيْهِ وَ الْمَحْقُومُ بِهِ كَذَٰ لِكَ وَ الْحَيْمُ لِإِ مَتِنَا عِ الْعُكُم مِثَنْ جَهِلَ ٱحَد هَٰذِهِ ٱلْاُمُورِ •

أَمَّا الْمَقَالاَتُ فَثَلْثُ * الْاوْلَى فِي الْمُفْرَداتِ وَفِيْهَا أَرْبِعَةُ فُصُولٍ الْفُصُلُ الْأَوْلُ فِي الْاَلْقَاظ

و ذَلِلَةُ اللَّفْظِ عَلَى المَعْنَى بِتَرَسُّطِ الْوَفْعِ لَهُ مُطْابِقَةً كُذَ لاَلَةِ الْإِنسَانِ عَلَى الْحَيْوَانِ النَّاطِقِ وَبِتَوَسُّطِهِ لِمَا وَحَمْلَ الْمَالِ عَلَى الْحَيْوَانِ النَّاطِقِ وَبِتَوَسُّطِهِ لِمَا خَرَجَ عَنْهُ الْتَزَامُ كَدَلاَئَتِهِ عَلَى قَابِلِ الْعَلْمِ وَصَنْعَةَ الْعَلَائِةَ .
 و يُشْتَرَطُ فِي الدَّلاَئَةِ الْانْتَزَامِيَّةً كُونُ الْخَارِجِيِّ بِحَالَةً يَلْزُمُ مِنْ تَصُورِ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الدَّلاَئِةِ الْإِنْتَزَامِيَّةً كُونُ الْخَارِجِيِّ بِحَالَةً يَلْزُمُ مِنْ تَصُورِ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الْخَارِجِ تَحَقَّقُهُ فَيْهِ وَ إِلَّا لَامْتَلَعُ فَهُمُهُ مِنَ اللَّفَظِ وَ لَا يُشْتَرَطُ فِيهَا كُونَهُ بِحَالَةً يَلْزُمُ مِنْ تُحَقِّقِ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الْخَارِجِ تُحَقَّقُهُ فَيْهِ كَوْنَهُ بِحَالَةً يَلْزُمُ مِنْ تُحَقِّقِ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الْخَارِجِ تُحَقَّقُهُ فَيْهِ كَوْنَهُ بِحَالَةً يَلْزُمُ مِنْ تُحَقِّقِ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الْخَارِجِ تُحَقَّقُهُ فَيْهِ كَوْنَهُ بِحَالَةً يَلْزُمُ مِنْ تُحَقِّقِ الْمُسَمَّى فِي الْجَارِجِ تُحَقَّقُهُ فَيْهِ كَوْنَهُ بِعَلَالِهِ يَلْمُ الْمَعْقِ الْمُعْلَاقِ لَالْمَالِقِي عَلَى الْبَصِرِ مَعَ عَدَمِ الْمُلازَمَّة بَيْلُهُمْ فِي الْخَارِجِ .

١٢ وَ الدَّالَ بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ إِنْ قُصِدَ بِجُرْتُهِ الدَّلاَ لَةُ عَلَى جُزْءِ مَعْنَاءُ فَهُوَ الْمُرَكَّبُ كُرَامِي الْحِجَارَةِ وَ إِلاَّ فَهُوَ الْمُرَكِّبُ كُرَامِي الْحِجَارَةِ وَ إِلَّا فَهُوَ الْمُؤْدِدُ وَ فَهُوَ الْمُؤْدِدُ وَ مُعَنَاء فَهُوَ الْمُؤْدِدُ وَ مُعَنَاء عَلَى مَعْنَاء مَلَحَ لِذَٰلكِ فَانِ دَلَّ بَعِيْنَتِه عَلَى وَهُ وَ إِنْ مُلَحَ لِذِلكِ فَانِ دَلَّ بَعِيْنَتِه عَلَى وَمُ الْمُؤْدِدُ وَهُو الْمُؤْدِدُ وَ إِنْ لَمْ يُدُلِّ فَهُو الْإِسْمُ .

في ثُبَيّه و كِتَابِيّه و مُلْتَزِمًا إِنْ لا أَخِلَّ بِشَيْنِي يُعَلَّدُهِ و مَعَ زِيادَاتِ شُويْفَة و نَكْتِ لَطَيْفَة مِنْ عِنْدي و مُنْبِعًا للْعَقِ الصَّرِيْمِ الَّذِي لاَيَاتِيهِ الْبَاطِلُ مِنْ بَيْنِ يَدَبِهِ لاَ مَنْ خَلْفَة و وَسَّنَيْتُهُ بِالرِسَالَة مَنْرِكًا لِلتَّقْلَيْدِ و مُنْبِعًا للْعَقِ الصَّرِيْمِ اللَّهِ الْبَاطِلُ مِنْ بَيْنِ يَدَبِهِ لاَ مَنْ خَلْفَة و وَسَّنَيْهُ بِالرِسَالَة الشَّيْمِ وَ فَلْ مِنْ وَلِي الْفَقْلِ و وَمُتَولِلاً عَلَى وَجُودِهِ النَّفْيْفِ للْغَيْرِ وَ الْعَدْلِ و إِنَّهُ خَيْرُ مُونِي و مُعَيْنِ و النَّذُونِيقِ مِن وَاهِبِ الْعَقْلِ و وَمُتَولِلاً عَلَى وُجُودِهِ النَّفْيْفِ للْغَيْرِ وَ الْعَدْلِ و إِنَّهُ خَيْرُ مُونِي وَمُعِيْنِ و النَّذُونِيقِ مِن وَاهِبِ الْعَقْلِ و وَمُتَولِلاً عَلَى وُجُودِهِ النَّفْيْفِ للْغَيْرِ وَ الْعَدْلِ و إِنَّهُ خَيْرُ مُونِي و مُعَيْنِ و النَّولِي فَي مَاهِيّةِ الْمَنْطِقِ وَبِيلِ الْحَيْلِ الْمَعْنَى وَالْمِي الْعَيْرِ وَ الْعَدْلِ وَالْمَالِ الْمُعْتَى وَبَيلِ الْحَالِ الْمَعْدِي وَالْمَالُ الْمُعْرَاقِ وَهُو حُصُولُ صُورَةِ الشَيْمِ فِي الْعَقْلِ اوْ تَصَوّرُ مَعَهُ حُمْ وَهُو الْهَالُولُ الْمَ الْمُعْرِقُ وَيَعْلِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَيَعْلِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَيُعْلِ الْمُعْلِقِ وَالْمُلُولِ الْمُعْرِقِ وَالْمَالُ الْمُعْلِقُ وَمُوالِقُولُ اللَّهِ الْمُعْلِقُ وَلَا اللَّهُ الْمُعْرَاقِ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْرَاقِ اللَّهُ الْمُعْرِقُ وَالْمَالُولُ الْمُعْرَاقِ اللَّهُ اللَّهِ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِ الْمُعْلِ وَيُعْلِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِ وَالْمُعْلِ الْمُعْلِ وَالْمُ الْمُعْلِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِيْلِي الْمُعْلِمِ الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِمِ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُع

ع وَ لَيْسُ الْكُلُّ مِنْ كُلِّ مِنْهُمَا بَدِيْهِيًّا وَ إِلَّا لَمَا جَهِلْنَا شَيْئًا وَلاَ نَظْرِيًّا وَ الْأَلْدَارَ أَوْ تَسَلْسَلَ .

٥ بَلِ الْبَعْضُ مِنْ كُلِّ مِنْهُما بَدْيِهِي وَ الْبَعْضُ نَظْرِي يَخْصُلُ مِنْهُ بِالْفَكْرِ وَهُو تَرْتِيبُ امُورِ مَعْلُومَةً لِلْنَادَى اللهَ الْبَعْضُ مِنْ كُلِّ مِنْهُما بَدْيِهِي وَ الْبَعْضُ نَظْرِي يَخْصُلُ مِنْهُ بِالْفَكْرِ وَهُو تَرْتِيبُ امُورِ مَعْلُومَةً لِلنَّادَى الْبَاتَضَ الْعَلَادِ بَعْضَا فِي مُقْتَضَى أَفْكَارِهِم بَلِ الْاَنْسَانُ الْوَاحِدُ يُنَاتِفُ نَفْسَهُ فِي وَقَنَيْنِ فَمَسَّتُ الْحَاجَةُ الْمِل قَانُونِ يُفِيدُ مَعْوِفَةً طُرُقِ اكْتَسَابِ النَّظْرِيَّاتِ مِن الشَّوْرِ الْوَاحِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَ رَسَمُوهُ بِاللَّهُ قَانُونِيَّةً مِن الْفَكْرِ الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَ رَسَمُوهُ بِاللَّهُ قَانُونِيَّةً قَانُونِيَّةً مَنْ الْفَكُر الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَرَسَمُوهُ بِاللَّهُ قَانُونِيَّةً قَانُونِيَّةً مَا الْفَكُر الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَرَسَمُوهُ بِاللَّهُ قَانُونِيَّةً قَانُونِيَّةً وَعَلَيْهِ فَيْهِا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَرَسَمُوهُ بِاللَّهُ قَانُونِيَّةً وَالْمَالِقُ اللهُ مَنْ النَّالُونِيَّةُ مَنْ الْفَكُورُ الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَرُسُوهُ بِاللَّهُ قَانُونِيَّةً وَيْ الْمُونِ اللَّهُ مَا الْفَالِدِي عَلَيْهِ اللْمُ الْوَلِي الْفَالِدِي الْفَاقِلَةُ اللْفَاقِيْرِ الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمُنْطِقُ وَرَسُوهُ بِاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ مَا الْفَاقِلُ اللْمُ الْقَالُونِي الْفَاقِلُولُ الْوَاقِعِ الْفَاقِلَةُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ وَالْمُنْ عَلَى الْفَاقِلُ فَي الْفَاقِلُولُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُنْطِقُ الْمُ الْمُنْ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُنْ عَلَيْهُ اللْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِ

٩٠ وَلَيْسَ كُلُهُ بَدِينِينًا وَ إِلَّا لَاسْتُغَذِي عَنْ تَعَلَّمُهُ وَلاَ نَظْرِيًّا وَ اللَّا لَذَارَ أَوْ تَسْلَسُلَ بِلَ بِعَضُهُ بَدِينِيٍّ وَبَعْضُهُ وَلَا نَظْرِيًّ وَاللَّا لَذَارَ أَوْ تَسْلَسُلَ بِلَ بِعَضُهُ بَدِينِيٍّ وَبَعْضُهُ

ألبعث الثاني في موضوع السَّطْقِ

٧ مَوْضُوعُ كُلِّ عِلْمٍ مَا يَبْخَتُ فِيهِ عَنْ عَوَارِضِهِ النَّي تَلْحَقُهُ لَما هُو هُو اَيْ لِذَاتِهِ اوْ لِجُزْنُهِ اوْ لِمِايسَاوِيهِ وَ وَمَوْضُوعُ النَّاعِ النَّمَعُومُ النَّاعُومُ النَّامُ النَّاعُومُ النَّاعُومُ النَّاعُومُ النَّاعُومُ النَّاعُ النَّومُ النَّاعُ النَّاعُومُ النَّاعُ اللَّاعُ اللَّاعُ النَّاعُ اللَّاعُ اللَّاعُلُومُ اللَّاعُ اللَّامُ اللَّامُ اللَّامُ اللَّاعُ اللَّامُ اللَّاعُ اللَّامُ ال

٨ وَ قُدْ جَرِتِ الْعَادَةُ بِأَنْ يُسَمُّو الْمُوصِلَ إِلَى النَّصَوُّرِ قُولًا شَارِحًا وَالْمُوصِلَ الِّي النَّصْدِيقِ حُجَّةً وَ يَجِبُ

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الْعَنْدُ لِلهِ الدَّيْ آبَدَعَ نِظَامَ الْوَجُودِ وَ اخْتَرَعَ مَاهِيَّاتِ الْشَيَاءِ بِمُقْتَضَى الْوُجُودِ وَ انشَا بِعُدْرَتِهِ انْوَاعِ الْمُعْلِيَّةِ وَ الصَّلُوةُ عَلَى ذَوَاتِ الْاَنْفُسِ الْقَدْسِيَّةِ وَ الصَّلُوةُ عَلَى ذَوَاتِ الْاَنْفُسِ الْقَدْسِيَّةِ وَ الصَّلُوةُ عَلَى ذَوَاتِ الْاَنْفُسِ الْقَدْسِيَّةِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ الْمُعْجَزِيْتِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَالْمِيْنِ لَلْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَالْمِيْنِ وَالْمُعْرِقِيْقِ اللَّهِ وَالْمِيْنِ لَلْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَالْمُعْرِقِيْنِ وَالْمِيْنِ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَالْمِيْنِ وَالْمِيْنِ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ وَالْمِيْنِ الْمُعْجِزِيْتِ الْمُعْجِزِيْتِ وَالْمِيْنِ وَالْمِيْنِ الْمُعْجِزِيْتِ الْمُعْجِزِيْتِ وَالْمِيْنِ الْمُعْجِزِيْتِ وَالْمِيْنِيْنِ الْمُعْرِقِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْرِقِيْنِ الْمُعْجِزِيْتِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعِلْمِيْنِ الْمُعْمِلِيْنِ الْمُعْمِيْنِ الْمُعِيْمِيْنِ

م و بَعْدُ فَلَمّا كَانَ بِالْفِعْتِي اهْلِ الْعَقْلِ و وَاطْبَاتِ دُوى الْفَصْلِ و أَنَّ الْعَقْمَ الْسَعْدَ الْمَلْوَ الْمَلْكِيةِ و وَ نَفَسَهُ اَسْرَعُ الْبَعْدِينِ الْمَلْكِيةِ و وَ نَفَسَهُ اَسْرَعُ الْتَعْلَقِ الْمَلْكِيةِ و وَ الْمَلْوِينِ الْمَلْمِ الْمَلْمِينِ و وَ الْمَلْمِ الْمَلْمِينِ و وَ الْمَلْمِينِ و الْمَلْمِينِ و وَ الْمَلْمُ الْمَلْمِينِ و وَ مَلَ الْمَلْمِ الْمُلْمِينِ و وَ الْمَلْمِينِ و وَ الْمُلْمِينِ و وَ الْمُلْمِينِ و وَ الْمُلْمِينِ و وَ الْمَلْمِينِ و وَ الْمُلْمِينِ و مُحَدِّدِ الْمُلْمِينِ و الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمِينِ و الْمُلْمِينِ و الْمُلْمِينِ و الْمُلْمِينِ و الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمِينِ و الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمِينِ الْمُلْمُلْمِينِ الْ

قال الويس اسفرنجر التيرولي قال مصنف نفائس المآثر مولانا نجم الدين كاتبي قزريني كه حكيم متبعر است و در حكمت شاگرد اثير الدين ابهري است شرح تلخيص و شرح محصل و حكمت عين و رسالة شمسيه و جامع الدقائق از مصنفات اوست و فاتش روزجمعه ثالث رجب سنة خمس و سبعين و ستمائة

الذيل الاول وفيه رسالتان في علم المنطق الرسالة الاولى وهي الرسالة الشمسية لنجم الدين ابن بكربن علي بن عمر الكاتبي بن عمر الكاتبي القزويني

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